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This  study  explores  the  views  of  the  peak  level  industrial  and  labour  organisations 
towards  government  social  policy  after  the  publication  of  the  Beveridge  Report  in 
1942.  The  reform  of  state  welfare  in  the  1940s  meant  that  employers  and  trade  unions 
became  more  involved  in  the  administration  than  in  the  provision  of  social  services. 
The  process  entailed  a  greater  role  for  the  Trades  Union  Congress,  the  British 
Employers'  Confederation  and  the  Federation  of  British  Industries  in  the  formulation 
of  state  social  policy.  This  is  a  hitherto  neglected  aspect  of  their  relations  with 
government.  Labour  and  business  historians  have  paid  little  attention  to  trade  union 
and  industrial  views  on  social  policy  after  the  second  world  war  while  historians  of 
the  welfare  state  have  neglected  the  participation  of  these  particular  interest  groups  in 
the  formation  of  welfare  policy. 
This  thesis  explores  the  attitudes  of  these  groups  towards  the  post-1945  welfare 
state  from  1942  until  1964.  It  does  so  in  the  context  of  two  widely-discussed 
approaches  to  government  policy  making  that  hold  the  potential  to  explain  the 
influences  behind  policy  after  the  war:  namely  corporatism  and  consensus. 
These  concepts  are  herein  applied  to  a  range  of  areas  of  welfare  -  social  security, 
pensions,  the  National  Health  Service  and  state  education  -  in  which  the  TUC,  BEC 
and  FBI  demonstrated  a  level  of  interest.  While  being  of  some  relevance  in  relation  to 
particular  areas  of  policy  and  and  specific  points  in  time,  these  approaches  have  a 
limited  ftinction  in  explaining  government  consultation  of  primarily  industrial 
interests  on  social  policy  matters.  Corporate  bias  may  help  to  explain  why 
consultation  took  place  but  offers  little  understanding  in  those  instances  where  it  did 
not.  A  search  for  a  wider  welfare  consensus  reaching  outside  the  political  party  arena 
is  similarly  flawed  as  the  theory  seeks  to  generalise  and  impose  uniform  patterns  of 
policy-making  where  none  existed.  If  the  consenualists  continue  to  adhere  to  the 
notion  that  the  involvement  of  economic  interests  in  policy  making  was  a  product  of 
consensus  politics,  it  must  now  seek  to  examine  the  impact  of  these  interests  on  the 
policy-making  process.  In  the  same  vein,  corporate  theorists  might  look  to  other 
policy  areas  outwith  the  industrial  and  economic  sphere  in  order  to  explore  the  wider 
application  of  their  findings. Contents 
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ii Chqpter  One:  Introduction 
This  is  a  study  of  the  social  policies  of  the  peak  level  representative  groups  of  the 
trade  union  movement  and  organised  industry  in  Britain  between  1942  and  1964  and 
their  relationship  with  government  in  this  sphere  of  policy-making.  The  Trades 
Union  Congress  (TUC),  founded  in  1868,  was  the'central  organisation  for  trade 
unions,  while  industrial  representation  was  divided  fourfold.  The  Federation  of 
British  Industries  (FBI),  established  in  1916,  was,  according  to  Stephen  Blank,  the 
foremost  industrial  body.  '  Its  capacity  to  represent  industry,  however,  was  shared 
with  the  National  Union  of  Manufacturers  (NUM),  the  National  Confederation  of 
Employers'  Organisations  (NCEO)  which  was  set  up  by  the  employers'  federations  in 
1919,  and  later  changed  its  name  to  the  British  Employers'  Confederation  (BEC)  in 
1939,  and  the  Association  of  British  Chambers  of  Commerce  (ABCC)  which  was,  in 
fact,  the  first  of  these  organisations,  having  been  formed  in  1860.  In  terms  of  activity 
in  the  social  policy  arena,  the  BEC  was  most  important,  having  responsibility  for 
monitoring  provision  in  social  security,  pensions  and  certain  aspects  of  education,  and 
the  FBI  was  also  interested  in  education  policy.  Otherwise,  there  is  no  indication  that 
the  NUM  paid  any  attention  to  social  policy,  while  the  Chambers  of  Commerce's 
involvement  was  iffegular. 
Co-operation  between  government,  industry  and  the  trade  union  movement, 
together  with  the  impetus  offered  to  social  policy,  are  widely  regarded  as  important 
features  of  the  years  1939-1945.  '  The  connection  between  the  two  has  received  little 
1S  Blank,  Industry  andgovernment,  p.  6. 
2K  Middlemas,  Power,  competition  and  the  state,  vol.  1,  ch.  1;  K  Morgan,  The  people's  peace,  p.  13;  D 
Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945  (1997),  p.  16;  GC  Peden,  British  economic  and  socialpolicy 
(199  1),  p.  119;  S  Blank,  Industiy  and  government,  p.  32  have  highlighted  improvements  in  relations.  R 
I detailed  attention  even  though  substantial  welfare  reform  looked  likely  to  impinge 
upon  the  objectives  of  occupational  and  trade  union  welfare  schemes:  labour 
discipline  and  the  retention  of  workers/members.  During  the  war  trade  union 
membership  grew  substantially  as  did  government  recognition  of  the  labour 
movement.  3  Ernest  Bevin,  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Transport  and  General 
Workers  Union  was  appointed  Minster  of  Labour  when  Churchill  invited  the  Labour 
Party  to  fonn  a  Coalition  government,  and  the  Trades  Union  Congress  was  consulted 
on  a  par  with  the  Federation  of  British  Industries  and  the  British  Employers' 
Confederation  after  1941.  In  1945,  collaboration  with,  and  consultation  of,  these 
interest  groups  was  viewed  positively,  and  certain  govermnent  policies,  such  as  the 
employment  policy  outlined  in  the  1944  White  Paper,  presumed  that  co-operation 
would  continue  in  order  to  ensure  their  effectiveness.  4 
A  substantial  number  of  monographs  have  examined  the  evolution  of  both  state- 
interest  group  relations  and  the  postwar  welfare  state,  but  there  are  no  detailed  studies 
of  the  relationship  between  these  two  phenomena.  '  As  Noel  Whiteside  notes,  '[s]ocial 
Titmuss,  Problems  ofsocial  policy,  D  Fraser,  The  evolution  ofthe  British  weý(are  state  (1984),  p.  207; 
P  Addison,  The  road  to  1945  (1998),  p.  121  identify  the  stimulating  effects  of  war  on  social  policy. 
3S  Beer,  Modern  British  politics,  p.  214;  L  Minkin,  The  contentious  alliance,  p.  54;  H  Pelling,  The 
history  ofBritish  trade  unionism  (1985),  p.  211;  Membership  reached  8.8m  in  1945,  and  increased 
further  to  9.53m  in  195  1.  Figures  from  H  Clegg,  A  history  ofBritish  trade  unions  since  1889,  vol.  111, 
r.  293. 
L  Minkin,  'Radicalism  and  reconstruction',  p.  179;  W  Paynter,  British  trade  unions,  p.  84;  H  Pefling, 
The  history  ofBritish  trade  unionism  (1985),  p.  211;  M  Sullivan,  The  politics  ofsocialpolicy,  p.  8;  K0 
Morgan,  The  people's  peace,  pp.  114;  S  Beer,  British  politics  in  the  collectivist  age  (1965),  pp.  189- 
200. 
'  There  are  several  comprehensive  studies  of  the  postwar  welfare  state  including  R  Lowe,  The  welfare 
state  in  Britain  since  1945;  H  Glennerster,  British  socialpolicy  since  1945;  M  Sullivan,  The 
development  ofthe  British  we4(are  state;  M  Hill,  The  welfare  state  in  Britain,  J  Brown,  The  British 
wel(are  state;  P  Gregg,  The  welfare  state;  N  Timmins,  Thefive  giants.  State  relations  with  industry  and 
trade  unions  are  explored  in  the  following:  P  Barberis  &T  May,  Government,  industry  andpolitical 
economy,  D  Barnes  &E  Reid,  Governments  and  trade  unions;  S  Beer,  Modern  British  politics;  S 
Blank  Industry  andgovernment,  N  Harris,  Competition  and  the  corporate  society  K  Middlemas, 
Politics  in  industrial  society  and  Power,  competition  and  the  state:  vol.  I;  B  Pimlott  &C  Cook,  eds., 
Trade  unions  in  British  politics;  R  Taylor,  The  trade  union  question  in  British  politics. 
2 policy  and'industrial  relations  are  rarely  studied  together'.  6  This  link  has  been 
established  in  fact  in  the  concept  of  the  'postwar  settlement',  though  only  implicitly.  7 
In  this  reading  of  postwar  British  history,  it  is  generally  believed  that  both  Labour  and 
Conservative  governments  accepted  responsibility  for  maintaining  high  levels  of 
employment  and  a  range  of  welfare  services  in  return  for  wage  restraint.  8  Thus, 
Bryan  Turner  argues  that  welfare  refonn  was  'a  consequence  of  bargains  developed 
between  labour  and  capital  under  the  auspices  of  extended  state  intervention  in 
wartime  conditions'.  9  For  Lewis  Minkin,  in  his  study  of  the  Labour  Party  and  the 
unions,  '[tlhe  unions'  ... 
imprint  lay  on  many  key  features  of  the  post-war  settlement. 
It  was  there  in  the  initiative  which  led  to  the  Beveridge  enquiry  and  there  also  in 
Bevin's  push  for  the  preservation  of  full  employment.  "O  ý 
What  is  lacking  in  these  accounts  is  a  detailed  exposition  of  employers'  and  trade 
unions'  contribution  to  social  policy  formulation.  There  is  a  tendency  to  allocate 
passive  roles  to  both  the  trade  union  movement  and  capital  in  the  making  of  the 
welfare  state  after  1945;  it  is  presumed  that  the  mere  strength  and  size  of  the  TUC,  or 
its  bargaining  power  in  wages  policy,  influenced  the  direction  of  social  policy.  It  is 
argued  here  that  without  greater  knowledge  of  the  TUC's  objectives  in  relation  to 
welfare,  and  the  role  of  its  industrial  counterparts,  it  is  not  possible  to  judge  the 
significance  of  the  'postwar  settlement'  from  the  perspective  of  these  participants. 
6N  Whiteside,  'The  politics  of  the  "social"  and  the  "industrial"  wage',  p.  122. 
7P  Dorey,  The  Conservative  Party  and  the  trade  unions,  p.  40;  J  Cronin,  The  politics  ofstate 
expansion,  p.  15;  R  Taylor,  'Industrial  relations',  p.  94. 
8G  Dorfman,  Wage  politics  in  Britain,  p.  5  1;  H  Glennerster,  British  socialpolicy,  p.  11. 
9B  Turner,  Citizenship  and  capitalism,  p.  69,  cited  by  R  Taylor,  'Industrial  relations',  p.  94. 
10  L  Minkin,  The  contentious  alliance,  p.  77. 
3 The  TUC's  activities,  and  those  of  employers  in  the  area  of  social  welfare,  have 
attracted  quite  a  lot  of  attention  with  respect  to  the  period  before  1939.11  As  general 
unions  became  more  dominant  in  the  TUC,  growing  support  superseded  the  trade 
union  movement's  initial  ambivalence  towards  state  social  security  schemes.  12  At 
first,  a  compulsory  scheme  of  contributory  social  security  was  unpopular  because  it 
required  the  unionised  and  better-paid  workers  to  subsidise  those  in  less  secure 
employment.  13  In  addition,  unions  were  concerned  that  state  provision  would 
undermine  their  relationship  with  their  members,  and  did  not  welcome  state 
intervention  in  the  functioning  of  the  labour  market.  14  Yet  in  1925  the  trade  unions 
did  not  resist  the  extension  of  the  insurance  principle  to  pensions  in  the  1925  Old  Age 
and  Widows  and  Orphans  Contributory  Pensions  Act:  '[tlhey  had  effectively  accepted 
that  the  provision  of  a  minimum  income  in  old  age  was  the  business  of  the  state.  '  15 
Moreover,  contributory  insurance  schemes  also  offered  'benefit  as  of  right'  with 
which  governments  could  not  tamper.  16  Cronin  suggests  that  the  change  in  attitude 
also  stemmed  from  the  effects  of  high  unemployment  and  the  emergence  of  long-term 
unemployment  on  the  unions'  capacity  to  provide  for  their  members  in  these 
circumstmces. 
17 
11  R  Fitzgerald,  British  labour  management  and  industrial  wetrare;  R  Hay,  'Employers  and  social 
policy';  JR  Hay,  'The  British  business  community';  H  Jones,  'Employers'  welfare  schemes';  J 
Melling,  'Welfare  capitalism'  and  'Industrial  capitalism';  T  Rodgers,  'Employers'  organisations, 
unemployment  and  social  politics'. 
12  J  Cronin,  Politics  ofstate  expansion,  pp.  5-6;  P  Thane,  'The  working  class  and  "state"  welfare  in 
Britain',  pp.  883-84. 
13  J  Cronin,  Politics  ofstate  expansion,  p.  39;  H  Heclo,  Modern  socialpolitics,  pp.  84-87;  N  Whiteside, 
'Welfare  legislation  and  the  unions  during  the  first  world  war',  p.  867. 
14  j  Cronin,  Politics  ofstate  expansion,  pp.  5-6;  N  Whiteside,  'Welfare  legislation  and  the  unions 
during  the  first  world  war',  p.  858. 
15  L  Hannah,  Inventing  retirement,  p.  3  1. 
16  AM  Rees,  TH  Marshall's  social  policy,  p.  120. 
17  j  Cronin,  Politics  ofstate  expansion,  p.  113. 
4 As  state  intervention  in  the  form  of  'Social  policy  expanded,  unions'  attitudes 
became  more  conciliatory  and,  consequently,  more  opposed  to  those  of  employers. 
Research  on  employers'  attitudes  has  generally  found  them  to  be  informed  by 
perceived  implications  of  state  welfare  for  company  welfare  schemes,  its  cost,  and 
views  on  the  appropriate  role  of  the  state.  18  Employers  used  occupational  welfare  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  good  industrial  relations  and  discipline  in  the  workplace.  19 
Accordingly,  Melling  believes  that  they  became  increasingly  resistant  to  state  reforms 
in  the  twentieth  century,  although  others  stress  some  variation  in  attitudes.  20  Turner 
has  found  that  before  world  war  one,  'some  businessmen  supported  state  welfare 
schemes  to  stave  off  social  unrest;  others  promoted  their  own  private  welfare  schemes 
as  part  of  an  industrial  relations  strategy  directed  against  trade  unions;  others  rejected 
any  form  of  welfare  activity,  public  or  private'.  21 
After  the  first  world  war,  and  the  establishment  of  centralised  business 
organisations,  the  Federation  of  British  Industries  and  the  National  Confederation  of 
Employers'  Organisations,  differences  of  opinion  were  apparent  at  this  peak  level.  " 
The  FBI  favoured  the  provision  of  a  range  of  benefits  that  should  be  organised  by 
employers  and  workers.  This  approach  was  adopted  -by  successful  companies  who 
could  afford  to  make  such  provision  and  did  so  partly  to  undermine  trade  unions  and 
to  maintain  stability  in  their  labour  force.  By  contrast,  the  Engineering  Employers' 
18  R  Fitzgerald,  British  tabour  management  and  industrial  wetQre,  p.  225;  H Jones,  'Employers' 
welfare  schemes',  pp.  63-4;  J  Melling,  'Welfare  capitalism',  p.  4. 
19  R  Fitzgerald,  British  tabour  management  and  industrial  wetfare,  p.  212;  H  Jones,  'Employers' 
welfare  schemes',  pp.  63-4. 
20  R  Fitzgerald,  British  tabour  management  and  industrial  wetrare,  p.  225;  JR  Hay,  '17he  British 
business  community',  p.  124;  J  Melling,  'Welfare  capitalism',  p.  19;  J  Turner,  'The  politics  of 
business',  p.  6. 
21  J  Turner,  'The  politics  of  business',  p.  6. 
22  The  establishment  of  these  bodies  is  discussed  in  S  Blank,  Government  and  indust7y,  AR  Ilersic  &P 
FB  Liddle,  Parliament  ofcommerce,  and  J  Turner,  British  politics  and  the  great  war. 
5 Federation,  a  leading  member  of  the  NCEO,  argued  that  the  state  should  provide 
welfare  at  a  basic  level.  The  NCEO  itself  was  opposed  to  an  expansion  of  industrial 
schemes  owing  to  their  cost.  23  State  provision  was  not  necessarily  their  preferred 
option:  Rodgers  refers  to  a  deputation  to  the  government  which  'made  a  series  of 
sweeping  attacks  on  the  administration  of  the  social  services  and  demanded  that  a 
strict  limit  be  imposed  upon  social  expenditure'.  24  Fitzgerald  also  highlights 
industry's  dissatisfaction  with  state  welfare  systems  during  the  interwar  period:  they 
offered  patchy  coverage  and  offered  little  assistance  to  industrial  relations.  25 
Complaints  were  also  made  about  the  increase  of  government  intervention  and  the 
impact  of  unemployment  and  health  insurance  on  taxation.  26 
In  contrast  to  the  reasonably  substantial  body  of  research  on  the  prewar  period, 
there  has  been  no  systematic  study  of  either  trade  union  or  business  attitudes  towards 
the  welfare  state  either  during  the  war  or  after  1945.  Their  activities  during  the  war 
have  received  most  attention  but  existing  interpretations  of  these  are  unsatisfactory  in 
some  respects.  The  TUC's  self-professed  role  in  the  establishment  of  the  Beveridge 
Committee  in  1941  has  been  widely  acknowledged.  27  Others  have  played  down  the 
TUC's  interest  in  social  reform  before  the  war.  28  For  instance,  Wooldridge  believes 
that  unions'  'preoccupation  with  industrial  conflicts  distracted  them  from  long-term 
consideration  of  reform  of  the  state,  and  union  barons  spent  more  time  squabbling 
23  J  Turner,  'The  politics  of  business',  pp.  13-14. 
24  T  Rodgers,  'Employers'  organisations,  unemployment  and  social  politics'  pp.  331-32. 
25  R  Fitzgerald,  British  labour  management  and  industrial  weýrare,  pp.  235-36. 
26  j  Cronin,  Politics  ofstate  expansion,  p.  6;  R  Fitzgerald,  British  labour  management  and  industrial 
weýrare,  p.  212. 
27  P  Barberis  &T  May,  Government,  industry  andpolitical  economy,  p.  100;  A  Marwick,  Britain  in  the 
century  oftotal  war,  (1968),  p.  289;  T  May,  Trade  unions  andpressure  grouppolitics,  p.  14;  L  Minkin, 
The  contentious  alliance,  p.  43. 
2"  D  Bames  &E  Reid,  Governments  and  trade  unions,  p.  11;  B  Pirnlott  &C  Cook,  Trade  unions  in 
British  politics,  p.  163. 
6 among  themselves  than  they  did  thinking  about  social  benefits'.  "  His  impression  may 
reflect  a  focus  on  individual  unions  since  the  appropriate  departments  and  committees 
in  the  TUC  developed  social  policies,  which  is  where  lengthy  consideration  of  social 
benefits  may  be  found 
. 
30  Nevertheless,  others  have  examined  the  work  of  the  TUC 
itself  and  do  still  overlook  its  activities  in  this  sphere.  31  Although  labour  historians 
have  identified  the  expansion  of  the  TUC's  interests  outwith  the  traditional  confines 
of  trade  union  legal  issues  and  industrial  relations  over  the  course  of  the  twentieth 
century  to  new  areas  such  as  social  policy,  they  are  usually  mentioned  briefly  if  at 
all  . 
32  The'  only  detailed  studies  that  exist  for  the  postwar  period  deal  solely  with  the 
subject  of  social  security.  Peter  Baldwin's  The  politics  of  social  solidarity  looks  at 
the  TUC's  attitudes  towards  development  in  social  security  in  the  1940s  and  1950s, 
and  Hugh  Heclo  traces  the  development  of  pensions  policy  in  the  1950s,  an  account  is 
based  on  published  sources  only.  33  The  findings  of  these  studies  will  be  discussed  in 
the  relevant  chapters. 
Industrial  responses  to  the  welfare  state  have  been  similarly  neglected;  Melling  and 
Hay's  criticisms  that  this  subject  has  been  neglected  for  the  first  part  of  the  twentieth 
century  are  yet  more  applicable  to  the  years  after  1945  and  the  modem  welfare  state.  34 
Only  responses  to  the  Beveridge  Report  have  been  briefly  considered,  and  Sir 
Norman  Kipping,  a  former  director-general,  describes  FBI  education  policy  in  his 
29  A  Wooldridge,  'In  place  of  fear',  p.  9  1. 
30  W  Paynter,  British  trade  unions,  p.  140. 
31  For  instance,  J Lovell  &BC  Roberts,  A  short  history  ofthe  T  UC.;  R  Martin,  TUC.  the  growth  ofa 
ressure  group. 
2VL  Allen,  Trade  unions  and  the  government,  p.  12;  H  Clegg,  A  history  ofBritish  trade  unions  since 
1889,  vol.  III,  preface;  A  Hutt,  British  trade  unionism;  K  Laybourn,  British  trade  unionism;  R  Martin, 
TVC.  the  growth  ofa  pressure  group,  p.  328;  W  Paynter,  British  trade  unionism,  p.  89. 
33  P  Baldwin,  The  politics  ofsocial  solidarity  and  H  Heclo,  Modern  socialpolitics. 
34  R  Hay,  'Employers  and  social  policy',  p.  435;  J  Melling,  'Welfare  capitalism',  p.  453. 
7 memoirs.  35  Whereas  trade  union  history  has  tended  to  underestimate  the  contribution 
of  organised  labour  towards  social  reconstruction,  those  examining  the  role  of 
business  organisations  have  tended  to  emphasise  the  most  supportive  and  pro-reform 
views  that  can  be  detected.  For  instance,  Pat  Thane  points  to  the  activities  of  the  FBI 
and  the  paternalistic  proposals  of  a  group  of  120  industrialists  who  produced  a 
pamphlet  on  social  policy,  A  National  Policyfor  Industry,  in  1942,  shortly  before  the 
publication  of  the  Beveridge  Report.  36  Paul  Addison  is  aware  of  the  BEC's  hostility 
towards  social  reforrn  but  considers  the  contribution  of  the  same  120  industrialists  to 
be  of  more  significance.  37  In  a  similar  vein,  Keith  Middlemas  suggested  that  the 
BEC's  dislike  of  the  Beveridge  Report  had  been  modified  under  the  influence  of  these 
industfialists.  38 
It  is  argued  in  this  thesis  that  the  tendency  to  highlight  the  activities  of  the  120 
industrialists  and  the  FBI  is  misleading  since  the  BEC's  more  negative  outlook  was  of 
equal,  if  not  greater,  significance.  As  Middlemas  later  acknowledges  in  Power, 
Competition  and  the  State,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  BEC  relaxed  its 
views  on  the  prospect  of  social  security  reform  at  any  time  during  the  war;  clearly 
divisions  within  industry  on  social  reforms  were  sustained  . 
39  For  instance  the 
National  Policy  for  Industry  group  proposed  a  school  leaving  age  of  sixteen  which 
both  the  BEC  and  the  FBI  continued  to  oppose  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  40  The  BEC's 
hostile  reaction  to  the  Beveridge  Report  is  important  because  the  employers' 
confederation,  not  the  FBI,  was  responsible  for  monitoring  government  policy  in 
'5  N  Kipping,  Summing  up. 
36  P  Thane,  Foundations  ofthe  wetfizre  state,  p.  233. 
37  P  Addison,  The  road  to  1945  (1994),  p.  214. 
38  K  Middlemas,  Politics  in  industrial  society,  p.  287. 
39  K  Middlemas,  Power,  competition  and  the  state  vol.  I,  p.  60. 
40  Ibid. 
8 relation  to  social  security  and  pensions.  After  the  war,  the  interest  of  these  120 
industrialists  in  social  policy  had  disappeared  and  the  BEC  was  left  to  represent 
industry  on  most  social  issues.  The  FBI's  involvement  extended  only  to  specific 
aspects  of  state  education;  therefore,  it  is  to  the  British  Employers'  Confederation  that 
we  must  look  for  much  evidence  of  state-industry  relations  in  the  sphere  of  state 
welfare. 
The  more  positive  impressions  of  industry's  response  -  to  wartime  social 
reconstruction  are  -sustained  in  postwar  studies.  These  tend  to  believe  that  capital 
accepted  the  expansion  of  state  welfare  after  1945.  Rogow  and  Shore  suggest  this 
was  the  case  although  ftirther  expansion  would  not  have  been  tolerated  . 
41  Andrew 
Cox  claims  that  industry  accepted  social  reconstruction  on  the  basis  that  the  state 
would  not  undertake  economic  reforms  . 
42 
-  There  is  a  lack  of  evidence  to  support  such 
assertions;  industry  did  not  launch  any  campaign  against  social  reform  but,  given  the 
level  of  public  support  for  social  reform,  this  would  have  been  politically  disastrous. 
Hence,  fin-ther  research  on  the  activities  of  the  BEC  and  FBI  in  relation  to  welfare  is 
required  toýdepict  more  accurately  the  relationship  between  industrial  interest  groups 
and  the  postwar  welfare  state. 
As  indicated  earlier,  this  subject  is  neglected  in  studies  that  seek  to  explain 
developments  in  state-interest  group  relations  in  the  postwar  period.  One  major 
theoretical  approach  to  understanding  these  developments  is  corporatism.  Accepted 
definitions  of  corporatism  are  elusive  and  often  vague  but  all  seek  to  describe  the 
41  A  Cox,  'The  failure  of  corporatist  state  forms',  p.  206;  AA  Rogow  &P  Shore,  The  Labour 
overnment  and  British  industry,  p.  176. 
A  Cox,  'The  failure  of  corporatist  state  forms',  p.  206. 
9 process  by  which  outside  interests  were  integrated  into  the  state  for  the  purposes  of 
formulating  and  implementing  government  policy.  "'  Both  Wyn  Grant  and  Andrew 
Cox  have  rejected  the  application  of  theories  of  corporatism  to  postwar  Britain 
because  the  peak  level  interest  groups  of  industry  and  labour  rejected  the  prospect  of 
integration  into  the  state  and  were  unable  to  guarantee  the  consent  of  their  members.  " 
A  more  enduring  thesis  has  been  that  of  'corporate  bias'  presented  by  Keith 
Middlemas.  He  argues  that  the  peak  level  representatives  of  capital  and  labour  -  the 
TUC,  BEC  and  FBI  -  became  increasingly  involved  in  state  policy-making  to  the 
extent  that  corporate  bias  became  a  distinguishing  feature  of  the  British  state, 
particularly  from  the  1920s  to  the  1960s.  In  this  process,  these  organisations  were 
elevated  to  the  status  of  'governing  institutions'.  Middlemas  has  selected  the  term 
corporate  bias  to  convey  the  involuntary  nature  of  its  development,  and  the  fact  that 
the  system  was  unstable  owing  to  these  groups'  lack  of  control  over  their  members.  "' 
With  regard  to  the  postwar  period,  Middlemas  subscribes  to  the  notion  of  a  political 
contract  whereby  the  state  would  guarantee  high  levels  of  employment  in  return  for 
wage  restraint,  high  productivity,  high  levels  of  investment  and  adequate  levels  of 
exports.  "'  Herein,  the  national  interest  superseded  sectional  interests  as  these  groups 
participated  in  government  policy-making  to  these  ends. 
Corporate  bias,  like  competing  corporatist  theories  in  their  various  guises,  exhibits 
a  tendency  to  either  examine  the  role  of  producer  groups  in  industrial  and  economic 
43  See  W  Grant,  ed.,  The  political  economy  ofcorporatism;  A  Cawson,  ed.,  Organised  interests  and  the 
state;  A  Cox  and  N  O'Sullivan,  eds.,  The  corporate  state;  PC  Schmitter  &G  Lembruch,  Trends 
towards  corporatist  intermediation  for  various  interpretations  of  corporatist  theory. 
"W  Grant,  ed.,  The  political  economy  of  corporatism,  p.  11;  A  Cox,  'The  failure  of  corporatist  state 
forms',  pp.  203-04. 
45  K  Middlemas,  Politics  in  industrial  society;  Power,  competition  and  the  state:  vols.  I  and  11. 
46  K  Middlemas,  'Corporatism',  pp.  8-9. 
10 policy,  or  to  assess  developments  in  social  Policy  without  considering  the  contribution 
of  producer  interests.  47  No  accounts  of  corporatism  in  Britain  have  studied  the 
relationship  between  the  state  and  industrial  interest  groups  in  the  context  of  the 
welfare  state.  Middlemas'  argument  is  based  upon  economic  and  industrial  policy, 
leaving  us  to  presume  that  social  policy  was  formulated  in  the  same  fashion,  or  that  it 
was  of  little  interest  to  either  capital  or  labour.  As  this  thesis  intends  to  disprove  the 
latter,  it  will  consider  the  appropriateness  of  Middlemas'  model  in  depicting  state- 
interest  group  relations  in  the  sphere  of  social  policy  and  examine  the  evidence  for  the 
existence  of  corporate  bias  in  relation  to  its  implications  for  social  policy. 
The  exclusion  of  these  groups  from  corporatist  interpretations  of  the  development 
of  state  welfare  may  follow  from  the  practice  of  labelling  them  as  producer  interests 
while  the  welfare  state  is  located  in  the  sphere  of  consumption  or  distribution.  "" 
Hence,  O'Sullivan  criticises  Middlemas'  theory  of  corporate  bias  on  the  basis  that 
'[t]he  overriding  significance  it  attaches  to  the  power  of  producer  groups  could  at  best 
only  account  for  selective  welfare  benefits  and  not  for  the  universal  ones  which  the 
welfare  state  in  fact  provides.  '49  O'Sullivan's  argument  reflects  the  tendency  to 
disregard  the  activities  of  producer  groups  in  relation  to  welfare,  particularly  the  TUC. 
This  thesis  will  demonstrate  not  only  the  range  of  TUC  activities  in  relation  to  the 
welfare  state  but  its  consistent  commitment  to  universalism  and  opposition  to 
47  A  Cawson,  Corporatism  and  weý`are;  H  Eckstein,  Pressure  group  politics;  P  Whiteley  &S  Winyard, 
Pressurefor  the  poor  take  this  approach  in  relation  to  the  welfare  state.  A  Cox  &N  O'Sullivan,  eds., 
The  corporate  state;  W  Grant,  Business  andpolitics  in  Britain;  K  Middlemas,  Politics  in  industrial 
society  and  Power,  competition  and  the  state  vol.  I  look  at  interest  group  relations  but  not  social 
policy.  S  Beer,  Modern  British  politics  typifies  both  practices.  49  S  Beer,  Modern  British  politics  and  A  Cawson,  Corporatism  and  wetrare  both  discuss  the  welfare 
state  in  a  corporatist  context  but  not  the  role  of  employers  or  the  TUC.  49  N  O'Sullivan,  'The  political  theory  of  corporatism',  p.  10. 
11 selectivity  in  state  welfare.  Furthermore,  the  TUC's  role  in  representing  users  of  the 
welfare  state,  particularly  NHS  patients,  will  be  considered. 
A  second  approach  to  explaining  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  industrial 
interests  and  the  creation  of  the  modem  welfare  state  in  wartime  and  post-  1945  can  be 
found  in  the  idea  of  the  postwar  consensus.  The  origins  of  consensus  are  generally 
found  in  the  war  years  and  the  Coalition  government's  policies  for  reconstruction  and 
it  endured  until  some  point  between  1964  and  1979.50  Proponents  of  the  consensus 
thesis  have  suggested  that  similarities  and  continuities  between  the  policies  of  the 
Coalition  government  and  postwar  Labour  and  Conservative  governments  imply  the 
51 
existence  of  a  shared  approach  to  policy-making  across  a  range  of  policy  areas. 
These  policies  include  the  establishment  of  a  mixed  economy,  employment  policy, 
foreign  policy,  trade  union  recognition  and  the  introduction  of  a  wide  range  of  welfare 
measures.  52  Addison,  in  'The  road  from  1945',  selects  a  similar  range  of  policies:  the 
mixed  economy,  ftill  employment,  the  welfare  state  and  expansion  of  state  education, 
increased  consultation  of  interest  groups  by  government,  and  the  advancement  of  the 
industrial  worker.  53 
The  policy  content  of  consensus  has  prompted  an  extensive  debate,  which  will  be 
outlined  below.  More  fundamentally,  the  very  definition  of  the  concept  has  eluded 
agreement.  Kavanagh  and  Morris  are  amongst  its  main  supporters  and  present  the 
50  A  Butler,  'The  end  of  the  post-war  consensus',  p.  438. 
51  This  theory  has  been  propounded  by;  D  Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945  (199  1);  D  Kavanagh  &P 
Morris,  Consensus  politics;  D  Kavanagh,  'The  postwar  consensus',  A  Seldon,  'Consensus:  a  debate  too 
long';  D  Marquand,  'The  decline  of  the  postwar  consensus';  E  Midwinter,  The  development  ofthe 
wetfare  state. 
52  D  Kavanagh  &P  Morris,  Consensus  politics,  p.  3. 
"P  Addison,  'The  road  from  1945',  p.  6. 
12 case  for  consensus  in  terms  of  'a  set  of  parameters  that  bounded  the  set  of  policy 
options  regarded  by  senior  politicians  and  civil  servants  as  administratively 
practicable,  economically  affordable  and  politically  acceptable'  where  party 
differences  were  subdued.  "  This  approach  allows  for  disagreement  between  parties 
and  ideological  differences.  Neither  is  it  necessary  for  governments  to  share  the  same 
objectives  in  the  formulation  of  their  policies.  This  has  been  the  basis  of  Ben 
Pimlott's  attack  on  the  idea  of  the  postwar  consensus;  he  has  described  it  as  a  'myth' 
on  the  grounds  that  similar  policies  did  not  reflect  a  free  choice  of  action,  informed  by 
the  same  motives  and  aspirations.  "  Stephen  Brooke  and  Kevin  Jefferys  have  focused 
on  intra-  and  inter-party  conflict  to  convey  the  lack  of  consensus  in  the  political 
sphere.  56 
Paul  Addison  and  David  Dutton  have  sought  to  counter  these  criticisms  by  arguing 
that  total  agreement  was  not  a  precondition  for  a  consensus.  57  Nonetheless,  the 
confusion  surrounding  its  usage  has  led  Addison,  one  of  its  earliest  progenitors,  to 
forsake  the  term  in  preference  for  the  idea  of  a  'postwar  settlement'  as  he  readily 
concedes  that  disagreements  did  exist  between  the  membership  of  the  Labour  and  the 
Conservative  parties.  58  Cross-party  differences,  however,  are  disregarded  by  Anthony 
Seldon  whose  response  to  the  debate  has  been  to  narrow  the  definition  of  consensus. 
In  'Consensus:  a  debate  too  long'  he  speaks  of  'a  broad  parameter  of  agreement  on 
many  key  areas  of  policy  between  the  leaderships  of  both  main  parties  when  they  are 
54  D  Kavanagh  &P  Morris,  Consensus  politics,  p.  13. 
55  B  Pimlott,  'The  myth  of  consensus',  p.  130. 
`S  Brooke,  Labour's  war,  p.  110;  K  Jefferys,  'British  politics  and  social  policy  during  the  second 
world  war',  p.  128. 
57  P  Addison,  'The  road  from  1945',  p.  5;  D  Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945  (1997),  p.  7. 
58  P  Addison,  'The  road  from  1945',  pp.  5-6. 
13 in  office'.  59  This  approach  may  be  more  tangible  but  considerably  reduces  the  scope 
of  the  consensus  thesis  in  explaining  economic  and  social  developments  in  postwar 
Britain,  and  consequently  his  interpretation  has  not  convinced  the  sceptics.  ' 
Still,  both  sides  of  the  debate  continue  to  centre  on  the  activities  of  the  British 
political  parties,  whether  in  government  or  otherwise.  The  notion  of  a  welfare 
consensus  follows  this  pattern.  Its  origins  are  sought  in  the  war  years,  which  are  seen 
to  have  lent  greater  legitimacy  to  state  intervention  in  the  economy  and  society,  thus 
setting  a  precedent  for  governing  in  peacetime.  61  At  first  the  government  undertook 
emergency  measures  such  as  the  evacuation  programme,  the  Emergency  Medical 
Service,  and  free  school  meals.  62  Fraser  has  argued  that  the  experience  of  war 
generated  a  greater  degree  of  social  solidarity:  '[b]ombs,  unlike  unemployment  knew 
no  social  distinctions,  and  so  rich  and  poor  were  affected  alike  in  the  need  for  shelter 
and  protection.  63  This  mood  precipitated  the  period  of  planning  for  postwar  social 
reconstruction  that  followed.  Jose  Harris  and  Kevin  Jefferys  have  questioned  the  role 
of  the  war  in  stimulating  government  interest  in  social  reconstruction.  Harris  suggests 
the  conclusions  drawn  from  Titmuss'  work  on  the  emergency  social  services  cannot 
be  applied  to  government  attitudes  towards  postwar  reform.  Both  she  and  Jefferys 
believe  that  the  war  effort  itself  remained  paramount.  Hence  the  release  of  the 
Beveridge  Report  was  perceived  as  a  regretful  incident  from  the  perspective  of 
Churchill  and  the  Conservative  Party.  64  Nonetheless,  the  government  did  proceed  to 
59  A  Seldon,  'Consensus:  a  debate  too  long?  ',  p.  508. 
60  For  instance,  N  Rollings,  'Butskellism,  the  postwar  consensus  and  the  managed  economy',  p.  114;  H 
Jones,  'A  bloodless  counter-revolution'. 
61  D  Kavanagh  &P  Morris,  Consensus  politics,  p.  6;  D  Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945  (199  1),  p.  2. 
62  R  Titmuss,  Essays  on  'the  weo'are  state',  p.  83. 
63  D  Fraser,  The  evolution  ofthe  British  wetrare  state,  p.  208.  A  Calder,  The  people's  war,  p.  545  also 
subscribes  to  this  interpretation  of  the  social  impact  of  war. 
64  J  Harris,  'Some  aspects  of  social  policy',  p.  249;  K  Jefferys,  ed.,  War  and  reform,  p.  90. 
14 produce  a  series  of  White  Papers  on  social  reconstruction  and  actually  legislated  for 
educational  reform. 
The  case  for  the  postwar  consensus  continues  along  the  same  theme  of  seeking 
similarities  between  the  Coalition's  policies  and  those  of  the  1945-51  Labour 
governments,  and  later  Labour  and  Conservative  administrations.  The  pro-consensus 
school  has  detected  a  strong  element  of  continuity  between  the  wartime  White  Papers 
and  the  Labour  government's  programme.  Evidence  is  found  in  the  implementation 
of  the  National  Insurance  Act  of  1946,  which  contained  a  substantial  element  of  the 
Beveridge  plan  and  Labour's  wholesale  adoption  of  the  1944  Education  Act 
wholesale.  65  Consensus  is  also  suggested  by  the  resemblance  between  both  parties' 
manifestos  in  1945.66  There  have  been  claims  that  a  Conservative  government  in 
1945  would  have  taken  a  similar  approach  to  social  policy:  Addison  believes  that  the 
Tories  would  have  introduced  the  national  insurance  scheme  and  universal  health 
services. 
67 
Studies  of  the  1951-64  Conservative  goverrunents  are  held  to  offer  further  support 
for  the  consensus  theory.  In  spite  of  early  concerns,  and  Labour  Party  propaganda, 
&.  at  the  Tories  would  dismantle  the  welfare  state,  radical  changes  were  avoided.  68 
According  to  Anthony  Seldon,  '[t]he  welfare  state  was  accepted,  and  in  some  areas 
was  extended.  Initial  plans  for  instituting  cuts  and  other  economies  were  dropped. 
There  was  no  doctrinal  attack  on  welfare,  nor  was  there  any  social  policy  offered  by 
65  D Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945  (1997),  p.  23. 
06  Ibid.,  p.  20. 
67  P  Addison,  'The  road  from  1945',  p.  15. 
69  S  Beer,  The  British  political  system,  p.  176;  N  Deakin,  The  politics  ofweýfare,  p.  52;  J  Harris, 
'Society  and  the  state  in  twentieth-century  Britain',  p.  105;  A  Seldon,  'The  rise  and  fall  of  the  postwar 
consensus',  P.  47. 
15 the  Conservatives  that  could  be  said  to  have  been  distinctly  Conservative.  1,69  The 
Conservative  government  did  increase  health  service  charges  but  Labour  had 
introduced  them  in  the  first  instance.  70  In  addition,  social  expenditure  rose  under  the 
71  Conservatives:  further  evidence  of  a  consensus,  according  to  Beer.  In  1958,  the 
resignation  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Peter  Thomeycroft,  and  his  Treasury 
team,  following  the  Cabinet's  refusal  to  sanction  cuts  in  the  social  services,  is  seen  to 
represent  'the  formal  political  acceptance  of  the  welfare  state  by  the  Conservative 
govemment'.  72 
The  mass  of  evidence,  of  which  only  key  points  have  been  identified  here,  has  been 
highly  contested.  Naturally,  respondents  have  focused  upon  the  political  sphere  as 
dictated  by  the  current  parameters  of  the  debate.  As  indicated  earlier,  the  consensus 
has  often  been  challenged  on  the  basis  of  party  differences.  Thus  Stephen  Brooke 
argues  that  continuity  between  the  Coalition's  proposals  and  the  Labour  Party's 
programme  has  been  overstated.  He  agrees  that  both  parties  accepted  the  need  for 
welfare  reform  but  claims  that  the  Attlee  governments  did  not  consider  the  VVhite 
Papers  'blueprints  for  easy  appropriation,  but  as  platforms  on  which  to  build  more 
radical  reforms'.  73  Hennessy  believes  it  is  likely  that  Labour's  policies  'went  ftu-ther 
and  faster  than  anything  a  Churchill  Cabinet  would  have  undertaken  after  1945  1. 
. 
74 
Eirgen  Heo  echoes  this  point,  contending  that  social  reform  would  have  been 
accorded  less  priority  under  the  Tories.  75 
69  A  Seldon,  'The  rise  and  fall  of  the  postwar  consensus',  p.  47. 
70  C  Pierson,  'Social  policy',  p.  148. 
71  S  Beer,  The  British  political  system,  p.  176. 
72  R  Lowe,  'Milestone  or  millstone',  p.  465. 
73  S  Brooke,  Labour's  war,  p.  I  10. 
74  P  Hennessy,  'The  Attlee  governments',  p.  33. 
75  J  Hep,  'The  social  policy  of  the  Attlee  government',  p.  3  00. 
16 Disagreement  also  surrounds  the  record  of  the  post-1951  Conservative 
governments  on  a  number  of  levels.  First,  it  is  claimed  that  the  Conservative 
governments  did  not  attach  as  much  priority  to  social  policy.  This  is  suggested  by 
regular  changes  in  social  policy  ministers  and  their  exclusion,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Minister  of  Housing,  from  the  Cabinet  during  this  period.  76,  Secondly,  the 
Conservatives  were  believed  to  have  accepted  Labour's  policies  as  the  maximum 
degree  of  reform:  '[t]he  expectation  was  that  economic  growth  and  not  social  policy 
would  now  provide  for  social  needs.  977  Social  expenditure  may  have  risen  but  only  in 
the  midst  of  much  discord  within  the  Conservative  Party.  78  Neither  was  it  permitted 
79  to  rise  faster  than  the  level  of  economic  growth  . 
Owing  to  full  employment, 
economic  growth  in  the  1950s,  and  falling  defence  expenditure,  the  Conservatives 
were  able  to  maintain  the  welfare  state  without  compromising  other  commitments 
such  as  lower  taxation-80  Moreover,  while  the  Conservatives  did  not  reduce  current 
expenditure,  the  1956  Guillebaud  Report  found  that  long-term  investment  in  the  NHS 
had  been  neglected.  81  The  third  approach  reflects  the  continued  focus  on  party 
differences:  82  during  the  1950s  the  Labour  Party  made  a  commitment  to  the 
introduction  of  comprehensive  schools,  renounced  NFIS  charges,  and  began  to 
consider  the  prospect  of  earnings-related  pensions  in  advance  of  the  Conservatives. 
76  M  Hill,  The  weUýre  state  in  Britain,  p.  50. 
77  P  Alcock,  Poverty  and  state  support,  p.  59. 
78  N  Ellison,  'Consensus  here,  consensus  there',  p.  20;  M  Kandiah,  'Conservative  leaders',  p.  67. 
79  A  Gamble,  Conservative  nation,  p.  64. 
so  M  Hill,  The  wetrare  state  in  Britain,  p.  50;  R  Lowe,  'Milestone  or  millstone',  pp.  463-9  1. 
81  Guillebaud  Report,  pp.  34-5.  This  is  also  noted  by  H  Jones,  'New  tricks  for  an  old  dog?  ',  p.  39. 
82  N  Deakin,  The  politics  ofweUiare,  p.  5  1. 
17 In  view  of  this  preoccupation  with  the  political  sphere,  the  more  recent  notion  of  a 
&negative  consensus'  offers  some  relief  This  suggests  that  policy-making  was  a 
product  more  of  constraints  on  governments  than  of  a  mutually  acceptable  shared 
approach  to  solving  postwar  problems.  83  Constraints  included  adverse  economic 
circumstances  for  the  Attlee  governments,  electoral  considerations  for  the 
Conservatives,  the  impact  of  demographic  changes  on  state  welfare,  the  civil  service, 
and  the  strength  of  the  trade  union  movement.  84 
It  is  the  latter  factor  that  is  of  significance  for  this  study.  We  have  already 
mentioned  the  TUC's  wartime  role,  which  is  seen  to  have  obliged  govermnents  to 
subscribe  to  welfare  reform  or  prevented  them  from  doing  otherwise  in  the  context  of 
the  postwar  settlement.  85  Noel  Whiteside,  in  a  study  of  the  'social  wage',  argues  that 
governments  were  unable  to  cut  benefits  for  fear  that  they  would  precipitate  higher 
wage  demands  and  industrial  action.  86  Once  more,  it  is  merely  the  presence  of  a 
strong  trade  union  movement,  or external  policy  considerations,  that  are  considered  to 
have  affected  social  policy.  Neither  Harriet  Jones  nor  Whiteside  look  in  any  detail  at 
the  TUC's  social  policy  to  ascertain  its  expectations  of  the  government  in  this  sphere. 
Furthermore,  these  interpretations  all  focus  exclusively  on  the  trade  union  movement, 
ignoring  the  role  of  employers  or  other  interests  that  may  have  participated  in 
government  policy-making. 
93  P  Catterall's  preface  of  H  Jones  &M  Kandiah,  The  myth  ofconsensus,  p.  x. 
94  N  Ellison,  'Consensus  here,  consensus  there',  p.  18;  H  Jones,  'New  tricks  for  an  old  dog',  p.  34;  R 
Lowe,  'The  second  world  war,  consensus  and  the  foundation  of  the  welfare  state',  p.  160  &  174. 
85  J  Cronin,  Politics  ofstate  expansion,  p.  194;  A  Gamble,  Conservative  nation,  p.  63;  H Jones,  'New 
tricks  for  an  old  dog?  ',  p.  34. 
86  N  Whiteside,  'The  politics  of  the  "sociar'  and  the  "industrial"  wage',  p.  13  1. 
is Still,  the  link  between  the  trade  union  movement  and  social  policy  has  at  least  been 
established.  This  represents  an  advance  on  earlier  and  more  traditional  interpretations 
of  consensus,  which  both  recognise  the  role  of  the  trade  union  movement  in  policy- 
making  and  seek  to  establish  a  policy  consensus  in  relation  to  the  welfare  state  but  do 
not  link  the  two.  This  highlights  a  major  weakness  of  the  consensus  thesis  in  its 
tendency  to  separate  analysis  of  the  constituent  areas.  For  Kavanagh  and  Morris,  a 
consensus  existed  with  regard  to  the  style  of  government  which  featured  'consultation 
between  government  and  the  major  economic  actors  ...  notably  ...  trade  unions',  later 
described  as  'agents  of  the  political  consensus',  and  the  policies  pursued  by  all 
postwar  governments  from  1948  to  the  mid-1970s.  87  The  implications  of  this  style  of 
government  for  policy-making  are  subsequently  ignored  in  the  analysis  of  welfare 
policy,  since  its  adherents  insist  that  only  policies  pursued  by  government  require 
consideration.  "  Accordingly,  no  attention  is  paid  to  the  impact  of  trade  union 
consultation  on  social  policy.  Having  identified  the  wider  forces  of  policy-making, 
the  consensus  thesis  then  fails  to  address  its  effects  in  the  context  of  its  own  argument. 
Recent  critics  of  the  consensus  thesis  suggest  that  the  focus  on  government 
activities  and  the  policies  that  they  implemented  'has  concealed  more  than  it  has 
rcvealed'  . 
89  Corporatists  and  pro-consensualists  alike  have  identified  the  importance 
of  consultation  of  interest  groups  after  the  war,  particularly  in  relation  to  economic 
and  industrial  policy.  90  Social  policy  offers  an  opportunity  to  examine  their 
relationship  with  government,  and  to  assess  the  application  of  corporate  bias  outside 
87  D  Kavanagh  &P  Morris,  Consensus  politics,  pp.  34  and  52-3. 
88  Ibid.,  p.  4. 
89  M  Kandiah,  'Conservative  leaders',  p.  74. 
90  S  Beer,  Modern  British  politics;  A  Cox  &N  O'Sullivan,  The  corporate  state;  W  Grant,  Business  and 
politics  in  Britain  (1993);  K  Middlernas,  Politics  in  industrial  society  and  Power,  competition  and  the 
state  vol,  L 
19 the  more  traditional  policy  areas  where  these  groups'  interest  is  easily  understood.  In 
doing  so,  the  impact  of  these  groups  on  welfare  policy  can  be  explored.  This  will  help 
to  redress  the  existing  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  goverment  in  the  history  of  the 
welfare  state  where  interest  groups  are  neglected  unless  it  is  impossible  to  ignore 
them,  as  in  the  case  of  the  BMA  during  the  struggle  to  establish  the  National  Health 
Service  or  the  family  allowances  movement.  91  The  social  policies  of  trade  unions  and 
industry  have  attracted  little  interest,  yet  the  records  of  these  organisations  offer  a 
valuable  insight  into  contemporary  responses  to  the  welfare  state  and  its 
conceptualisation.  In  turn  an  insight  into  their  role  and  their  attitudes  towards  postwar 
social  policy  will  assist  in  determining  the  existence  of  a  broader  consensus,  outside 
Whitehall,  in  Britain  between  1942  and  1964.  This  will  take  into  account  perceptions 
of  the  maintenance,  or  even  growth,  of  the  welfare  state,  and.  its  fundamental 
principles  and  objectives. 
The  changing  role  of  peak  level  labour  and  industrial  organisations  in  relation  to 
welfare  -  from  direct  provision  and  monitoring  the  limited  scope  of  state  services  to 
negotiating  the  boundaries  of  the  welfare  state  -  can  be  investigated  by  consulting  the 
records  of  these  organisations.  The  archives  of  the  Labour  Party  and  government 
papers  are  also  of  assistance.  These  records  reveal  the  content  of  the  internal 
discussions  held  by  these  groups,  their  correspondence,  their  submissions  to 
government  and  independent  enquiries,  and  their  meetings  with  Ministers  and 
officials.  They  allow  us  to  ascertain  their  opinion  of  state  welfare,  the  motives  behind 
their  policies  and  objectives,  the  contribution  that  they  made  to  policy  formulation 
"H  Eckstein,  Pressure  group  politics;  R  Klein,  The  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service;  J 
Macnicol,  The  movementforfamily  allowances;  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service  vols.  I  and  II. 
20 and  the  level  of  influence  held  by  them  overý  its  direction.  TUC  interest  can  be 
detected  in  all  aspects  of  state  welfare  during  the  process  of  wartime  reconstruction 
and  in  the  postwar  years.  The  two  leading  industrial  organisations,  the  BEC  and  FBI, 
dealt  with  labour  issues  and  economic  matters  respectively.  Therefore,  the 
employers'  confederation  was  responsible  for  social  security,  pensions,  and  some 
aspects  of  education  while  the  FBI  discussed  only  secondary  education  in  grammar 
schools,  higher  technological  education,  and  policies  concerning  the  universities. 
The  division  of  responsibilities  between  the  BEC  and  FBI  suggests,  quite  rightly, 
that  a  neat  and  rational  picture  is  unlikely  to  emerge  from  this  research,  given  that 
these  organisations  did  not  discuss  social  policy  in  such  a  manner.  Different  areas  of 
the  welfare  state  were  discussed  in  isolation  from  each  other  within  these  groups.  The 
level  of  interest  and  concern  could  vary  with  respect  to  different  areas  of  policy,  and 
over  time.  The  TUC  declared  a  fervent  interest  in  all  welfare  policies  but  the  BEC 
and  FBIs  approach  was  much  more  haphazard  and  inconsistent.  Neither  of  them  took 
any  direct  interest  in  the  NHS  for  instance.  The  policies  of  all  three  were  also  shaped 
by  a  variety  of  influences,  which  changed  over  time.  These  influences  included  the 
policies  of  the  governing  party,  the  economic  situation,  the  implications  of  social 
policies  for  their  other  interests,  the  level  of  opportunities  for  them  to  participate  in 
government  policy,  and  their  perceptions  of  what  social  policy  should  seek  to  achieve. 
Neither  were  their  relations  with  government  in  this  sphere  necessarily  similar  to  each 
other  as  their  interpretations  of  appropriate  behaviour  differed.  Also,  willingness  to 
participate  in  government  policy-making  was  subject  to  variation,  on  the  part  of 
industry  at  least. 
21 The  focus  of  this  study,  addressing  only  the  peak  level  of  activity  and  relations 
with  central  goVerrunent,  is  not  always  ideal.  In  health  and  education,  much  policy 
was  implemented  at  the  local  level  where  trade  unions  and  industrialists  were  also 
involved.  Nonetheless,  the  dlite  nature  of  this  research  is  not  entirely  inappropriate. 
Social  policies  were  generally  formulated  by  the  central  organisations  of  these  groups, 
and  were  informed  by  their  members'  views  as  advised  in  correspondence,  responses 
to  questionnaires  and  surveys,  and  at  annual  conferences.  Within  the  peak  level 
bodies,  committees  and  departments  existed  to  determine  their  position  of  various 
social  policy  matters.  The  TUC  had  social  insurance  and  education  departments  and 
committees.  The  BEC  too  had  a  social  insurance  and  an  education  and  industrial 
training  committee  but  no  supporting  departments  owing  to  the  relatively  small  size  of 
its  central  bureaucracy  and  lack  of  funds.  92  The  FBI's  Education  Committee 
discussed  relevant  educational  matters.  Furthermore  the  government  would  usually 
consult  the  peak  level  groups  on  policy  changes  rather  than  individual  members:  this 
aspect  of  the  relationship  requires  an  dlite  focus. 
The  formulation  of  many  welfare  policies  within  these  organisations  predated  the 
second  world  war,  but  the  establishment  of  the  Beveridge  Committee  and  plans  for 
the  reform  of  state  education  and  the  health  services  required  more,  explicit  policy 
stances  and  a  response  to  government  action.  The  TUC  reacted  most  eagerly  to  the 
opportunity  that  the  war  presented  to  persuade  the  goverment  to  accept  its 
prescriptions  for  reform.  Accordingly,  it  composed  comprehensive  policy  statements, 
92  Modem  Records  Centre  (henceforth  MRC),  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  109,  Ref  N.  C.  8303, 
Confederation  finance  memorandum  by  director,  29  Feb.  1944. 
22 which  contained  proposals  for  reconstruction  in  line  with  the  principles  of  the  trade 
union  movement.  After  the  war,  the  TUC  monitored  all  aspects  of  government  social 
policy  with  a  view  to  securing  expansion  and  improvement.  Industrial  views  are  less 
easy  to  discern  because  of  the  different  organisations  involved.  Generally,  neither  the 
FBI  nor  the  BEC  approached  government  directly  to  discuss  policy  issues.  They 
tended  to  rely  on  goverment  requests  for  consultation,  and  opportunities  to  express 
their  views  as  members  of  government  committees,  or  when  presenting  evidence  to 
such  enquiries.  Through  a  variety  of  methods,  therefore,  these  interest  groups  made 
some  contribution  to  social  policy-making  both  during  and  after  the  war.  The 
significance  of  that  contribution  and  the  influence  they  had  on  government  policy  will 
be  discussed  the  following  chapters,  which  explore  developments  in  social  security, 
pensions,  health  and  education  policy.  Housing  policy  is  not  considered,  as  a  brief 
examination  of  these  organisations'  activities  in  this  area  detected  little  interest. 
The  following  chapter  examines  the  evolution  of  social  security  from  the 
establishment  of  the  Beveridge  Committee  in  1941  through  to  plans  for  earnings- 
related  unemployment  and  sickness  benefit  formulated  by  the  Conservative 
government  in  1963  and  1964.  The  TUC  adopted  the  Beveridge  Report  as  an  ideal 
model  of  state  social  security  from  which  it  was  loath  to  depart.  It  was  not  quite  so 
dearly  held  by  the  BEC,  which  was  forced  to  temper  its  views.  As  successive 
governments  gradually  abandoned  the  Beveridge  plan,  the  attitudes  of  these 
organisations  towards  social  security,  and  the  motivations  that  underpinned  them,  are 
explored  in  the  context  of  the  postwar  period.  The  third  chapter  continues  by  looking 
specifically  at  the  case  of  pensions  policy.  Both  social  and  labour  policy 
considerations  were  raised  in  this  sphere  owing  to  the  relationship  between  the 
23 presence  of  older  workers  and  wage  levels  and  employment  opportunities.  This 
presented  the  TUC  with  a  dilernma  in  its  views  on  pensions,  which  it  was  slow  to 
address.  Consultation  by  Conservative  governments  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Phillips  Committee  on  Pensions  also  provided  the  BEC  with  opportunities  to  air  its 
views.  Chapter  four  moves  away  from  the  income  maintenance  sphere  to  explore  the 
TUC's  activities  in  relation  to  health  policy.  The  focus  on  the  TUC  reflects  the  virtual 
absence  of  industrialists  in  this  sphere,  owing  to  a  lack  of  direct  interest  in  the  NHS. 
In  this  sector,  the  TUC  emerges  most  clearly  as  representative  of  consumers  rather 
than  having  been  concerned  merely  with  sectional  issues.  Education  is  the  subject  of 
the  final  substantive  chapter.  This  is  the  only  policy  sector  in  which  the  TUC,  BEC 
and  FBI  all  made  a  contribution  towards  the  formulation  of  policy,  during  the  war  and 
thereafter.  The  chapter  considers  policy  developments  at  the  levels  of  secondary 
schooling,  ftu-ther  and  technical  education,  and  higher  education.  The  reasons  behind 
a  much  more  active  interest  on  the  part  of  industrialists  will  be  considered.  Finally, 
the  concluding  chapter  assesses  the  whole  range  of  these  groups'  involvement  across 
different  aspects  of  welfare  policy  in  order  to  assess  the  nature  of  relationship 
between  government  and  interest  groups  in  the  context  of  the  welfare  state.  It  can 
then  determine  whether  or  not  corporate  bias  was  a  feature  of  state-interest  group 
relations  in  this  sphere  of  policy,  and  if  so  the  degree  of  its  importance.  Given  the 
extent  of  their  involvement,  and  the  opportunities  provided  for  these  groups  to  express 
their  opinions  on  the  development  of  the  welfare  state,  it  is  then  possible  to  identify 
the  existence,  or  otherwise,  of  a  broader  consensus  over  welfare  policy  that 
encapsulated  important  economic  interests  during  this  period. 
24 Chapter  Two:  Social  Securi 
The  publication  of  the  Beveridge  Report  in  December  1942  set  in  train  social  security 
reforms  that  culminated  in  the  implementation  of  the  1946  National  Insurance  Act  and 
the  1947  National  Assistance  Act  on  5  July  1948.  Under  the  terms  of  the  1946 
legislation,  a  single  contributory  national  insurance  scheme  was  established  in  which 
participation  was  compulsory  for  the  majority  of  workers.  For  those  who  were 
excluded,  or  who  found  insurance  benefits  to  be  insufficient,  the  National  Assistance 
Board  provided  means-tested  help.  After  1948  there  were  no  major  developments  in 
social  security  policy  until  the  introduction  of  eamings-related  pensions  under  the 
1959  National  Insurance  Act.  Before  1939  employers  and  trade  unions  were 
important  sources  of  welfare  provision.  The  wartime  reforms were  accompanied  by 
ttWch  greater  state  intervention  in  the  sphere  of  social  security  that  resulted  in  a  lesser 
role  for  these  groups.  Little  is  known,  however,  about  their  responses  to  these 
changes. 
This  chapter  will  look  at  the  central  organisations  of  these  interests,  the  TUC  and 
the  BEC,  in  order  to  examine  their  activities  in  this  area  of  policy  after  1942.  It  will 
be  argued  that  these  activities  have  significant  implications  for  the  theories  of  both 
consensus  and  corporate  bias.  Consultation  with  industry  and  the  trade  union 
movement  was  undertaken  by  the  state  during  the  war  and  maintained  therealler  to  a 
greater  extent  than  in  the  aftermath  of  the  first  world  war.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
different  govenunents'  willingness  to  consult  these  groups  is  a  feature  of  the  'postwar 
consensus',  as  is  the  maintenance  of  the  welfare  state.  This  chapter  considers  the 
extent  and  importance  of  this  consultation  in  relation  to  social  security,  the  fwst  area of  social  policy  that  tends  to  be  overlooked  as  being  of  interest  to  organised  labour 
and  capital.  Having  established  the  level  of  these  groups'  interest  in  this  aspect  of 
social  policy,  and  their  activities  in  relation  to  social  security,  it  will  then  be  possible 
to  examine  the  existence  of  a  'welfare  consensus'  outside  the  province  of  the  political 
parties. 
Reformin  state  welfare:  the  reconstruction  of  social  security.  1942-1948 
British  social  security  before  Beveridge 
The  flaws  in  interwar  social  security  policy  have  been  well-documented,  in  particular 
its  patchy  and  ad  hoc  nature?  In  the  words  of  Derek  Fraser,  '[c]ommon  social 
conditions  did  not  produce  common  social  security  benefits  as  classification  and 
technical  qualifications  had  usurped  need  as  the  determining  factor.  Q  In  1941,  social 
security  was  administered  by  seven  separate  government  departments  and  financed 
from  different  sources.  3  For  instance,  pensions  were  funded  by  general  taxation  local 
rates  provided  public  assistance.  Benefit  levels  also  varied:  rates  of  workmen's 
compensation  for  industrial  injury  were  earnings-related,  while  unemployment  benefit 
was  a  flat-rate  subsistence  payment. 
-TUC  criticism  of  the  social  services  was  longstanding.  Pensions,  unemployment 
insurance  and  national  health  insurance  all  gave  cause  for  concern.  In  particular  the 
TUC  was  unhappy  with  nature  of  provision  under  unemployment  and  health 
I  For  example,  see  B  Abel-Sm  ith,  'The  Beveridge  report',  p.  13. 
2D  Fraser,  Me  evolution  ofthe  British  wvV2zre  state,  p.  202. 
3J  Harris,  William  Beveridge,  p.  378. 
26 insurance,  and  the  relationship  between  these  two  schemes.  The  upper  income  limit 
of  E250  per  annum  for  unemployment  insurance  was  said  to  deter  non-manual 
workers  from  accepting  wage  increases  that  would  take  them  above  this  ceiling. 
Health  benefits  were  lower  than  those  for  unemployment,  resulting  in  a  fall  in  benefit 
when  workers  became  ill.  4  In  February  1941,  a  General  Council  deputation  met  with 
the  Minister  of  Health,  Ernest  Brown,  to  express  its  concerns  about  national  health 
insurance.  These  included  the  lack  of  cover  for  dependants  and  discrepancies  in  the 
provision  offered  by  the  different  Approved  Societies.  The  TUC  officials  asked 
Brown  to  devise  a  new  state  scheme  for  social  security,  which  could  be  implemented 
5 
after  the  war. 
Divisions  in  industrial  representation  before  1965  manifested  themselves  in 
similarly  divided  views  on  social  policy  in  the  interwar  years.  The  FBI  favoured  a 
paternalistic  approach  whereby  employers  would  provide  social  security  benefits  and 
social  services  for  their  workers.  It  was  generally  supported  in  this  by  successful 
companies  who  could  afford  to  make  provision,  and  did  so  to  undermine  trade  unions 
and  maintain  stability  in  their  labour  forces.  '  The  NCEO  (BEC  after  1939)  adopted  a 
somewhat  different  stance  that  reflected  its  belief  that  welfare  was  the  responsibility 
of  the  state  but  only  at  a  very  basic  level  of  provision.  Consequently,  the  NCEO  was 
not  interested  in  Pursuing  improvements  in  state  social  services  and  consistently 
opposed  increases  in  social  expenditure.  7 
4  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1937,  pp.  34142. 
5  MRC,  MSS.  292/15531/4,  Health  insurance  reform  -history  of  case,  194  1. 
6J  Turner,  "Me  politics  of  business',  P.  6. 
7T  Rodgers,  'Employers'  organisations,  unemployment  and  social  politics',  pp.  331-2. 
27 Thus  the  TUC  and  the  FBI  and  BEC  held  quite  different  attitudes  with  regard  to 
state  social  security.  The  TUC  was  unhappy  with  current  provision  because  it  was 
confined  to  manual  workers  and  the  low-paid,  and  was'ridden  with  anomalies.  It 
sought  reform  and  improvements,  firmly  believing  this  to  be  the  responsibility  of  the 
state.  This  view  had  developed  gradually  during  the  1920s  and  1930s  following  the 
inability  of  trade  union  schemes  to  cope  with  high  unemployment.  Meanwhile, 
industry  was  ambivalent  about  the  role  of  the  state  in  social  security  provision  but  had 
little  to  offer  in  terms  of  solutions  for  interwar  problems.  While  the  FBI  wanted 
employers  to  be  responsible  for  social  policy  in  order  to  derive  benefits  in  terms  of 
industrial  relations,  smaller  firms,  affiliated  through  their  employer  organisation  to  the 
BEC,  argued  that  such  provision  should  be  organised  by  the  state  but  only  at  a 
minimal  level. 
The  Interdepartmental  Committee  on  Social  Insurance  and  Allied  Services 
Wartime  plans  for  the  reform  of  social  security  have  their  roots  in  the  report  of  the 
Interdepartmental  Committee  on  Social  Insurance  and  Allied  Services  (the  Beveridge 
Committee).  On  22  May  1941,  Ernest  Brown,  the  Minister  of  Health,  announced  in 
the  House  of  Commons  that  the  government  was  to  undertake  a  survey  of  the  social 
services.  Subsequently,  Churchill  established  a  Central  Committee  on  Reconstruction 
chaired  by  Arthur  Greenwood,  deputy  leader  of  the  Labour  Party.  Greenwood  then 
appointed  the  Beveridge  Committee  in  June  1941,  which  is  widely  recognised  as  the 
most  important  legacy  of  his  committee.  Its  membership  comprised  eleven  civil 
servants,  selected  from  departments  concerned  with  social  insurance.  The  terms  of 
reference  were:  'to  undertake  with  special  reference  to  the  inter-relation  of  the 
28 schemes,  a  survey  of  the  existing  national  schemes  of  social  insurance  and  allied 
services,  including  workmen's  compensation,  -  and  to  make  recommendations.  '8  The 
government  expected  the  Beveridge  committee  to  do  no  more  than  carry  out  an 
administrative  review;  however,  Beveridge  would  make  the  most  of  his  appointment 
as  chairman  to  produce  a  report  that  had  a  more  far-reaching  impact. 
Friendly  relations  existed  between  the  TUC  and  the  Beveridge  Committee.  The 
TUC  claimed  that  its  deputation  to  Brown  in  1941  had  been  instrumental  in  the 
committee's  establishment.  9  Beveridge  also  believed  that  the  TUC's  complaints 
about  unemployment  and  health  insurance  had  been  influential.  10  Several  scholars, 
who  have  cited  the  TUC's  role  in  the  setting  up  of  the  Interdepartmental  Committee, 
have  acknowledged  the  link.  "  According  to  Ross  Martin,  the  author  of  a  study  of  the 
TUC,  '[i]t  might  well  be  argued  that  the  TUC's  little-noticed  achievement  in  relation 
to  the  formation  of  the  Beveridge  Committee,  is  actually  one  of  its  most  momentous 
successes  -  perhaps  even  its  greatest.  '  12  The  amicable  relationship  between  the  TUC 
and  Beveridge  himself  has  also  been  noted  while  the  TUC's  evidence  bore  substantial 
similarities  to  the  general  content  of  the  Beveridge  Report.  13 
Agreement  extended  to  the  basic  principles  of  state  provision  of  social  security:  a 
flat-rate  scheme  with  respect  to  both  contributions  and  benefits,  universalism  and 
"  Beveridge  Report,  para.  1. 
9  MRC,  MSS292/150.5/1,  TUC  social  insurance  department  circular  to  trades  councils  and  affiliated 
unions,  30  July  1942. 
'0  W  Beveridge,  Power  and  influence,  p.  296. 
11  B  Abel-Smith,  'The  Beveridge  Report',  p.  13;  P  Barberis  &T  May,  Government,  industry  and 
political  economy,  p.  100;  S  Brooke,  Labour's  war,  p  146;  A  Calder,  Me  people's  war,  p.  525;  A 
Marwick,  Britain  in  the  century  oftotal  war  (1968),  p.  289  and  7he  homefront,  p.  128;  T  May,  Trade 
unions  andpressure  group  politics,  p.  14;  L  Minkin,  7he  contentious  alliance,  p.  43  and  'Radicalism 
and  reconstruction,  p.  187;  E  Wilson,  Women  and  the  wetfare  state,  p.  143. 
12  R  Martin,  TUC.  the  growth  of  a  pressure  group,  p.  I  On. 
13  H Heclo,  Modem  social  Politics  in  Britain  and  Sweden,  p.  147. 
29 subsistence.  This  supports  the  widely  expressed  view  that  the  Beveridge  Committee 
represented  the  origins  of  a  consensus  on  social  policy  during  the  second  world  war.  14 
The  TUC  took  an  appreciable  interest  in  social  policy  but  it  is  clear  that  the 
significance  of  its  close  links  with  Beveridge  should  not  be  overstated.  The 
Beveridge  Report  was  very  much  a  one-man  exercise,  and  Beveridge  was  sidelined 
after  the  publication  of  his  report.  The  goverment,  especially  its  Conservative 
members,  did  not  perceive  the  Beveridge  Committee  to  be  of  any  great  importance 
when  it  was  appointed. 
Industry's  attitudes  towards  social  policy  during  the  war  offer  less  support  for  the 
consensus  thesis.  As  in  the  interwar  period,  industrial  views  were  less  coherent  than 
those  of  the  TUC  and  reflected  conflicts  both  between  and  within  the  different 
organisations.  The  most  positive  views  were  expressed  by  a  group  of  120 
industrialists  who  comprised  a  liberal  wing  of  the  FBI.  15  In  1942  these  industrialists 
endorsed  a  document  entitled  A  national  policyfor  industry,  which  outlined  support 
for  a  welfare  system  that  included  corporate  housing,  subsidies  jo  prevent 
unemployment  and  occupational  supplements  to  state  pensions.  16  Less  positive  views 
continued  to  be  expressed  by  the  BEC  although  there  were  internal  differences  of 
opinion.  The  Shipping  Federation  and  the  Liverpool  Steam  Ship  Owners' 
Association,  dismayed  at  the  BEC's  procrastination,  submitted  evidence  to  the 
Beveridge  Committee  independently.  They  endorsed  the  reform of  the  social  services 
in  the  shape  of  a  single  scheme  for  unemployment  and  health  insurance,  workmen's 
14  P  Addison,  'The  road  from  1945',  pp.  134;  H  Glcnncrstcr,  British  socialpolicy  since  1945,  pp.  10-  1; 
R  Lowe,  The  second  world  war,  consensus  and  the  foundation  of  the  welfare  state',  p.  158;  C  Pierson, 
'Social  policy',  p.  139. 
"Their  views  did  not  reflect  official  FBI  policy. 
16  C  Madge,  Industry  after  the  war,  K  Middlemas,  Politics  in  industrial  society,  p.  287. 
30 compensation,  widows'  and  orphans'  benefits,  and  pensions.  These  would  be  funded 
by  equal  tripartite  contributions  from  the  Exchequer,  employers  and  workers.  17  This 
appears  to  be  have  been  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule:  the  Employers' 
Association  of  the  Port  of  Liverpool  and  the  Federation  of  Master  Cotton  Spinners' 
Associations  both  refused  to  submit  observations  on  Beveridge's  list  of  questions. 
The  former  claimed  that  it  was  'actively  and  entirely  engaged  on  work  of  far  more 
urgent  and  immediate  importance'.  18  The  Cotton  Spinners  and  the  Railway 
Companies  were  concerned  that  social  security  reform  would  create  higher  costs  for 
industry.  19  The  Wool  (and  Allied)  Textile  Employers'  Council  wanted  to  postpone 
discussion  on  the  matter  until  the  end  of  the  war  was  closer.  20 
These  more  negative  views  were  predominant  in  the  BEC's  evidence  to  the 
Beveridge  Committee.  The  Confederation  purported  to  endorse  the  principle  of  a 
compulsory  national  insurance  scheme,  but  the  thrust  of  its  statement  emphasised  the 
impracticability  of  implementing  postwar  social  reforms  in  anticipation  of  an  adverse 
economic  situation.  Thus,  it  suggested  that  the  Beveridge  Committee  be  replaced  by  a 
Commission,  which  would  assess  existing  social  policy  and  make  recommendations 
for  reform  after  the  war  that  would  be  in  keeping  with  the  postwar  economic  and 
financial  climate.  21 
17  MRC,  MSSIOO/B/3/2/C216  pt.  3,  Post-War  Social  Services:  Evidence  to  Inter-Departmental 
Committee,  Submitted  by  the  Shipping  Federation  and  the  Liverpool  Steam  Ship  Owners'  Association, 
23  March  1942. 
's  Ibid.,  W  Awstun  Jones,  Secretary  of  Employers'  Association  of  The  Port  of  Liverpool  to  HM  Piper, 
Social  Service  Survey  -  Governmcnt  Committee,  19  Feb.  1942. 
'9  Ibid.,  WM  Wiggins,  President  of  Master  Cotton  Spinners'  Associations  Ltd  to  Sir  John  Forbes 
Watson,  Social  Service  Survey  -  Government  Committee,  23  Feb.  1942;  Memorandum:  Observations 
of  Railway  Companies  on  Principal  Questions  Raised  with  Ile  British  Employers'  Confederation  by 
Interdepartmental  Committee  on  Social  Insurance  and  Allied  Services,  24  Feb.  1942. 
20  Ibid.,  Preliminary  Memorandum  by  The  Wool  (and  Allied)  Textile  Employers'  Council,  undated  (c. 
Feb.  1942). 
21  Ibid.,  N.  C.  7405,  Draft  Report  to  Beveridge  Committee:  Post-War  Reconstruction  -  Social  Services, 
undated  (April  1942). 
31 In  accordance  with  its  prewar  views,  the  BEC  was  unwilling  to  sanction  greater 
state  intervention  in  welfare.  Although  it  accepted  compulsory  national  insurance, 
such  a  scheme  should  play  only  a  minimum  role  in  social  security  provision.  Non- 
state  organisations  should  continue  to  offer  supplementary  provision,  making 
subsistence-level  state  benefits  unnecessary.,  The  Confederation  resisted  state  benefits 
at  subsistence  level  on  the  grounds  that  they  would  undermine  'thrift,  independence 
and  individual  responsibility'  . 
22  Flat-rate  contributions  and  benefits  were  approved 
by  the  employers  for  reasons  of  administrative  convenience.  They  were  also 
compatible  with  the  objective  of  minimising  the  state's  role,  an  issue  on  which  the 
BEC  and  Beveridge  were  in  accord.  By  contrast  the  TUC's  adherence  to  flat-rate 
principles  was  based  more  on  its  ideology  of  equality,  which  it  believed  could  be 
ftS.  23 
achieved  through  uniform  bene  I  Furthermore,  the  TUC  was  unwilling  to  accept 
the  replication  of  wage  inequalities  in  social  security  that  would  result  from  earnings- 
related  benefits.  The  burden  that  flat-rate  contributions  imposed  on  the  lowest-paid 
workers  and  the  consequences  for  the  financing  of  social  security  were  not  considered 
at  this  time.  Baldwin  suggests  that  the  TUC  did  not  anticipate  problems  here  because 
it  expected  minimum  wages  to  be  higher  after  the  war.  24 
The  BEC  was  the  only  central  industrial  organisation  to  provide  the  Beveridge 
Committee  with  evidence.  This  reflected  its  responsibility  for  matters  relating  to 
social  policy.  Its  evidence  was  largely  negative  in  tone  although  its  desire  for  a 
minimum  state  role  was  perfectly  in  keeping  with  Beveridge's  own  views.  Their 
22  lbidL 
23  B  Abel-Smith,  'The  Beveridge  report',  p.  16;  P  Baldwin,  7hepolitics  ofsocial  solidarity,  pp.  122 
and  127. 
24  P  Baldwin,  Politics  ofsocial  solidarity,  pp.  122  and  127. 
32 respective  interpretations  of  minimal  state  intervention  were  quite  different  however: 
the  BEC  did  not  support  the  central  principles  of  universalism  or  subsistence  to  which 
both  Beveridge  and  the  TUC  were  firmly  wedded.  Its  unwillingness  to  countenance 
plans  for  postwar  social  reform  was  clearly  out  of  step  with  popular  opinion  and  the 
views  of  the  trade  union  movement.  This  suggests  that  the  perceived  consensus  on 
the  need  to  plan  for  the  postwar  world was  not  quite  so  prevalent  as  is  often  believed. 
The  Beveridge  Report 
The  Beveridge  Report  was  published  on  I  December  1942.  It  outlined  a  plan  that 
would  coordinate  and  consolidate  the  existing  social  security  schemes.  Its  chief 
objective  was  to  abolish  poverty  via  compulsory  participation  in  a  comprehensive 
social  insurance  scheme,  which  would  provide  an  income,  adequate  for  subsistence,  in 
times  of  need.  The  scheme  would  be  financed  by  flat  rate,  tripartite  contributions 
from  employers,  workers  and  the  state.  Beveridge  devised  six principles  on  which  the 
social  insurance  scheme  would  be  based:  flat  rate  of  subsistence  benefit;  flat  rate  of 
contribution;  unification  of  administrative  responsibility;  adequacy  of  benefit; 
comprehensiveness  and  classification.  25  For  the  scheme  t6  be  successfid  there  were 
three  preconditions  or  'assumptions'.  These  were  universal  provision  of  family 
allowances,  the  establishment  of  a  national  health  service  and  the  maintenance  of  high 
levels  of  employment.  Finally,  a  safety  net,  in  the  form  of  national  assistance,  would 
provide  for  those  outside  the  national  insurance  scheme.  This  would  be  a  residual 
means-tested  benefit  for  which  demand  was  expected  to  fall  as  the  scope  of  insurance 
expanded. 
25  Beveridge  Report,  paras.  303-309. 
33 The  Beveridge  Report  has  been  variously  described  as  the  founding  document  of 
the  welfare  state  and  a  plan  for  rationalising  existing  provision,  containing  little  that 
was  radical  or  revolutionary.  26  However,  there  is  no  doubting  its  contemporary 
popularity  among  the  British  public  at  large;  it  is  claimed  that  approximately  750,000 
copies  were  sold  and  a  British  Institute  of  Public  Opinion  (BIPO)  poll  showed  that  95 
per  cent  of  people  were  aware  of  the  Beveridge  Report  two  weeks  after  its  release.  27 
Political  responses  to  the  Beveridge  Report  were  somewhat  more  complex.  The 
Labour  Party  responded  enthusiastically  while  Conservative  members  of  the 
government  were  rather  less  impressed.  Like  the  BEC,  Churchill's  main  concern  was 
that  the  report  should  not  be  implemented  before  the  war  ended  . 
28  Amore  positive 
Conservative  reaction  came  from  the  Tory  Reform  Committee  although  this 
progressive  wing  was  very  much  a  minority  at  this  time.  The  more  critical  views  in 
the  government  were  sustained  during  the  parliamentary  debate  on  the  Beveridge 
Report  that  took  place  in  February  1943.  The  debate  created  the  impression  that  the 
government  was  lukewarm  in  its  attitude  towards  the  Beveridge  Report.  Ultimately, 
however,  public  support  for  the  Beveridge  Report  was  such  that  Churchill  was  forced 
to  be  outwardly  positive.  In  a  radio  broadcast  in  March  1943,  he  announced  details  of 
a  four-year  plan  for  post-war  reconstruction.  Afterwards,  the  drafting  of  a  White 
Paper  on  the  reform  of  social  security  got  underway. 
26  ADK  Owen,  The  Beveridge  Report,  p.  I  and  RJ  Cootes,  The  making  ofthe  wetibre  state,  p.  82 
subscribe  to  the  fonner  view  and  M  Bruce,  The  coming  ofthe  welfare  state,  p.  274  and  AI  Ogus, 
'Great  Britain',  p.  191  to  the  latter. 
27  jC  Kincaid,  Poverty  and  equalily  in  Britain,  p.  44;  British  Institute  of  Public  Opinion,  The 
Beveridge  report  and  the  public,  p.  5. 
29  P  Alcock,  Poverty  and  state  support,  p.  52. 
34 Given  the  role  of  interest  groups  such  as  the  TUC  and  the  BEC  in  other  areas  of 
policy  and  their  involvement  in  social  policy  via  the  Beveridge  Committee,  it  is 
plausible  to  seek  a  wider  notion  of  a  welfare  consensus  outside  the  arenas  of  party 
politics  and  public  opinion.  There  has  been  a  tendency  among  some  historians  to 
underestimate  the  trade  union  movement's  interest  in  the  Beveridge  Committee  and 
social 
poliCy. 
29  This  is  a  reflection  of  a  focus  on  individual  unions  rather  than  the 
TUC,  which  was  where  trade  union  social  policy  was  formulated.  Others  have  noted 
the  trade  union  movement's  positive  response  to  Beveridge.  A  number  of 
explanations  for  this  have  been  put  forward:  Heclo  suggests  that  high  interwar 
unemployment,  a  dislike  of  the  means  test  and  amicable  links  between  Beveridge  and 
trade  unionists  were  factors  in  the  unions'  lavourable  reaction.  30  Van  Leeuwen  also 
cites  the  influence  of  interwar  mass  unemployment  .31 
Brooke  argues  that  wartime 
purchasing  restrictions  reduced  the  importance  of  wages  resulting  in  a  corresponding 
increase  in  interest  in  social  POHCY.  32 
The  TUC's  Joint  Social  Insurance  and  Workmen's  Compensation  and  Factories 
Committee  discussed  the  Beveridge  Report  in  some  detail.  The  committee  drew  a 
favourable  comparison  between  the  TUC's  evidence  to  Beveridge  and  the  content  of 
the  report,  recommending  that  the  General  Council  accept  the  report  although  the 
details  required  ftirther  examination.  33  The  emphasis  was  on  obtaining  improvements 
in,  and  the  extension  of,  its  provisions.  With  the  exception  of  the  incorporation  of 
29  D  Barnes  &E  Reid,  Governments  and  trade  unions,  p.  11;  M  Bruce,  The  coming  ofthe  weyizre  state, 
p.  276;  B  Pimlott  &C  Cook,  eds.,  Trade  unions  in  British  politics,  p.  163. 
30  H Heclo,  Modern  socialPOlitics,  p.  147. 
31  MHD  van  Leeuwen,  'Trade  unions  and  the  provision  of  welfare  in  the  Netherlands',  p.  787. 
32  S  Brooke,  Labour's  war,  p.  152. 
33  MRC,  MSS.  292/161.1/3,  Joint  Social  Insurance  and  Workmen's  Compensation  and  Factories 
Committee  (Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC)  1,9  Dec.  1942;  MSS.  292/150.5/4,  General  Council  resolution,  16  Dec. 
1942. 
35 workmen's  compensation  into  social  insurance,  any  dissatisfaction'on  the  part  of  the 
TUC  stemmed  from  a  desire  to  advance  upon  Beveridge's  proposals  rather  than  from 
an  aversion  to  them.  From  the  earliest  stages,  the  TUC  was  active  in  lobbying  for  the 
implementation  of  the  Beveridge  Report. 
The  Beveridge  plan  formed  the  basis  for  TUC  social  security  policy  over  the 
course  of  the  next  twenty  years.  The  key  tenets  of  TUC  policy  included  the  principles 
of  universalism,  uniformity,  flat-rate  contributions  and  benefits  and  subsistence  levels, 
those  that  underpinned  the  Beveridge  model.  The  drawbacks  of  a  flat-rate  system 
were  to  become  apparent  in  the  early  1950s  but  there  was  little  resistance  in  1942 
when  flat-rate  principles  satisfied  different  interests  for  different  reasons.  The 
principle  of  subsistence  benefits  did  provoke  controversy.  The  Beveridge  Report 
advocated  that  benefits  should  be  sufficient  both  in  amount  and  duration.  The  TUC 
was  a  keen  proponent  and  pursued  the  concept  of  subsistence  benefits  and  pensions 
throughout  this  period.  It  praised  the  report  for  establishing  'subsistence  on  a  proper 
administrative  basis  under  which  every  citizen  will  be  provided  with  subsistence  as  a 
right  by  virtue  of  his  contributions  and  without  means  test  or  investigations'  . 
34  The 
TUC  rejected  the  government's  argument  that  subsistence  benefits  were  impractical 
because  they  would  be  required  to  fluctuate  in  line  with  inflation.  It  believed  that  the 
government  should  control  inflation  in  peacetime  as  they  were  doing  during  the  war.  35 
With  regard  to  industrial  views,  we  have  already  observed  that  the  most  positive 
and  enlightened  views  emanating  from  industry  have  been  highlighted  while  the 
34  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.5/4,  A.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  4,14  Jan.  1943. 
35  Ibid. 
36 BEC's  more  conservative  outlook  has  been  overlooked  or  downplayed.  36  The 
Beveridge  Report  received  a  less  amicable  response  from  the  BEC  than  from  the 
TUC.  The  fiercest  criticism  came  from  its  director,  Sir  John  Forbes  Watson,  -  although 
the  Confederation's  official  reaction  was  toned  down  in  response  to  the,  popular 
mood.  37  Watson  complained  that  'an  atmosphere  has  been  created  in  which  anyone 
who  dares  to  criticise  the  proposals  from  any  angle  is  looked  upon,  not  only  as  being 
antagonistic  to  the  Government  and  thereby  jeopardising  the  national  unity,  but  as  an 
inhumane  person  who  wishes  to  perpetuate  want  in  this  country'.  38  Watson  and  the 
BEC  were  now  opposed  to  compulsory  participation  in  a  social  insurance  scheme. 
The  retreat  was  based  on  their  belief  that  Beveridge  had  not  satisfactorily  established 
the  widespread  existence  of  want.  Watson  also  objected  strongly  to  the  cost  of 
implementing  Beveridge,  which  would  require  an  undesirable  level  of  redistribution 
of  incomes  and  higher  taxes.  He  concluded  that  the  report  was  'an  instrument  which 
holds  within  itself  the  possibility  of  political  exploitation  to  an  extreme  point  where, 
through  increases  in  Direct  Taxation,  the  whole  community  can  be  reduced  to  a 
uniform  level  of  income  and  where  the  reward  for  initiative  and  enterprise  would 
disappear.  09 
The  BEC's  published  statement  on  the  Beveridge  Report  was  more  subdued.  Still, 
the  only  positive  comment  was  in  praise  of  the  survey  of  existing  provision.  The 
Confederation  resisted  the  principle  of  universalism  because  the  scheme  would  then 
provide  for  those  who  were  'not  in  want'.  Its  chief  concem  was  the  cost  of  the 
36  P  Addison,  7he  road  to  1945  (1994),  p.  214;  P  Thane,  Foundations  ofthe  weVire  state,  p.  233.  See 
also  K  Middlemas,  Politics  in  industrial  society,  p.  287. 
37  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C216  pt  5,  Sir  John  Forbes  Watson  to  Sir  Andrew  Duncan,  20  Jan.  1943. 
39  WC,  MSSIOO/13/3/2/C4  pt.  105,  N.  C.  7720,  Social  Insurance  and  Allied  Services.  "Beveridge' 
Report  Notes  for  Meeting  -  15th  January,  15  Jan.  1943. 
39  Ibid. 
37 Beveridge  plan;  it  argued  that  the  introduction  of  Beveridge's  proposals  could  not  be 
considered  until  Britain  had  established  the  order  of  her  post-war  priorities  and  her 
capacity  for  meeting  them.  The  BEC  also  shed  doubt  on  the  feasibility  of  maintaining 
Beveridge's  recommended  level  of  employment  amid  'international  and  other  factors 
beyond  our  control  which  may  largely  determine  the  employment  position  of  an 
40  exporting  and  importing  country  such  as  ours'.  Indeed,  employers  believed  that  the 
cost  of  the  Beveridge  Report  and  its  impact  on  industry  would  be  a  cause  of 
unemployment.  Thus,  rather  than  implementing  the  Beveridge  Report,  the 
goverment  should  instigate  an  inquiry  to  investigate  the  existence  of  want  and  ways 
and  means  of  eliminating 
it.  41 
Another  organisation,  representative  of  business  interests,  the  Association  of 
British  Chambers  of  Commerce,  expressed  its  views  on  Beveridge.  While  the  ABCC 
favoured  the  simplification  of  social  security  provision  and  endorsed  the  -general 
themes  contained  in  the  Beveridge  Report,  it  too  warned  against  making  plans  before 
the  end  of  the  war.  Unlike  most  other  contemporary  commentators,  the  Chambers  of 
Commerce  held  reservations  over  flat-rate  principleS.  42 
Strong  public  support  encouraged  a  more  positive  political  response  to  the 
Beveridge  Report,  which  eventually  included  the  Conservative  Party  albeit  with  some 
reluctance.  Similar  enthusiasm  was  displayed  by  the  TUC.  The  apparent  consensus 
over  Beveridge  is,  therefore,  only  undermined  by  the  continued  pessimism  expressed 
40  mRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C216  pt.  5,  Social  Insurance  and  Allied  Services  -  Memorandum  on  the 
Beveridge  Report,  10  Feb.  1943. 
U 
lbid- 
42  Public  Record  Office  (henceforth  PRO),  PIN  8/23,  The  Beveridge  Report  on  Social  Insurance  and 
Allied  Services,  Report  of  a  special  committee  on  the  views  expressed  by  Chambers  of  Commerce,  I 
June  1943. 
38 by  the  BEC.  Although  the  BEC  did  temper  its  response  in  keeping  with  public 
opinion,  it  was  basically  opposed  to  the  implementation  of  the  Beveridge  plan  and  to 
the  fundamental  themes  of  universalism  and  subsistence  that  found  so  much  favour 
among  the  public  and  in  the  labour  movement.  While  more  positive  views  from  other 
representatives  of  industry  complicate  the  picture  somewhat,  these  found  little 
expression  after  1942.  The  conservative  BEC  emerged  as  the  main  spokesgroup  in 
relation  to  social  security  policy  although  it  often  only  volunteered  opinions  when 
governments  made  direct  approaches  to  it. 
In  fact,  the  BEC  did  not  prove  to  be  particularly  effective  in  influencing 
government  social  policy.  Its  reactionary  nature  and  unwillingness  to  participate  in 
the  policy-making  process  militates  against  Middlemas'  thesis  of  'corporate  bias'. 
The  BEC  did  not  seek  to  shape  plans  for  social  reconstruction  during  the  war. 
Conversely,  while  the  TUC  actively  sought  to  participate  in  social  policy-making  via 
deputations  to  members  of  the  government,  it  had  little  obvious  success  at  first. 
Access  to  government,  in  this  case  to  Sir  William  Jowitt  who  was  responsible  for 
social  reconstruction  as  Minister  without  Portfolio,  was  unproblematic  but  produced 
little  in  the  way  of  results.  Efforts  to  elicit  the  government's  intentions  towards 
Beveridge  tended  to  be  ineffectual  as  Jowitt  refused  to  provide  the  TUC  with  details 
of  governinent  PoliCY.  43  Meanwhile,  officials  were  reticent  about  consultation  with 
the  TUC  and  the  government's  Reconstruction  Priorities  Committee  expressed  a 
desire  for  caution  when  informing  the  TUC  of  government  PoliCY.  44 
43  PRO,  PIN  9/9  1,  Sir  William  Jowitt  to  Sir  Walter  Citrine,  General  Secretary  of  TUC,  2  April  1943; 
Note  on  TUC  deputation  to  Sir  William  Jowitt  on  8  April  1943;  MRC,  MSS-292/150.5/4,  TUC  General 
Council  deputation  to  Sir  William  Jowitt,  8  April  1943. 
"  Ibid.,  TT  Hutson,  Office  of  the  Minister  without  Portfolio  to  EG  Beam  at  the  Ministry  of  Health,  6 
Aug.  1943. 
39 Legislating  social  security:  1944-1946 
The  Coalition  government  released,  a  VVWte  Paper,  Social  Insurance,  in  September 
1944.  It  embodied  many  of  Beveridge's  proposals  but  rejected  the  principle  of 
subsistence  and  unlimited  duration  for  benefits  and  there  was  no  prospect  of 
implementation  during  the  war  . 
4'  The  TUC's  response  to  social  security  reforms 
proposed  after  the  Beveridge  Report  has  attracted  little  attention  from  scholars. 
Brooke  suggests  that  the  Labour  Party  and  the  TUC  were  ambivalent  towards  the 
White  Paper.  46  Indeed,  the  TUC  was  generaRy  satisfied  with  the  White  Paper  but 
irate  at  the  omission  of  the  subsistence  principle,  time  limits  on  benefits  and  the  level 
of  family  allowances.  47  Employers  paid  little  attention  to  the  White  Paper;  there  is  no 
record  of  any  discussion  on  the  matter  by  the  BEC. 
Responsibility  for  the  implementation  of  the  Beveridge  Report  and  the  1944  White 
Paper  passed  to  the  Labour  Party  upon  its  election  in  July  1945  and  the  new 
government  is  associated  with  a  range  of  social  policy  measures  which  formed  the 
basis  of  the  postwar  welfare  state.  These  included  the,  1946  National  -insurance  Act 
and  the  1947  National  Assistance  Act.  Another  wartime  trend,  the  practice  of 
consulting  the  trade  union  movement  and  industry  in  policy-making,  was  also 
ostensibly  maintained.  This  is  the  period  in  which  the  'postwar  settlement'  is 
believed  to  have  been  forged.  48  It  is  argued  that  the  cooperation  of  the  unions  in  the 
45  R  Lowe,  'The  second  world  war,  consensus  and  the  foundations  of  the  welfare  state',  p.  169. 
46  S  Brooke,  Labour's  war,  p.  147. 
47  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.6/1,  Government's  White  Paper  on  Social  Insurance  -  Parts  I  and  11,  Proposed 
Statement,  10  Oct.  1944. 
48  1  Gough,  Ae  political  econoM  ofthe  w60re  state,  p.  7;  K  Jcfferys,  7he  Labour  Party  since  1945, 
p.  8;  M  Sullivan,  Thepolitics  ofsocialpolicy,  p.  6;  A  Warde,  Consensus  and  beyond,  p.  4  1. 
40 war  effort  and  their  increased  strength  resulted  in  concessions  to  labour  in  the  form  of 
a  government  commitment  to  maintaining  a  high  level  of  employment  and  a  range  of 
state-sponsored  social  serviceS.  49  In  turn,  the  unions  would  adopt  new  responsibilities 
for  cooperating  in  industrial  and  economic  policy,  particularly  in  terms  of  wage 
50 
restraint  to  assist  the  government  in  carrying  out  its  policies. 
Scholars  have  questioned  the  strength  of  the  links  between  the  Labour  Party  and 
the  TUC!  '  There  were  early  grievances  in  the  TUC  with  regard  to  consultation,  and 
these  were  evident  in  social  policy-making  following  TUC  complaints  that  it  had  not 
been  involved  in  the  drafting  of  the  1945  National  Insurance  Bill.  52  TUC 
representatives  met  with  Jim  Griffiths,  the  Minister  of  National  Insurance  only  once 
before  the  publication  of  the  Bill  although  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  Labour  Party 
would  have  been  familiar  with  TUC  policy  already.  The  deputation  pressed  Griffiths 
to  implement  the  subsistence  principle,  following  its  rejection  by  the  Coalition 
government,  and  to  remove  the  time  limits  on  beenefitS.  53 
Whether  the  Labour  government  subscribed  to  the  subsistence  principle  continues 
to  be  a  subject  of  debate.  Both  Hill  and  HeB  believe  the  Labour  government  did 
intend  to  provide  subsistence  benefits  even  if  it  was  not  necessarily  successful  in 
doing  S0.54  Others  have  questioned  this  view  and  have  cited  the  out-of-date  price 
49  G  Dorfinan,  Wage  politics  in  Britain,  p.  5  1;  L  Minkin,  The  contentious  alliance,  p.  77. 
50  S  Beer,  Modem  British  politics,  pp.  318-9;  G  Dorfman,  Wagepolitics  in  Britain,  p.  5  1;  H 
Glcnnerster,  British  socialpolicy  since  1945,  p.  11;  1  Gough,  Thepolitical  economy  ofthe  weVizre 
state,  p.  147;  B  Jessop,  'The  transformation  of  the  state  in  post-war  Britain',  pp.  28-9;  R  Taylor, 
'Industrial  relations',  p.  94. 
51  R  Martin,  TUC,  pp.  290  and  296. 
32  Ibid.;  PRO,  PIN  19/21,  Sir Walter  Citrme  to  Rt.  Hon.  James  Griffiths,  30  Oct.  1945. 
53  MRC,  MSS192/161.1/4,  A.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  deputation  to  the  Minister  of  National  Insurance,  15  Nov. 
1945. 
54  J  HeB,  'The  social  policy  of  the  Attlee  government',  p.  304;  M  Hill,  The  wettizre  state  in  Britain,  p. 
30. 
41 55  index  used  to  set  benefit  levels  and  estimates  of  rent  employed.  Lowe  also  points 
out  that  the  time  limits  on  benefits  also  contravened  the  principle  of  adequacy.  56  A 
memorandum  written  by  Griffiths  reveals  his  determination  to  avoid  committing  the 
government  to  the  subsistence  principle,  which  he  thought  was  an  unfeasible  basis  for 
benefit  levels.  57  He  promised  the  TUC  that  benefits  would  be  increased  beyond  the 
levels  proposed  in  the  White  Paper  but  not  necessarily  in  accordance  with  the 
subsistence  principle  on  grounds  of  practicality.  58  However,  initial  benefit  levels  did 
correspond  with  Beveridge's  concept  of  subsistence  even  though  there  was  no 
commitment  to  strictly  maintain  the  correlation  between  benefit  levels  and  increases 
in  the  cost  of  living.  TUC  representatives  met  with  Griffiths  to  discuss  the  National 
Insurance  Bill  in  February  1946.  The  Minister  told  the  deputation  that  the  benefit 
levels  in  the  Bill  were  based  on  Beveridge's  recommendations  plus  an  allowance  for 
the  subsequent  increase  in  the  cost  of  living.  The  government  was  not  prepared  to  tie 
benefit  rates  to  prices  though  it  would  try  to  keep  the  cost  of  living  at  its  current  level. 
In  addition,  quinquennial  reviews  would  provide  the  opportunity  to  adjust  benefits  in 
line  with  inflation.  59  These  meetings  between  Griffiths  and  the  General  Council  led 
the  TUC  to  believe  that  the  Labour  government  did  in  fact  give  effect  to  the 
subsistence  principle,  which  continued  to  be  a  feature  of  TUC  policy. 
The  BEC's  response  to  the  National  Insurance  Bill  is  unknown  owing  to  the 
absence  of  records  documenting  the  discussions  of  a  sub-committee  which  was  set  up 
-5-5  B  Abel-Smith,  "Me  Beveridge  Report',  p.  20;  P  Baldwin,  Thepolifics  ofsocial  solidaray,  p.  133;  H 
Heclo,  Modem  socialpolitics,  p.  148;  B  Jordan,  'Want',  p.  19;  J  Veit-Wilson,  'Condemned  to 
deprivationT,  p.  109. 
56  R  Lowe,  'A  prophet  dishonoured  in  his  own  countryT,  p.  120. 
57  PRO,  PIN  1816,  Social  Services  Committee,  national  insurance  pensions  and  benefit  rates,  draft 
memorandum  by  the  Ministry  of  National  Insurance,  6  Nov.  1945,  p.  1. 
58  PRO,  PIN  19/21,  Deputation  from  the  General  Council  of  TUC,  15  Nov.  1945,  p.  3. 
59  MRC,  MSS292/161.1/4,  A.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  5/1,  deputation  to  Minister  of  National  Insurance  on 
National  Insurance  Bill  on  12  Feb.  1946,14  Feb.  1946. 
42 to  discuss  potential  amendments  to  the  Bill.  60  One  member  organisation,  the  Cotton 
Spinners'  and  Manufacturers'  Association,  wrote  to  the  BEC  to  complain  about  the 
payment  of  full  national  insurance  contributions  on  behalf  of  part-time  workers,  a 
grievance  that  would  be  pursued  throughout  this  period.  The  Cotton  Spinners  were 
concerned  that  generous  state  benefits  would  encourage  absenteeiSM.  61  In  response  to 
the  National  Insurance  Act,  1946,  the  BEC  focused  on  the  implications  for 
occupational  sick  pay  schemes  and  its  impact  on  the  economy.  62  The  BEC  blamed 
economic  difficulties  on  the  labour  shortage  and  the  cost  of  imports:  essential  imports 
required  high  export  levels  to  pay  for  them,  which  raised  the  issue  of  wages  as  a 
factor  in  production  costs.  The  Confederation  cited  recent  wage  rises,  family 
allowances  and  increased  state  social  spending  as  the  source  of  inflationary  pressure. 
The  BEC  was  also  worried  about  the  level  of  taxation,  claiming  that  Britain  was  'the 
most  heavily  taxed  ... 
[country]  in  the  world'.  63  In  1947  these  concerns  led  the  British 
Employers'  Confederation  to  conclude  that  'that  the  Government  should  make  it  clear 
that  its  National  Insurance  and  Industrial  Injuries  Acts  will  not  be  brought  into 
operation  next  year'.  64 
Throughout  this  formative  period  of  the  modem  welfare  state,  the  TUC  continued 
to  monitor  the  development  of  social  policy  but  its  positive  relations  with  the 
Beveridge  Committee  were  not  maintained  when  the  responsibility  for  social  security 
reform  shifted  to  the  government.  Access  to  the  relevant  members  of  government  was 
60  MRC,  MSS200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  114,  N.  C.  9156,  FJC  Honey  (Assistant  Secretary)  to  members  of  the 
National  Insurance  Bill  Sub-Committee,  23  Feb.  1946. 
61  Ibid.,  N.  C.  9163,  Government's  National  Insurance  Bill,  Summary  of  Observations  by  Members  of 
Confederation,  undated,  (FcbJMarch  1946). 
62  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  115,  N.  C.  9397,  HM  Piper,  Secretary  to  employers'  organisations 
concerned,  Superannuation  and  Sick  Pay  schemes,  6  Sept.  1946. 
63  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  117,  N.  C.  9625,  Notes  for  Confederation  Committee  -  Economic 
Survey  for  1947,4  March  1947. 
64  Ibid. 
43 granted  but  was  looked  upon  with  little  enthusiasm  in  government  circles.  The 
situation  improved  little  upon  the  election  of  the  Labour  Party,  which  provided  little 
additional  opportunity  for  the  TUC  to  play  a  role  in  policy  making.  Nonetheless  the 
TUC  had  unlimited  access  to  the  government  and  was  kept  informed  of  policy 
developments.  The  TUC's  general  endorsement  of  the  pattern  of  social  reform 
supports  the  consensus  thesis  at  a  general  level  but  disagreement  over  details 
remained.  The  BEC  did  not  actively  seek  a  role  in  policy  making,  nor  to  influence 
government  policy.  This  should  not  imply  that  the  BEC  accepted  events  as  they 
unfolded.  The  popular  mood  forced  the  Confederation  to  stifle  its  criticism  but  until 
the  implementation  of  the  1946  National  Insurance  Act  the  BEC  continued  to  oppose 
social  security  reforms  along  the  lines  of  the  Beveridge  plan. 
The  development  of  social  security.  1948-64 
As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  certain  scholars  locate  the  origins  of  a  welfare 
consensus  in  the  activities  of  the  Coalition  government  during  the  second  world  war.  65 
Others  look  to  the  continuity  between  the  policies  of  the  Coalition  and  the  1945-51 
Labour  governments  or  between  the  Attlee  administration  and  the  Conservative 
opposition.  66  The  policies  of  the,  postwar  Labour  government  and  subsequent 
Conservative  administrations,  particularly  that  led  by  Churchill  between  1951  and 
1955,  have  also  been  examined  for  this  purpose  ý7  Some  critics  of  the  consensus 
thesis  have  argued  that  there  are  explanations  for  apparent  continuities  in  policies 
65 
Page  14. 
66  P  Addison,  The  road  from  1945',  p.  15;  D  Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945;  R  Lowe,  'Second 
world  war,  consensus  and  the  foundations  of  the  welfare  state',  p.  158. 
67  S  Beer,  The  British  political  system,  p.  176;  J  Harris,  'Society  and  the  state  in  twentieth-century 
Britain',  p.  105;  A  Marwick,  Britain  in  the  cerawy  oftotal  war,  p.  374;  A  Seldon,  'The  Churchill 
administration'  p.  67;  A  Seldon,  'The  rise  and  fall  (and  rise  again?  )  of  the  post-war  consensus',  p.  47. 
44 other  than  the  existence  of  a  cross-party  consensus  . 
68  For  instance,  policy  may  have 
been  governed  by  constraints,  which  prevented  radical  change.  The  trade  union 
movement  has  been  cited  as  one  such  constraint.  69  One  of  the  problems  with  this 
approach  is  that  it  fails  to  consider  the  role  of  employers  who  may  have  countered 
trade  union  influence. 
Labour  governments 
On  5  July  1948  the  Labour  goverment  implemented  its  1946  National  Insurance  and 
National  Health  Service  Acts  and  the  1947  National  Assistance  Act.  The  social 
security  legislation  was  largely  based  on  the  Beveridge  Report,  causing  historians  to 
establish  an  element  of  continuity  between  the  social  security  policies  of  the  wartime 
Coalition  and  the  postwar  Labour  governments.  On  the  whole  the  TUC  approved  of, 
and  supported,  this  legislation.  By  contrast  the  BEC  had,  in  1947,  voiced  its  opinion 
that  the  acts  should  not  be  implemented  amid  adverse  economic  circumstances.  Once 
the  legislation  was  in  place,  the  Confederation  turned  its  attention  to  the  activities  of 
the  National  Insurance  Advisory  Committee  (NIAC)  which  had  been  established  to 
make  and  review  social  security  regulations.  It  largely  eschewed  direct  involvement 
in  other  aspects  of  social  security  policy  other  than  when  it  was  approached  by  the 
goverment  for  advice. 
The  Labour  government's  social  security  policy  quickly  provoked  dissatisfaction 
among  both  employers  and  the  trade  union  movement  alike.  In  1949,  Forbes  Watson 
68  N  Ellison,  'Consensus  here,  consensus  there',  pp.  18-19;  H Jones,  'New  tricks  for  an  old  dog?  ',  p. 
43;  C  Pierson,  'Social  policy',  p.  149. 
69  H Jones,  'New  tricks  for  an  old  dog?  ',  p.  43. 
45 of  the  BEC  complained  to  the  National  Joint  Advisory  Committee  (NJAC)  about  the 
negative  effects  of  social  spending  on  capital  investment  and  tax  levelS.,  70  The  unions 
took  an  opposing  stance:  social  expenditure  was  not  high  enough.  The  Labour 
government's  benefit  levels  corresponded  to  those  recommended  by  Beveridge,  thus 
creating  the  impression  that  the  principle  of  subsistence  had  been  implemented.  But 
the  inconsistency  of  flat-rate  subsistence  benefits  soon  became  apparent,  exacerbated 
by  the  anomalous  relationship  between  national  insurance  and  national  assistance. 
National  insurance  benefits  included  a  flat-rate  element  for  rent  that  was  inevitably 
inadequate  in  some  regions  while  national  assistance  provided  a  full  allowance  for 
rent,  which  resulted  in  national  assistance  payments  being  higher  than  those  under  the 
national  insurance  scheme.  Consequently  national  insurance  beneficiaries  with-no 
other  source  of  income  were  able  to  supplement  their  benefit  or  pension  with  national 
assistance.  Instead  of  diminishing  as  the  scope  of  insurance  expanded,  national 
assistance  grew  considerably  over  the  years  that  followed.  This  trend  was  intensified 
by  the  tendency  for  insurance  benefits  to  fall  behind  movements  in  the  cost  of  living 
from  the  outset.  The,  subsistence  principle,  always  tenuous,  soon  became  eroded 
when  benefit  levels  were  not  improved  until  195  1. 
Initially  these  developments  incited  complaints  from  the  unions  at  annual  trade 
union  congresses,  which  were  stifled  or  deflected  by  members  of  the  General  Council 
who  defended  the  government's  record  . 
7'  The  1951  National  Insurance  Bill  put  an 
end  to  its  deference:  the  Bill  made  proposals  for  confming  pension  increases  to  older 
pensioners  only,  invoking  a  breach  with  the  principle  of  uniformity.  Strong 
70  NMC,  MSS.  292/108.2/2,  Ministry  of  Labour  and  National  Service  National  Joint  Advisory  Council 
(NJAC)  27th  minutes,  27  April  1949. 
71  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1948,  pp.  356-58,  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report 
19499p.  129. 
46 dissatisfaction  with  anomalies  between  national'health  insurance  and  unemployment 
insurance  in  the  interwar  period  had  led  the  General  Council,  if  not  the  wider  trade 
union  movement,  to  consider  uniformity  of  benefits  to  be  a  central  tenet  of  social 
security  policy.  Further  dissatisfaction  was  incited  by  the  fitilure  to  reinstate  the 
subsistence  principle  together  with  improvements  in  national  assistance,  which 
created  a  'poverty  trap':  increases  in  national  insurance  caused  a  reduction  in  national 
assistance  leading  to  no  or  very  little  increase  in  total  income.  The  inadequacy  of  the 
benefit  increases  was  especially  unsatisfactory  since  the  government  had  also  taken 
advantage  of  the  surplus  in  the  national  insurance  fund  to  reduce  the  Exchequer's 
share  of  the  national  insurance  contribution,  and  had  abolished  the  block  grant  to  the 
fund.  The  TUC's  dismay  at  these  developments  was  compounded  by  the  Labour 
government's  failure  to  consult  it  during  the  drafting  of  the  Bill.  72 
At  the  end  of  the  Attlee  goverment's  period  in  office,  the  BEC  was  still  critical  of 
the  levels  of  social  expenditure  and  there  was  also  evidence  of  dissatisfaction  amongst 
the  trade  union  movement  at  large  as  expressed  at  congress.  The  unions'  complaints 
came  to  be  voiced  among  the  highest  echelons  of  the  movement  in  1951.  The  BEC 
had  never  shown  any  support  for  Labour's  social  security  policy  while  the  TUC's  was 
disintegrating  towards  the  end  of  the  Labour  administration.  The  TUC's  complaints 
concerned  not  only  the  nature  of  the  development  of  social  security  policy  but  the 
government's  failure  to  consult  it.  The  BEC  had  no  direct  contact  with  the  Labour 
government  with  regard  to  this  area  of  policy  outside  of  the  NIAC.  There  is, 
therefore,  little  evidence  to  support  Keith  Middlemas'  thesis  of  'corporate  bias'  during 
this  period.  These  groups,  by  virtue  of  their  importance  in  other  areas  of  policy,  were 
72  MRC,  MSS292/161/9,  Social  Insurance  and  Industrial  Welfare  Committee  (SIIWC)  14,11  June 
47 granted  unlimited  access  to  government  in  this  sphere,  an  opportunity  that  the  BEC 
regularly  chose  not  to  exploit,  but  in  any  case  were  not  involved  in  the  making  of 
policyper  se. 
Conservative  governments 
Both  the  theories  of  corporate  bias  and  consensus  are  argued  to  have  extended  into  the 
subsequent  period  of  Conservative  rule,  from  1951  to  1964.  The  Churchill 
goverment  (1951-55)  in  particular  has  been  fertile  ground  for  both  supporters  and 
detractors  of  the  consensus  thesis.  It  is  during  these  years  that  trade  union  opinion, 
for  some,  became  a  constraint  on  government  policy-making,  a  factor  in  preventing 
Conservative  government  from  undertaking  radical  changes  in  social  policy. 
Middlemas  also  maintains  that  the  practice  of  corporate  bias  was  sustained.  The  good 
relations  between  the  Churchill  government  and  the  TUC  have  been  widely  noted 
although  the  relationship  is  often  perceived  to  have  deteriorated  thereafter.  73  It  has 
been  suggested  that  government-industry  relations  took  a  downturn  immediately 
following  the  Tory  victory  in  1951  although  for  the  purposes  of  social  security  policy 
the  BEC  was  treated  on  equal  terms  with  the  TUC.  74 
The  practice  of  consultation  was  in  fact  maintained  by  Conservative  governments, 
and  to  a  greater  degree  than  under  their  Labour  predecessors.  For  those  seeking 
1952. 
73  VL  Allen,  Trade  unions  and  the  government,  p.  34;  D  Bames  &E  Reid,  Governments  and  trade 
unions,  p.  19;  P  Dorcy,  7he  Conservative  Party  and  the  trade  unions,  p.  3  9;  G  Dorfin  an,  Wage  politics 
in  Britain,  p.  8  1;  R  Martin,  TUC.  ý  growth  ofapressure  group,  pp.  300-2;  L  Minkin,  The  contentious 
alliance,  p.  81;  H Pelling,  A  history  ofBritish  trade  unionism,  pp.  223  and  247;  R  Taylor,  'Industrial 
relations',  p.  98. 
74  S  Blank,  Industry  antigovernment,  p.  59;  W  Grant  &D  Marsh,  The  Confederation  ofBritish 
Industpy,  p.  23;  N  Kipping,  Summing  up,  p.  68. 
48 evidence  of  'corporate  bias',  the  period  began  promisingly,  with  substantial 
consultation  of  both  the  BEC  and  TUC  during  the  drafting  of  the  1952  National 
Insurance  and  Family  Allowances  Bill.  The  BEC  continued  to  have  close  links  with 
the  NIAC  while  the  TUC  increased  its  involvement  with  this  body.  75  rMe 
appointment  of  the  Phillips  Committee  on  pensions  and  the  introduction  of  graduated 
pensions,  both  fully  discussed  in  chapter  three,  provided  additional  opportunities  for 
BEC  and  TUC  involvement  in  social  policy-making.  Finally,  proposals  for  the 
introduction  of  earnings-ýrelated  unemployment  and  sickness  benefit  in  1963  required 
full  and  regular  consultation  with  both  bodies. 
The  new  Conservative  Minister  of  National  Insurance,  Osbert  Peake,  approached 
the  BEC  and  TUC  for  consultation  while  it  was  preparing  its  first  piece  of  social 
security  legislation.  Meetings  were  held  with  TUC  and  BEC  representatives,  and  both 
groups  were  given  advance  note  of  the  contents  of  the  Bill  before  its  publication.  The 
Act  itself  did  restore  the  principle  of  uniformity  and  benefits  were  raised,  though  not 
as  far  as  subsistence  levels.  However,  both  the  consultation  process  and  the 
coincidence  between  the  TUC's  views  and  the  policy  changes  owed  more  to  the 
desire  to  compensate  for  reductions  in  food  subsidies  and  attempts  to  secure  TUC  and 
BEC  agreement  for  a  higher  retirement  age  . 
76  The  restoration  of  uniformity  probably 
resulted  more  from  the  Treasury's  opposition  to  providing  higher  pensions  for  older 
pensioners  on  grounds  of  cost  rather  than  a  desire  to  adhere  to  Beveridgian 
principleS.  77  Thereafter,  neither  the  TUC  nor  the  Confederation  was  consulted  during 
75  During  the  1940s,  the  TUC  submitted  evidence  to  the  NIAC  regularly  but  its  nominee,  Sir  Alfred 
Roberts  who  chaired  the  General  Council  Social  Insurance  Committee,  seldom  attended  its  meetings. 
76  PRO,  7227/105,  Osbert  Peake  to  RA  Butler,  4  Dec.  1952.  Tripartite  talks  on  the  retirement  age  are 
discussed  in  chapter  3,  p.  14. 
77  PRO,  T227/119,  EW  Playfair  to  JG  Owen,  28  Jan.  1952. 
49 the  preparation  of  social  security  until  the  consideration  of  earnings  relation  in  the 
1960s. 
The  BEC  and  TUC  were  involved  in  extensive  consultation  with  regard  to  social 
security  regulations  through  the  activities  of  the  National  Insurance  Advisory 
Committee.  The  NIAC  was  established  by  the  National  Insurance  Act,  1946  to 
review  draft  regulations,  and  to  advise  the  Minister  on  the  technical  problems  of 
national  insurance.  Both  the  BEC  and  the  TUC  made  non-dnations  for  one  member 
each  of  the  advisory  committee  although  their  nominees  were  not  appointed  in  a 
representative  capacity.  The  BEC  and  TUC  were  also  active  in  presenting  evidence  to 
NIAC  inquiries,  which  dealt  with  matters  such  as  the  duration  of  unemployment 
benefit  and  the  participation  of  certain  groups,  i.  e.  married  women  and  part-time 
workers,  in  the  national  insurance  scheme.  78  Discussions  on  the  proposed 
introduction  of  earnings  relation  and  membership  of  independent  committees  aside, 
the  NIAC  provided  one  of  the  most  important  opportunities  for  these  interests  to  be 
actively  involved  in  the  formulation  of  policy,  albeit  at  an  administrative  level. 
Consultation  took  place  then  on  those  occasions  when  significant  policy  reviews 
were  taking  place  or  on  administrative  issues  processed  by  bodies  such  as  the  NIAC. 
It  generally  reflected  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  acquaint  itself  with  the 
views  of  industry  and  employers  on  certain  issues  rather  than  efforts  to  integrate  these 
groups  into  the  policy-making  process.  Therefore,  the  TUC  continued  to  send 
deputations  to  government  ministers  on  a  regular  basis  in  order  to  try  to  affect  policy. 
78  The  minutes  of  the  NIAC  until  1960  can  be  found  in  PRO,  PIN  60.  Minutes  for  subsequent  years  are 
not  yet  available  under  the  thirty  year  rule. 
50 The  BEC  seldom  made  such  direct  approaches  to  the  goverriment  though  it  was 
always  available  for  consultation. 
Released  from  the  ties  of  loyalty  to  a  Labour  administration,  the  TUC  became 
much  more  critical  of  government  social  security  policy  during  the  Conservative 
years.  In  part  this  reflected  a  philosophy  of  resistance  to  change.  The  Beveridge  plan 
continued  to  form  the  basis  of  TUC  thinking  on  social  security  and,  therefore,  the 
principles  of  actuarially-based  contributions,  flat-rate  contributions  and  benefits, 
uniformity  and  subsistence  were  fiercely,  if  not  always  successfully,  defended 
. 
79  By 
1964,  TUC  support  of  government  social  security  policy,  already  eroded  in  195  1,  had 
been  severely  tested.  Signs  of  consensus  are  yet  fewer  when  examining  the  BEC's 
position:  beneath  a  veneer  of  general  disinterest  and  unwillingness  to  undertake  direct 
action  before  1963,  the  BEC  took  every  opportunity  to  express  its  dissatisfaction  with 
the  national  insurance  scheme  and  its  underlying  principles,  and  levels  of  social 
spending.  As  the  tripartite  talks  on  earnings-related  unemployment  benefit  in  1963 
and  1964  would  reveal,  the  BEC  never  came  to  terms  with  the  social  objectives  of 
state  social  security  policy. 
The  gradual  abandonment  of  the  Beveridge  Report  led  to  growing  dissatisfaction  in 
the  TUC  with  social  security  policy,  a  process  that  was  provoked  by  Labour's 
abandonment  of  uniformity  in  1951  and  accelerated  under  Conservative 
administrations.  Contribution  and  benefit  levels  were  the  main  source  of  concern. 
The  TUC  was  wedded  to  the  principle  of  actuarially  based  contributions  and  so 
79  Actuarially-based  contributions  were  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  average  amount  of  contributions 
required  to  finance  benefits  and  pension  received  from  the  national  insurance  sclieme  by  an  employee 
who  participated  from  the  ages  of  16  to  65. 
51 resisted  increases  beyond  those  required  to  maintain  the  actuarial  principle. 
Moreover,  during  the  1950s,  the  TUC  became  increasingly  concerned  about  the 
burden  of  contributions  on  low-paid  workers.  The  TUC  persistently  failed  to 
acknowledge  this  as  an  inherent  flaw  of  a  social  security  system  based  on  flat-rate 
contributions,  continuing  to  perceive  the  problem  in  terms  of  inadequate  government 
funding.  80  It  was  aided  in  this  analysis  by  Labour's  cut  in  the  Exchequer's 
contribution  in  1951,  which  had  produced  an  obvious  explanation  for  the  presumed 
shortfall  in  the  national  insurance  fund.  A  shift  away  from  actuarial  principles  in 
setting  contribution  levels  also  encouraged  their  belief  that  the  fault  lay  with  the 
government.  In  1960  the  General  Council  complained  that  contributions  were  rising 
faster  than  benefit  levels  thus  shifting  liability  for  future  national  insurance  fund 
deficits  from  the  Exchequer  to  the  employee.  81  In  order  to  reverse  this  trend,  the  TUC 
called  for  a  return  to  actuarially  based  contributions  and  an  increase  in  the 
Exchequer's  share  of  the  contribution.  It  also  objected  to  the  NHS  element  in  the 
national  insurance  contribution.  82 
The  TUC  was  unsuccessftil  in  persuading  Conservative  governments  to  increase 
their  fmancial  commitment  to  the  insurance  scheme.  83  In  spite  of  this,  it  was  reluctant 
to  consider  other  methods  of  funding.  The  Labour  Party's  proposals  for  a  social 
security  tax  incited  little  enthusiasm  in  the  TUC  leading  to  the  policy  being  dropped 
. 
84 
A  flat-rate  contributory  system  of  social  security  continued  to  be  favoured  by  the 
so  MRC,  MSS292/161/10,  SIIWC  14/1,  Congress  resolution  on  national  insurance  benefit  rates  -  note 
of  deputation  to  Minister  of  National  Insurance  on  13  May  1953. 
81  MRC,  MSS.  292B/  161/13,  SIIWC  2,9  Nov.  1960. 
112  Ibid.,  SIIWC  2/6,  Changes  in  national  insurance,  industrial  injuries,  national  assistance  and  war 
1 en=ns  schemes,  9  Nov.  1960. 
3C,  MSS.  292/20/39,  General  Council  (General  Council),  24  Nov.  1954;  MSS.  292/161/12,  SIIWC 
4,8  Dec.  1954;  MSS.  292B/161/13,  SIIWC  2/6,  Changes  in  national  insurance,  industrial  injuries, 
national  assistance  and  war  pensions  schemes,  9  Nov.  1960. 
"  Labour  Party  Archive,  (henceforth  LPA),  R.  508/April  1955,  Policy  and  Publicity  Sub-Committee. 
52 TUC  because  it  was  seen  to  offer  benefits  'as  of  right'  and  be  a  more  egalitarian 
system  than  the  graduated  benefits  that  would  be  provided  under  a  social  security  tax. 
Baldwin  and  Ashford  have  explained  the  TUC's  recaltricance  in  terms  of  highcr-paid 
workers'  opposition  to  a  greater  degree  of  redistribution  because  they  were  often 
members  of  supplementary  insurance  schemes.  Baldwin  also  notes  that  earnings- 
related  benefits  were  perceived  to  produce  inequality.  85  Such  self-interested  motives 
are  not  reflected  in  the  discussions  of  the  TUC's  Social  Insurance  Committee.  These 
reveal  that  reservations  were  based  on  a  desire  to  avoid  both  an  expansion  in  means 
testing  and  the  threat  to  the  principle  of  universalism  that  would  be  posed  if  well-paid 
workers  sought  to  be  exempted  from  the  national  insurance  scheme.  86  Should 
national  insurance  be  confined  to  low-paid  employees,  as  in  the  interwar  period,  then 
a  greater  degree  of  redistribution  would  not  have  been  achieved  in  any  case. 
The  TUC  was  equally  ineffective  in  persuading  governments  to  restore  the 
subsistence  principle.  Although  it  was  consulted  during  the  preparation  of  the  1952 
National  Insurance  Bill,  the  Act  did  not  raise  benefits  to  subsistence  level.  Successive 
Conservative  Ministers  of  National  Insurance  rejected  TUC  demands  for  substantial 
increases  in  national  insurance  benefits.  Still,  the  TUC  prevaricated  over  the  Labour 
Party's  proposals  for  a  national  superannuation  scheme  for  fear  that  graduated 
pensions  would  undermined  its  campaign  for  a  flat-rate  subsistence  national  insurance 
benefit.  87  By  the  time  the  Conservatives  had  increased  benefits  to  1946  levels  in  real 
tenns  the  TUC  had  raised  the  stakes.  The  Beveridge  concept  of  subsistence  was  now 
dismissed  as  being  out-dated  and  thus  it  wanted  an  independent  inquiry  that  would 
85  DE  Ashford,  Policy  andpolitics  in  Britain,  p.  208;  P  Baldwin,  Politics  ofsocial  solidarity,  p.  233. 
86  MRC,  MSS292/161/10,  SlIWC  10,11  March  1953. 
87  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/6,  SllWC  5,13  Nov.  1958. 
53 establish  a  modem-day  definition  of  subsistence.  The  General  Council  also  suggested 
that  the  government  devise  a  special  cost-of-living  index,  giving  more  weight  to  basic 
items,  to  be  used  for  setting  benefit  levels,  a  request  that  was  denied.  88  Neither  was 
the  Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  willing  to  agree  to  an  inquiry  into 
subsistence.  Niall  Macpherson,  the  current  Minister,  rejected  this  on  the  grounds  that 
the  principles  of  flat-rate  and  subsistence  were  inherently  incompatible.  In  fact  the 
government  was  already  undertaking  a  review  of  guiding  principles  for  benefit  levels 
but  did  not  want  the  TUC  to  know  since  'this  would  invite  pressure  for  announcement 
of  the  findings'.  89  Benefit  increases  under  the  1961  and  1963  National  Insurance  Acts 
then  failed  to  meet  the  TUC's  demands.  90 
No  such  demands  for  improvements  to  national  insurance  came  from  the 
employers.  While  the  TUC  expressed  dismay  over  the  expansion  of  national 
assistance,  the  BEC  was  arguing  that  national  assistance  should  take  precedence  over 
national  insurance.  91  In  its  evidence  to  the  Phillips  Committee  on  pensions,  the 
Confederation  blamed  the  social  services  for  encouraging  people  to  rely  excessively 
on  the  state.  92  It  continued  to  resist  the  principle  of  subsistence  benefits  and 
pensions.  93  When,  in  1963,  the  BEC  first  signalled  its  acceptance  of  eamings-related 
unemployment  benefit,  economic  considerations  were  presented  as  being  paramount. 
Its  activities  in  relation  to  the  NIAC,  with  which  the  BEC  had  strong  links,  reveal  that 
the  Confederation's  attitudes  towards  social  security  in  the  1950s  continued  to  be 
88  MRC,  MSS292B/  161/13,  Letter  from  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance,  21  July  1960. 
89  PRO,  CAB  134/2418,  Cabinet  Committee  on  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  3,28  Jan.  1963. 
90  MRC,  MSS192B/161/16,  SIIWC  8,8  May  1963. 
91  PRO,  PIN  46/79,  Budget  proposals  and  national  insurance  benefits  -  note  of  meeting  with  British 
Employers'  Confederation  in  Minister's  room  on  27  March  1952,  pp.  1-2. 
92  NMC,  MSS.  200AB/3/2/C4  pt.  144,  N.  C.  13746..  Goverrunent  committee  on  economic  and  financial 
r  roblems  of  the  provision  for  old  age  -  note  by  Confederation,  undated  (c.  Nov.  1953-Jan.  1954). 
3  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C  1120  pt.  2,  N.  C.  14050,  Government  committee  on  economic  and  financial 
problems  of  the  provision  for  old  age  -  memorandurri  of  evidence  by  Confederation,  April  1954, 
54 governed  by  conservative  concerns  about  cost  and  expenditure.  Fear  of  abuse  of  the 
national  insurance  fund  and  inconvenience  to  employers  also  appeared  to  be 
formative  factors.  Considerations  of  both  the  public  purse  and  to  industry  itself 
explains  the  BEC's  opposition  to  the  payment  of  extended  unemployment  benefit,  full 
participation  of  part-time  workers  in  the  national  insurance  scheme  and  the 
requirement  to  pay  contributions  during  holiday  periods.  94  The  BEC  supported  the 
maintenance  of  the  Married  Women's  Anomalies  Regulations  that  placed  restrictions 
upon  the  participation  of  married  women  in  national  insurance  on  the  grounds  that 
such  workers  could  abuse  the  scheme.  95  Finally,  inconvenience  to  employers  was  the 
reason  behind  the  BEC's  support  for  improved  provision  for  short-time  workers 
because  these  workers  were  placing  pressure  on  their  employers  to  arrange  their  hours 
of  employment  so  as  to  allow  them  to  maximise  entitlement  to  unemployment 
be  f-t.  96 
ne  I 
In  1957  the  TUC  conceded  that  the  flat-rate  national  insurance  scheme  was 
operating  unsatisfactorily,  a  fact  made  glaringly  obvious  by  the  continued  expansion 
zp.  1-3. 
Details  of  the  BEC's  grievances  on  these  matters  can  be  found  in  the  following  documents:  MRC, 
MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  121,  N.  C.  10068,  National  Insurance  (Contributions  During  Holidays)  Draft 
Regulations  -  copy  of  letter  from  the  Confederation  to  the  National  insurance  Advisory  Committee,  20 
Jan.  1948;  MSS.  200/B/4/t/14,  N.  C.  14700,  Annual  Report  1954-55,  p.  3  1;  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C365  pt  8, 
N.  C.  13263,  National  insurance  proposed  regulations  -  copy  of  statements  submitted  by  the 
Confederation  to  the  National  Insurance  Advisory  Committee,  7  April  1953;  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C  115  1, 
N.  C.  14928,  Part-time  employment  in  relation  to  national  insurance  -  memorandum  submitted  to  the 
National  Insurance  Advisory  Committee,  May  1955;  N.  C.  15787,  National  Insurance  Acts  -  Part-time 
workers,  c.  6  Feb.  1957;  PRO,  PIN  60/22,  N.  I.  AX.  13,  Memorandum  submitted  by  the  Ministry  of 
National  Insurance  (vide  N.  I.  A.  C.  13,  Paper  3,  Representation  1,  Note)  Contributions  during  holidays  - 
historical  sketch,  3  Feb.  1948,  p.  1;  PIN  60/1,  National  Insurance  Advisory  Committee  5th  meeting,  10- 
II  Feb.  1948,  pp.  13-15. 
95  PRO,  PIN  19/144,  Married  women's  anomalies  regulations,  undated;  PIN  60/100,  N.  I.  A.  C.  88,  Paper 
3,  Representation  1,  Married  Women  Amendment  Regulations,  1953,  Representation  from  the  British 
Employers'  Confederation,  30  March  1953;  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/4/l/12,  N.  C.  13270,  Annual  Report 
1952-53,  pp.  26-27. 
96  MRC,  MSSIOO/B/3/2/C4  pt.  166,  N.  C.  16870,  Note  of  meeting  at  Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National 
Insurance,  23  July  1958;  PRO,  PIN  60/159,  N.  I.  A.  C.  147,  Paper  3,  Representation  2,  Unemployment 
and  Sickness  Benefit  Amendment  (No.  2)  Regulations,  1959,  memorandurn  submitted  by  the  British 
Employers'  Confederation,  I  June  1959. 
55 of  means-tested  national  assistance.  It  admitted  that  'the  uniform  benefits  of  the 
97 
present  scheme  have  become  synonymous  with  inadequate  benefits'.  It  somewhat 
reluctantly  accepted  the  principle  of  earnings-relation  for  pensions  in  1959  and,  in 
1962,  entered  into  discussions  on  graduated  unemployment  and  sickness  benefit  with 
the  Labour  Party  and  then  with  the  Conservative  goverment  in  the  following  year. 
In  spite  of  the  shift  towards  eamings-related  contributions  and  benefits,  a  flat-rate 
subsistence  level  benefit  and  pension  remained  the  predominant  goal  of  TUC  social 
security  policy  at  the  end  of  this  period,  one  which  was  clearly  at  odds  with 
government  policy.  The  BEC  entered  into  discussions  on  eamings-related  benefits  for 
quite  different  reasons:  its  interest  reflected  economic  concerns,  while  social 
considerations  were  dismissed  as  being  irrelevant  to  the  Confederation. 
Modernisation  ofnational  insurance:  earnings  relation  1963-1964 
Both  the  BEC  and  the  TUC  were  involved  in  consultation  with  the  Conservative 
goverment  in  1963  and  1964  regarding  plans  to  introduce  earnings-related  benefits. 
The  talks  involved  the  Ministry  of  Labour  and  the  Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National 
Insurance  (MPNI),  and  were  conducted  at  an  official  level.  The  opinions  expressed 
by  the  BEC  and  TUC  show  that  twenty  years  after  the  publication  of  the  Beveridge 
Report,  these  interests  were  still  as  divided  as  ever  over  the  objectives  of  social 
security  policy.  Although  both  groups  came  to  endorse  eamings-related 
unemployment  benefit,  their  reasons  for  doing  so  and  views  about  the  scope  of 
earnings-relation  continued  to  be  very  different.  The  govenunent's  response  to  the 
BEC's  proposals,  and  the  TUC's  attitude,  undermine  any  suggestion  that  agreement 
97  MRC,  MSS.  2921161/14,  SIIWC  14/7,  Suggested  paragraphs  for  Congress  report,  12  June  1957. 
56 on  camings-rclation  for  unemployment  benefit  as  the  future  direction  of  social 
security  policy  amounted  to  a  consensus.  These  tripartite  talks  provide  the  strongest 
evidence  of  corporate  bias  in  the  making  of  social  security  policy  during  this  period. 
The  BEC  and  TUC  were  consulted  because  of  their  position  as  interest  groups. 
However,  the  existence  of  corporate  bias  was  no  guarantee  that  these  groups  would 
have  an  active  influence  on  the  development  of  policy.  In  fact,  officials  proved  to  be 
disappointed  with  their  solutions  to  the  problems  of  earnings-relation. 
The  TUC  first  took  part  in  discussions  on  eamings-related  benefits  with  the  Labour 
Party  in  1962.  The  General  Council  endorsed  the  principle  of  earnings-relation  on  the 
condition  that  basic  national  insurance  benefits  were  restored  to  subsistence  level, 
which  needed  to  be  redefiried.  98  This  remained  the  TUC's  chief  objective  during  talks 
with  the  Conservative  government;  it  anticipated  that  the  additional  funds  raised  by 
graduating  contributions  could  be  used  to  improve  the  flat-rate  scheme.  99  This 
reflected  the  TUC's  continued  emphasis  on  social  security  for  low-paid  workers  and 
those  who  were  excluded  from  occupational  provision.  The  social  aspects  of  the 
national  insurance  scheme  were  deemed  to  be  paramount  and  the  alleviation  of 
poverty  continued  to  be  the  TUC's  priority.  By  contrast  BEC  interest  in  earnings- 
related  unemployment  benefit  reflected  economic  concerns:  'any  question  of  the 
adequacy  of  the  unemployment  benefit  on  social  grounds  was  not  a  matter  for  the 
Confederation.  What  concerned  the  Confederation  was  the  advantage  or  otherwise  to 
98  Ibid.,  SIIWC  Sub-Committee  on  Sickness  and  Unemployment  Benefit  4,9  May  1962. 
"  PRO,  LAB  10/193  1,  Note  of  deputation  from  the  TUC  to  the  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National 
Insurance  on  14  Jan.  1963,18  Jan.  1963,  p.  I  and  3;  Note  of  a  meeting  with  representatives  of  the 
TUC,  17  Dec.  1963,  p.  1;  LAB  10/1932,  Richard  Wood  to  AS  Marre,  17  Dec.  1963;  LAB  10/193  1,  CF 
Heron  to  DC  Barnes,  30  Jan.  1964;  Note  of  the  third  meeting  of  officials  with  representatives  of  the 
TUC,  21  Feb.  1964;  PIN  18/302,  Earnings-related  short-term  benefits  -a  summary  of  the  discussions 
held  at  official  level  with  the  BEC  and  the  TUC,  undated. 
57 industrial  relations  of  any  change  in  benefit  rates'.  '00  The  BEC  devised  proposals  for 
improved  unemployment  benefit  in  order  to  avoid  government  legislation  on 
severance  pay  and  to  relieve  demands  on  employers  to  make  provision  for 
redundancy.  '01  It  also  hoped  to  use  earnings-related  unemployment  benefit  in  order  to 
improve  labour  mobility  and  to  encourage  agreement  on  an  incomes  poliCy.  102 
Under  the  BEC's  scheme,  earnings-relation  would  not  be  extended  to  sickness 
benefit  for  a  number  of  reasons:  sick  workers  had  jobs  to  which  they  would  return, 
over  50  per  cent  of  workers  received  occupational  sick  pay,  eamings-related.  sickness 
benefit  was  irrelevant  to  the  objective  of  increasing  mobility,  and  it  would  be 
inflationary.  103  The  Confederation  also  favoured  strict  conditions  on  the  receipt  of 
eamings-related  unemployment  benefit;  these  included  a  good  national  insurance 
contribution  record  and  willingness  to  relocate  and  retmin.  104  The  objective  of  the 
contribution  condition  was  to  'cut  down  the  numbers  qualifying  for  benefit  to  a 
moderate  figure 
...  and  enable  contributions  to  be  kept  small  if  spread  over  all  insured 
persons'.  105  The  BEC  later  agreed  that  the  requirement  to  relocate  and  retrain  was 
perhaps  too  onerous  but  believed  it  should  be  given  serious  consideration  once  the 
supply  of  housing  and  training  facilities  improved.  106  In  order  to  avoid  benefit 
becoming  a  disincentive  to  return  to  work,  the  BEC  advocated  a  ceiling  on  the  total 
100  MRC,  MSS.  200/C/3/EMP/3/114,  BEC  63/135,  Payments  for  redundancy,  7  March  1963,  p.  2. 
101  Ibid.,  BEC  62/385,  Report  of  working  party  on  unemployment  benefit,  27  Sept  1962;  BEC  63/135, 
Payments  for  redundancy,  7  March  1963,  p.  2. 
102  PRO,  LAB  10/1932,  Note  of  a  meeting  with  representatives  of  the  BEC,  16  Dec.  1963;  Mr  Davies 
to  K  Barnes,  18  Dec.  1963. 
103  Ibid.,  Report  on  meeting  of  Minister  of  Pensions  with  BEC,  26  Nov.  1963,  p.  2;  Note  of  the  second 
meeting  of  officials  with  the  BEC,  7  Feb.  1964,  p.  1;  Note  by  K  Barnes,  Ministry  of  Labour,  13  Feb. 
1964;  PIN  18/302,  Memorandum  by  the  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance,  undated  (c.  Feb. 
1964). 
104  PRO,  LAB  10/1932,  Report  on  meeting  of  Minister  of  Pensions  with  BEC,  26  Nov.  1963,  pp.  1-2. 
105  MRC,  MSS.  200/C/3/EMP/3/115,  Notes  of  meeting  with  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National 
Insurance,  16  Dec.  1963. 
106  PRO,  LAB  10/  1932,  Note  of  the  second  meeting  of  officials  with  the  BEC,  7  Feb.  1964,  p.  3. 
58 benefit  of  two-thirds  of  normal  earnings,  which  would  be  payable  for  only  ten  to 
fifteen  weeks.  107  The  TUC  was  concerned  solely  with  the  social  aspects  of  national 
insurance  and  wanted  the  new  scheme  to  be  as  generous  as  possible.  Accordingly  it 
rejected  the  E9  to  E18  wage  band  that  operated  for  graduated  pensions  as  being  too 
narrow  since  it  would  not  'achieve  a  satisfactory  measure  of  re-distribution  in  favour 
of  the  lower-wage  earners'.  108  The  TUC  was  also  strongly  opposed  to  the  exclusion 
of  sickness  benefit  from  an  earnings-related  scheme.  This  stemmed  from  the  trade 
unions'  dislike  of  the  anomalies  between  national  health  insurance  and  unemployment 
insurance  in  the  interwar  period.  In  addition,  a  high  proportion  of  workers  were  not 
members  of  occupational  sick  pay  schemes.  'O' 
The  BEC's  scheme  found  little  favour  with  either  the  Ministry  of  Labour  or  the 
Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance,  though  the  former  was  more 
sympathetic  to  its  interest  in  the  economic  aspects  of  the  national  insurance 
scheme.  '  10  The  MPNI  was  opposed  to  the  BEC's  attempts  to  restrict  improvements  to 
redundant  workers  and  objected  to  national  insurance  being  used  to  satisfy  only 
economic  objectives.  "'  Both  Ministries  accepted  that,  earnings-relation  should  be 
107  PRO,  LAB  10/1931,  Eamings-related  unemployment  benefit  -some  of  the  points  for  discussion, 
undated,  LAB  10/1932,  Note  of  the  second  meeting  of  officials  with  the  BEC,  7  Feb.  1964,  p.  3;  PIN 
18/302,  Memorandum  by  the  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance,  undated  (c.  Feb.  1964). 
'011  PRO,  LAB  10/193  1,  Note  of  a  meeting  with  representatives  of  the  TUC,  17  Dec.  1963,  p.  2;  LAB 
10/1932,  Meeting  with  BEC  and  TUC  on  16-17  Dec.  1963  -  note  of  main  points  concerning  practical 
problems  of  wage-relation. 
'09  PRO,  LAB  10/193  1,  Note  of  a  meeting  with  representatives  of  the  TUC,  17  Dec.  1963,  p.  2;  LAB 
10/  1932,  Meeting  with  BEC  and  TUC  on  16-17  Dec.  1963  -  note  of  main  points  concerning  practical 
problems  of  wage-relation;  Richard  Wood  to  AS  Marre,  17  Dec.  1963. 
110  PRO,  PIN  35/203,  AS  Marre  to  RS  Swift,  23  Dec.  1963. 
111  PRO,  LAB  10/1932,  Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  document,  'Eamings-related 
unemployment  benefit',  14  Nov.  1963;  Report  on  meeting  of  Minister  of  Pensions  with  BEC,  26  Nov. 
1963,  p.  2;  PIN  35/203,  Note  of  a  meeting  on  earnings-related  unemployment  benefit,  7  Jan.  1964; 
MRC,  MSS.  200/C/3/EMP13/I  IS,  Notes  of  meeting  with  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance, 
16  Dec.  1963. 
59 also  extended  to  sickness  benefit.  '  12  The  Ministry  of  Labour  found  that  only  ten  per 
cent  of  unemployed  workers  would  benefit  under  the  BEC's  plan,  which  would  do 
little  to  lessen  workers'  fear  of  redundancy  or  to  improve  industrial  relations.  113  ne 
MINI  was  critical  of  the  two-thirds.  ceiling  on  benefit  levels  that  would  prevent 
families  with  two  children  on  an  income  of  E16  per  week  from  receiving  a  graduated 
supplement  even  though  the  wage  earner  would  be  liable  for  eamings-related 
contributions.  '  14  VVhile  the  Ministry  of  Labour  agreed  with  the  BEC  with  regard  to 
the  three-month  limit  on  the  payment  of  eamings-related  unemployment  benefit,  the 
Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  argued  that  it  should  be  paid  for  seven 
months  on  the  same  basis  as  flat-rate  unemployment  benefit.  "' 
While  the  Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  found  it  desirable  to 
ascertain  the  views  of  industry  and  trade  unions  on  earnings-related  short-term 
benefits,  they  did  not  necessarily  influence  it.  One  Ministry  of  Labour  official 
described  the  shortcomings  of  the  BEC's  proposals  as  'formidable'.  '  16  The  MINI 
was  clearly  not  impressed  with  many  aspects  of  the  BEC's  proposals  and  observed 
that  while  '[o]bviously  the  views  of  the  B.  E.  C.  are  extremely  important  ...  they  do  not 
fully  reflect  the  views  of  industry.  '  117  Officials  were  also  disappointed  by  the  TUC's 
contribution  to  the  talks  on  the  practical  problems  of  earnings-related  benefits:  '[i]t 
seems  likely  that  the  main  value  of  these  talks  with  the  T.  U.  C.  will  be  to  make  the 
112  MRC,  MSS.  200/C/3/EMP/3/115,  Notes  of  meeting  with  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National 
Insurance,  16  Dec.  1963;  PRO,  PIN  35/203,  AS  Marre  to  RS  Swift,  23  Dec.  1963;  LAB  10/193  1,  CF 
Heron  to  DC  Barnes,  30  Jan.  1964. 
113  PRO,  LAB  10/2024,  Note  of  meeting  to  discuss  the  BEC's  comments  on  the  government's 
memorandum  on  redundancy,  29  Nov.  1963. 
114  PRO,  LAB  10/1932,  K  Barnes  to  AS  Marre,  24  Feb.  1964. 
115  PRO,  PIN  35/203,  AS  Marre  to  RS  Swift,  23  Dec.  1963;  Note  of  a  meeting  held  on  earnings-related 
unemployment  benefit,  18  Feb.  1964. 
116  PRO,  LAB  10/1932,  UD  to  Minister  of  Labour,  4  Nov.  1963. 
117  PRO,  LAB  10/2046,  DC  Barnes  to  unknown,  18  Dec.  1963. 
60 unions  realise  the  difficulties  involved.  ""  Another  suggested  that  'the  main  interest 
of  the  talks  for  us  is  to  gauge  their  attitude  and  strength  of  feelipg  on  particular  points 
as  a  background  of  opinion  to  our  own  discussions'.  '  19 
Neither  were  the  BEC  and  the  TUC  impressed  by  the  other's  plans.  The  TUC  was 
critical  that  the  employers  were  approaching  the  subject  from  an  economic  viewpoint 
only.  120  It  was  particularly  opposed  to  the  proposed  exclusion  of  sickness  benefit 
from  earnings-relation,  the  BEC's  benefit  levels,  and  the  time  limit  of  three  months.  121 
Similarly  the  TUC's  position  found  little  favour  with  the  BEC.  The  Confederation 
objected  to  the  TUC's  demands  for  improvements  in  both  flat-rate  national  insurance 
benefits  and  the  introduction  of  earnings-relation  for  sickness  as  well  as 
unemployment  benefit:  '[ilt  cannot  be  repeated  too  often  that  increased  payments  of 
this  type  to  workers  whether  through  Social  Insurance  schemes  or  by  employers  are 
inflationary  unless  they  can  be  paid  for  by  higher  productivity.  "  122  Although  the  BEC 
had  agreed  to  the  introduction  of  earnings-relation,  for  unemployment  benefit  only,  it 
continued  to  concern  itself  about  the  cost  of  such  advances.  Its  director,  Sir  George 
Pollock,  wrote  to  the  Ministry  of  Labour  to  voice  'concern  at  the  serious  inflationary 
situation  which  might  result  from  the  -  implementation  of  all,  or  part  of,  the 
Government's  programme  for  the  improvement  of  the  status  and  security  of 
workers'.  123  The  BEC  was  worried  that  the  introduction  of  earnings-related 
118  PRO,  LAB  10/  193  1,  Note  by  K  Barnes,  21  Jan.  1964. 
119  Ibid.,  Davies  to  K  Barnes,  31,  Jan.  1964. 
120  PRO,  LAB  10/  1932,  Richard  Wood  to  AS  Marre,  17  Dec.  1963. 
121  PRO,  LAB  10/193  1,  Note  of  the  second  meeting  of  officials  with  the  TUC,  30  Jan.  1964;  Note  of 
the  third  meeting  of  officials  with  the  TUC,  21  Feb.  1964;  PIN  18/302,  Earnings-related  short-term 
benefits  -a  summary  of  the  discussions  held  at  official  level  with  the  BEC  and  the  TUC,  undated. 
122  PRO,  LAB  10/1932,  Extract  from  BEC  Bulletin  No.  222,22  Jan.  1964. 
123  MRC'  MSS.  200/C/3/EMP/3/115,  George  Pollock  to  Sir  James  Dunnet,  Ministry  of  Labour,  29  Jan. 
1964. 
61 unemployment  and  sickness  benefit  would  result  in  increased  costs  for  industry  and  a 
reduction  in  employers'  bargaining  power  in  negotiations  with  the  trade  unions.  '  24 
Although  agreement  was  reached  on  the  introduction  of  earnings-relation  for 
unemployment  benefit  between  the  TUC  and  the  BEC,  important  differences 
remained  outstanding  and  were  not  resolved  while  the  Conservatives  were  in 
goverment.  For  the  duration  of  these  talks,  the  Confederation  refused  to  endorse  the 
application  of  graduation  to  sickness  benefit.  Together  with  the  restrictive  nature  of 
its  proposals  for  earnings-related  unemployment  benefit  this  demonstrated  its 
continued  aversion  to  the  social  benefits  of  state  social  security  provision.  The  TUC 
continued  to  support  earnings-relation  only  on  the  basis  of  substantial  improvements 
to  the  basic  national  insurance  scheme,  a  policy  option  that  was  not  satisfactory  in  the 
eyes  of  the  goverment. 
Conclusion 
In  1948,  the  Labour  government  introduced  social  security  reforms  based  largely  on 
the  recommendations  of  the  Beveridge  Report.  By  1964,  the  basic  structure  remained 
in  place  following  thirteen  years  of  Conservative  administration,,  but  many  of  the 
Beveridgian  principles  had  been  abandoned.  The  principle  of  uniformity  was 
breached  by  the  Labour  government  in  1951,  restored  by  the  Conservatives  in  1952, 
and-  finally  displaced  by  the  introduction  of  graduated  pensions  in  1961.  Earnings- 
related  pensions  also  incurred  a  departure  from  the  principles  of  flat-rate  contributions 
124  PRO,  T227/1498,  Deputation  from  the  BEC  on  3  Feb.  1964,4  Feb.  1964. 
62 and  benefits  and  universalism.  Finally,  the  subsistence  principle  was  never  fully 
implemented. 
Although  the  underlying  principles  of  the  Beveridge  Report  slowly  became 
obsolete,  Conservative  governments  did  not  instigate  radical  reform  of  social  security 
policy.  The  shift  from  universal  insurance  benefits  to  means-tested  national 
assistance  occurred  only  gradually  and  not  as  a  consequence  of  cuts  to  the  national 
insurance  scheme.  The  most  important  policy  change  involved  the  introduction  of 
earnings-relation,  which  was  first  mooted  by  the  Labour  Party.  Cross-party  support 
for  the  Beveridge  Report,  the  implementation  of  the  Beveridge  plan  by  the  postwar 
Labour  government,  the  decision  by  post-1951  Conservative  governments  not  to 
undertake  radical  reform  of  social  security,  and  the  lack  of  different  policies  between 
Conservative  governments  and  the  Labour  opposition  in  the  1950s  have  all  lent 
support  to  the  idea  of  a  'postwar  consensus'  of  which  the  welfare  state  is  but  one 
ingredient.  A  second  aspect  is  the  practice  of  consultation  with  the  major  interest 
groups  in  policy-making,  a  process  that  Middlemas  describes  as  corporate  bias. 
This  chapter  has  sought  to  establish  the  existence  of  corporate  bias  in  the  sphere  of 
social  security  policy  during  the  period  1942  to  1964.  It  has  found  that  it  can  only  be 
applied  tentatively:  it  was  evident  in  relation  to  particular  instances  of  policy-making 
but  was  not  a  characteristic  of  social  security  policy-making  as  a  rule.  Neither  the 
BEC  nor  the  TUC  experienced  difficulty  in  gaining  access  to  the  government 
ministers  or  officials  although  the  BEC  seldom  took  advantage  of  this  opportunity. 
Both  were  consulted  on  important  changes  of  policy  and  on  administrative  change  via 
the  NIAC.  Access,  however,  was  not  tantamount  to  influence  and  the  latter  is  hard  to 
63 detect.  It  seems  that  successive  governments  of  both  parties  consulted  these  groups  in 
their  own  interests.  Often  the  objective  was  to  ascertain  views  for  a  backgroundto 
discussion  or  to  obtain  agreement  to  a  change  of  P-olicy  as  in  the  case  of  earnings- 
relation.  The  goal  was  never  to  instigate  a  tripartite  policy  network. 
These  groups  were  not  incorporated  into  the  policy-making  process  with  respect  to 
social  security  policy  but  were  consulted  at  various  times  by  government  and  actively 
formulated  policy  within  their  own  organisations.  The  TUC  was  the  more  active  in 
terms  of  the  development  of  its  own  policy  and  the  frequency  of  meetings  with 
government  at  its  own  bequest.  In  the  absence  of  any  other  pressure  group  activity 
addressing  the  issue  of  poverty  before  1965,  this  may  have  been  the  TUC's  most 
important  contribution.  In  this  case,  its  lack  of  success  in  obtaining  improvements  to 
the  national  insurance  scheme  was  unfortunate.  The  BEC  tended  to  focus  its  efforts 
on  the  activities  of  the  NIAC  and  developed  policy  in  response  to  requests  for  advice 
or  consultation  by  the  government.  As  groups,  which  developed  definite  positions  on 
social  security  policy  bringing  them  into  contact  with  the  government,  it  is  plausible 
to  look  here  for  signs  of  a  consensus  outside  government. 
The  evidence  is  mixed:  the  TUC  supported  government  policy  with  few 
reservations  until  1951,  while  the  BEC  tended  to  resist  social  policy  initiatives 
regardless  of  the  governing  party.  After  1951,  the  TUC  became  increasingly 
dissatisfied  with  government  policy  as  it  moved  away  from  the  Beveridge  model  of 
social  security.  Contribution  and  benefit  levels  were  particular  sources  of  grievance 
and  the  introduction  of  eamings-relation  was  accepted  only  grudgingly.  The  BEC 
took  advantage  of  meetings  with  the  government  and  its  membership  of  social 
ý64 security-related  committees  to  express  continued  distaste  for  the  underlying  principles 
of  the  social  security  system.  Tripartite  talks  on  eamings-related  benefits  in  1963  and 
1964  revealed  that  the  BEC  and  TUC  had  maintained  significantly  different  opinions 
about  the  purposes  of  state  social  policy  throughout  this  period.  At  a  fundamental 
level  the  TUC  was  part  of  a  welfare  consensus  whereby  government  should  be  the 
main  provider  of  social  security,  while  the  BEC  clearly  never  subscribed  to  this  view. 
On  closer  inspection  the  principles  which  underpinned  TUC  social  security  policy  at 
this  time  came  to  be  increasingly  at  odds  with  that  of  the  goverment.  Signs  of 
consensus,  therefore,  diminished  throughout  this  period. 
65 Chapter  Three:  Retirement  Pensions 
Chapter  one  on  social  security  showed  how  the  TUC  became  one,  of  the  most 
important  sources  of  pressure  on  governments  for  improvements  in  social  security 
during  the  years  1942  to  1964.  Higher  benefits  were  a  feature  of  TUC  social  policy 
throughout  this  period.  These  were  pursued  by  lobbying  government  and  via  the 
TUC's  membership  of  the  National  Insurance  Advisory  Committee.  This  indicated 
that  the  TUC  was  the  most  important  of  those  groups  promoting  the  rights  of  the 
unemployed  and  the  sick,  who  were  dependent  on  state  benefits,  prior  to  the 
emergence  of  poverty-based  pressure  groups  in  the  mid-1960s.  While  the  TUC's 
direct  impact  is  difficult  to  assess,  its  strong  opposition  to  cuts  in  social  expenditure 
has  been  cited  as  an  indirect  factor  in  Conservative  governments'  maintenance  of  the 
welfare  state.  However,  this  reading  of  TUC  influence  on  government  social  policy 
ignores  the  input  of  the  employers'  association,  the  BEC,  which  often  presented  views 
quite  opposite  to  those  of  the  TUC.  An  examination  of  BEC  social  policy  in  the 
postwar  period  and  its  impact  on  policy-making  highlights  the  complexity  of  relations 
between  government  and  interest  groups. 
This  chapter  focuses  on  one  particular  aspect  of  social  security  policy,  retirement 
pensions  in  order  to  allow  a  more  in-depth  assessment  of  the  TUC's  anti-poverty 
stance  and  the  BEC's  attitudes  towards  state  social  services.  Pensions  proved  to  be 
problematic  for  successive  governments  because  of  widespread  concerns  about  the 
cost  of  the  'ageing  population'  and  their  implications  for  employment  policy. 
Likewise,  the  TUC's  pension  policy  did  not  solely  reflect  concerns  about  social 
justice  but  impinged  upon  other  trade  union  interests,  namely  wages  and  the  labour 
66 market.  TUC  pension  policy,  throughout  this  period,  was  therefore,  somewhat 
inconsistent  with  its  wider  social  security  policy.  The  TUC's  interest  in  better 
pensions  for  the  benefit  of  the  elderly  was  seldom  pursued  at  the  cost  of  possible 
detriment  to  the  structure  of  the  labour  market.  Competing  interests  also  led  the  BEC 
to  have  very  little  interest  in  the  social  objectives  of  pensions  policy. 
Old  age  pensions  to  retirement  pensions:  the  process  of  reform,  1942-48 
British  old  age  pensions  before  the  second  world  war 
The  1908  Pensions  Act  introduced  the  first  state  old  age  pensions  for  the  over-70s. 
These  were  financed  from  taxation  and  means-tested.  Contributory  pensions  for  the 
over-65s  were  not  introduced  until  the  legislation  of  the  1925  Widows',  Orphans'  and 
Old  Age  Pensions  Act,  which  covered  all  manual  workers  and  those  earning  less  than 
E250  a  year.  Following  the  1937  Pensions  Act,  voluntary  participation  was  extended 
to  those  earning  less  than  E400  a  year.  Then,  in  1942,  the  responsibility  for  deciding 
the  future  of  pensions  policy  was  passed  to  the  Beveridge  Committee. 
These  changes  in  pensions  policy  were  largely  supported  by  the  TUC.  Initially  it 
preferred  state-financed  pensions  to  a  contributory  system,  and  welcomed  the  1908 
Act  accordingly.  By  1925  the  TUC  had  come  to  endorse  the  contributory  principle 
and  accepted  state  responsibility  for  the  administration  of  pensions  schemes. 
Thereafter,  it  turned  its  attention  to  pension  levels.  These  provoked  frequent 
complaints  from  the  TUC  during  the  interwar  period.  Dissatisfaction  with  pensions  at 
the  annual  congresses  in  1937  and  1938  prompted  the  General  Council  to  send  a 
67 deputation  to  Sir  John  Simon,  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  in  February  1939  to 
protest  about  the  dependence  of  many  old  people  on  public  assistance  as  a  result  of 
inadequate  pensions.  '  Shortly  afterwards  the  govermnent  instigated  an  enquiry  into 
pensions  but  little  progress  was  made  before  the  war.  Sympathy  for  elderly  poverty 
was  not,  however,  the  sole  determinant  of  TUC  pensions  policy.  Labour  market 
considerations  were  equally,  if  not  more,  important.  High  unemployment  had 
heightened  interest  in  the  removal  of  older  workers  from  employment  in  order  to 
reduce  competition  for  younger  workers.  2  Unions  were  also  concerned  about,  the 
practice  of  cutting  older  workers'  wages  by  the  value  of  their  pension,  which  had  a 
negative  impact  on  the  wage  structure  and  on  trade  union  bargaining  power.  3 
Consequently  both  the  Labour  Party  and  the  TUC  adopted  the  policy.  of  making  state 
pensions  conditional  upon  withdrawal  from  the  labour  market  in  1937.4 
Business  interest  in  pensions  policy  before  1939  often  reflected  concerns  with  their 
CoSt.  5  During  the  1920s,  the  NCEO  persistently  lobbied  the  government  for  a 
reduction  in  the  health  insurance  contribution  in  view  of  a  surplus  in  the  health 
6  insurance  fund 
. 
It  also  urged  that  implementation  of  the  1925  Widows',  Orphans' 
and  Old  Age  Pensions  Bill  be  delayed  until  unemployment  was  reduced,  and  accused 
t1he  government  of  being  'prepared  to  see  the  Health  Section  of  the  Social  Services 
over-developed  and  over-financed.  0  The  NCEO  was  opposed  to  the  legislation 
1  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1939,  pp.  165-66. 
2j  Macnicol  and  A  BIaikie,  'The  politics  of  retirement',  p.  25,  BE  Shenfield,  Social  policiesfor  old 
age,  p.  94. 
3J  Macnicol,  'Beveridge  and  old  age',  p.  80;  J  Macnicol  and  A  Blaikie,  'The  politics  of  retirement',  p. 
30 
4J  Macnicol,  'Beveridge  and  old  age',  p.  8  1;  WA  Robson,  Social  Security,  p.  159. 
5L  Hannah,  Inventing  retirement,  p.  17. 
6  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C645  pt.  2,  Deputation  from  CEO  to  the  Rt.  Hon.  Neville  Chamberlain,  17 
July  1925,  pp.  3-5. 
7  Ibid.,  Ref.  N.  C.  127  1,  Widows,  Orphans  and  Old  Age  Contributory  Pensions  Bill,  29  June  1925. 
68 because  the  cost  was  too  onerous  for  -industry  and  excessive  in  comparison  with 
foreign  competitors!  Opinions  were  mixed  however;  Hannah  has  found  some 
businessmen  welcomed  the  1925  Act  since  state  pensions  that  did  not  carry  a  means 
test  would  not  infringe  upon  occupational  schemes.  9 
In  the  interwar  years,  both  the  policies  of  business  and  the  labour  movement  in 
respect  of  pensions  reflected  a  certain  amount  of  self-interest.  Employers  focused  on 
levels  of  taxation  and  insurance  contributions,  and  the  implications  for  occupational 
provision.  The  TUC  was  more  concerned  about  elderly  poverty  but  had  to  consider 
also  the  interests  of  younger  workers  and  the  wider  impact  of  pensions  on  wage 
levels.  Higher  pensions  could  lead  to  larger  wage  cuts  for  older  workers,  therefore, 
the  retirement  condition  was  seen  as  a  potential  solution  to  this  problem  and  as  such 
was  to  become  a  central  feature  of  TUC  policy  towards  the  aged. 
Beveridge  andpensions 
The  outbreak  of  war  and  subsequent  high  rates  of  employment  shifted  the  emphasis 
from  family'  to  elderly  poverty.  'Only  with  the  economic  upturn  and  urban 
evacuations  at  the  beginning  of  World  War  II  was  policy  attention  directed  away  from 
the  mass  unemployment  of  the  interwar  years  and  toward  the  gross  poverty  of  many 
aged  Britons.  "O  Early  measures  to  address  this  matter  included  a  reduction  in  the 
pension  age  for  women  from  65  to  60  and  the  introduction  of  a  5s  supplementary 
pension  subject  to  a  household  means-test.  When  the  Beveridge  Committee  began  its 
a  Ibid.,  Ref,  N.  C.  1285,  Widows,  Orphans  and  Old  Age  Contributory  Pensions  Bill,  notes  for 
deputation  to  Minister  of  Health,  17  July  1925. 
9L  Hannah,  Inventing  retirement,  pp.  29  and  159. 
10  H  Heclo,  Modern  socialpolitics,  p.  254. 
69 review  of  social  security  in  1941,  pensions  quickly  emerged  as  an  important  issue 
because  of  the  growing  numbers  of  elderly  people  and  their  prospective  cost. 
The  amicable  relationship  between  Beveridge  and  the  TUC,  and  the  degree  of 
similarity  between  their  ideas  about  social  security  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  one. 
With  regard  to  pensions,  the  TUC  proposed  that  they  should  be  sufficient  as  to 
provide  a  subsistence  standard  of  living,  and  that  they  should  be  paid  only  upon 
retirement  from  paid  work.  In  line  with  TUC  prewar  policy  on  this  matter,  the 
attachment  of  a  retirement  condition  was  intended  to  prevent  employers  from 
reducing  older  workers'  pay  once  they  were  in  receipt  of  a  pension.  The  provision  of 
adequate  pensions  combined  with  a  retirement  condition  was  also  designed  to 
promote  earlier  retirement  in  order  to  provide  work  for  younger  people.  "  Clearly 
labour  market  considerations  continued  to  inform  the  TUC's  position  on  state 
pensions  in  wartime.  The  BEC  did  not  formulate  any  detailed  policy  on  pensions 
although  their  wider  opposition  to  the  subsistence  principle  was  at  odds  with  both  the 
views  of  the  TUC  and  Beveridge  himself.  12 
Some  of  the  TUC's  views  and  those  of  Beveridge  coincided  in  the  Beveridge  plan. 
The  report  proposed  that  pensions  be  brought  into  line  with  other  social  security 
benefits  in  order  to  establish  the  principle  of  uniformity.  Beveridge  also 
recommended  that  old  age  pensions  be  subject  to  a  retirement  condition  in  accordance 
with  the  TUC's  proposal.  The  new  pension  involved  a  substantial  improvement  on 
the  prewar  pension  of  I  Os,  which  had  provoked  repeated  complaints  at  annual 
11  J  Macnicol,  'Beveridge  and  old  age',  p.  80. 
12  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C216  pt.  3,  N.  C.  7405,  undated  (April  1942). 
70 congresses.  Beveridge  recommended  that  the  pension  be  increased  to  24s  and  42s  for 
a  single  person  and  a  couple  respectively,  but  in  view  of  the  cost  of  pensions  the 
improved  pensions  were  to  be  introduced  over  a  transitional  period  of  twenty  years. 
Consequently,  the  proposed  pension  reforms  probably  incurred  more 
dissatisfaction  in  the  TUC  than  any  other  recommendations  aside  from  the 
incorporation  of  workmen's  compensation  into  social  security.  A  memorandum 
produced  by  the  TUC  Joint  Committee  on  Social  Insurance  and  Workmen's 
Compensation  following  discussion  of  the  Beveridge  Report  over  a  month-long 
period  identified  retirement  pensions  as  one  of  the  most  contentious  aspects  of  the 
plan  for  social  security.  13  Beveridge's  initial  pension  levels  and  the  prospect  of  such  a 
gradual  introduction  were  the  sources  of  its  dissatisfaction.  While  the  TUC  General 
Council  eventually  agreed  to  a  transitional  period  of  ten  years  in  conjunction  with  the 
Labour  Party,  it  continued  to  seek  an  alternative  to  the  transitional  period.  14  -In  a 
meeting  with  Sir  William  Jowitt,  the  minister  in  charge  of  social  reconstruction,  its 
representatives  suggested  that  reduced  pensions  be  paid  to  those  with  inadequate 
contribution  records  instead  of  a  delay  in  the  introduction  of  full  pensions.  15 
While  the  TUC  and  Beveridge  agreed  on  the  subsistence  principle,  the  TUC 
wanted  it  to  be  implemented  immediately  in  relation  to  retirement  pensions  while 
Beveridge  had  recommended  its  gradual  introduction  in  order  to  reduce  costs. 
Similarly,  both  favoured  a  retirement  condition  with  Beveridge  doing  so  following 
13  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.5/2,  Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  memorandum  on  certain  phases  of  the  Beveridge  Report, 
4  Jan.  1943. 
14  MRC'  MSS.  292/161.1/3,  Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  meeting  with  the  Social  Insurance  Sub-Committees  of 
the  Labour  Party  and  the  Co-operative  Union,  9  Feb.  1943. 
15  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.5/4,  Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC,  TUC  deputation  to  Sir William  Jowitt,  12  Aug.  1943. 
71 discussions  with  the  TUC  on  this  matter.  Yet,  as  John  Macnicol  has  pointed  out,  'in 
one  of  the  oddest  paradoxes  of  social  policy  history,  the  stated  intention  behind 
Beveridge's  innovation  was  precisely  the  opposite  of  what  previous  advocates  had 
suggested.  He  hoped  that  the  retirement  condition  would  discourage  withdrawal  from 
the  labour  market,  and  thus  contain  the  cost  of  pensions.  '  16  In  order  to  reinforce  this 
objective,  Beveridge  recommended  increments  to  the  pensions  of  those  who  deferred 
retirement  and  also  his  proposals  permitted  a  small  amount  of  earnings  in  order  to 
allow  pensioners  to  undertake  some  part-time  work  after  retirement.  17  At  first  the 
TUC  Joint  Social  Insurance  Committee  refused  to  sanction  higher  pensions  for 
deferred  retirement  in  view  of  the  TUC's  policy  of  encouraging  earlier  retirement  but 
did  change  its  mind  a  few  days  later.  18 
Herein  lay  the  contradictory  nature  of  TUC  pensions  policy  throughout  the  postwar 
years,  stemming  from  its  adherence  to  the  retirement  condition  which  effectively 
limited  the  potential  income  of  those  over  the  statutory  retirement  age.  Consequently, 
improvements  in  elderly  standards  of  living  were  largely  dependent  upon  the  level  of 
state  assistance.  This  put  the  onus  on  the  TUC  to  ensure  that  pensions  were  adequate 
in  order  to  make  compulsory  retirement  tolerable,  a  task  with  which  it  had  little 
saccess  and  where  its  commitment  proved  at  times  to  be  ambivalent.  Macnicol  and 
Blaikie  have  noted  how  the  TUC  prioritised  the  needs  of  younger  workers  through  its 
6curious  "complicity" 
... 
in  demanding  a  measure  that  was  to  confirm  the  economic 
uselessness  of  old  people'.  19  The  TUC  was,  however,  caught  in  a  dilemma:  it 
16  j  Macnicol,  'Beveridge  and  old  age'  p.  85. 
17  Beveridge  Report,  para.  338. 
18  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.5/2,  it.  SIC-WC  &  FC  memorandum  on  certain  phases  of  the  Beveridge  Report, 
4  Jan.  1943;  MSS.  292/161.1/3,  it.  SIC  &  WC  &  FC  4/1,14  Jan.  1943. 
19  J  Macnicol  and  A  Blaikie,  'The  politics  of  retirement',  pp.  37-8. 
72 believed  that  employers  would  cut  the  pay  of  older  workers  in  receipt  of  a  pensions, 
which  would  reduce  opportunities  for  younger  workers  and  undermine  wage 
negotiations  unless  a  retirement  condition  was  in  place.  20  This  reflected  the  legacy  of 
mass  interwar  unemployment  and  the  weakness  of  the  trade  unions  at  that  time.  Such 
insecurity  continued  to  dominate  TUC  thinking  after  the  war  in  spite  of  sustained  high 
employment  levels.  Although  its  wider  social  security  policy  tended  to  be  guided  by 
social  principles  -  an  aversion  to  means  testing  and  a  belief  in  the  elimination  of 
poverty  via  state  benefits  -  pensions  policy  produced  a  conflict  of  interests  that  was  to 
prevent  the  TUC  from  becoming  an  effective  defender  of  pensioners. 
Following  the  Beveridge  Report,  the  next  development  in  pensions  policy  was 
outlined  in  the  publication  of  the  coalition  government's  White  Paper  on  social 
insurance  in  1944.  It  rejected  Beveridge's  proposed  transitional  period  for  pensions 
on  the  grounds  that  it  was  politically  unattractive.  The  coalition  agreed  that  pensions 
would  be  introduced  at  20s  and  35s  for  those  who  were  insured  under  the  1925 
legislation.  Meanwhile  those  who  had  not  participated  in  the  existing  insurance 
scheme  would  have  to  make  contributions  for  ten  years  before  gaining  entitlement  to 
a  state  retirement  pension.  The  coalition  did  accept  Beveridge's  recommendation  for 
compulsory  retirement  subject  to  permitting  earnings  of  20s  per  week.  The  TUC  was 
unhappy  with  this  earnings  limit,  arguing  that  pensioners  would  find  it  difficult  to 
i 
obtain  work  that  paid  less  than  20s.  Consequently  it  would  be  necessary  to  implement 
safeguards  to  prevent  exploitation  by  employers  seeking  to  employ  pensioners  at 
lower  rates  of  pay.  21  Furthermore  the  TUC  complained  that  the  pension  levels 
20  Ibid. 
21  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.6/1,  Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  meeting  with  the  Labour  Party  and  the  Co-operative 
Congress,  5  Oct.  1944;  Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  meeting  with  representatives  of  certain  affiliated  unions,  4 
Oct.  1944. 
73 recommended  in  the  White  Paper  were  inadequate  and  argued  that  these  should  be 
increased.  22  During  this  time,  employers  had  little  to  say  on  the  subject  of  pensions. 
The  BEC's  hostile  reaction  to  the  Beveridge  Report  and  its  lack  of  response  to  the 
1944  White  Paper  have  been  noted  in  the  previous  chapter.  The  Confederation  would 
not  participate  in  any  -debate  on  pensions  before  the  return  of  a  Conservative 
administration  in  1951. 
Postwar  retirement  pensions  and  the  cost  of  the  welfare  state 
Labour  governments 
Pension  reform  was  a  component  of  the  new  Labour  government's  programme  for 
social  reconstruction.  Historians  have  observed  similarities  between  the  policies  of 
the  wartime  coalition  government  and  the  postwar  Labour  administration  resulting  in 
the  identification  of  a  post-1945  consensus.  The  example  of  pensions  lends  credence 
to  this  reading  of  postwar  British  politics.  There  were  no  real  differences  between  the 
coalition's  plans  for  pensions  and  the  reforms  implemented  by  the  Attlee 
governments.  Pensions  were  integrated  into  the  national  insurance  scheme  in  line  with 
other  benefits  such  as  unemployment  and  sickness,  although  pension  reform  was 
introduced  two  years  earlier.  This  reforni  involved  two  significant  changes:  a 
substantial  improvement  in  pension  levels,  to  24s  and  42s  (single  and  couple  rate), 
and  the  implementation  of  the  retirement  condition.  While  the  Labour  government's 
pensions  were  higher  than  those  offered  by  the  Coalition,  the  principle  was  the  same 
and  both  the  Conservatives  and  Labour  were  agreed  on  compulsory  retirement. 
22  MRC,  MSS.  292/150.6/1,  Some  comments  on  the  government  White  Paper  by  JL  Smyth,  undated. 
74 The  welfare  state  did  bring  about  significant  improvements  in  financial  provision 
for  the  aged.  Retirement  pensions  were  substantially  increased,  from  10s  to  24s 
(single  rate)  while  the  replacement  of  public  assistance  by  national  assistance  was 
designed  to  eliminate  the  stigma  often  attached  to  means'tested  benefits.  Yet  the 
introduction  of  universal  pensions  was  most  beneficial  for  the  better-off  among  the 
elderly  since  those  with  an  annual  income  of  less  than  E420  had  been  protected  under 
the  previous  legislation.  Nonetheless,  after  the  war  itwas  believed  that  the  problems 
23 
of  elderly  poverty  had  been  resolved.  At  the  same  time,  increasingly  more  negative 
attitudes  were  being  expressed  about  the  financial  'implications'  of  the  ageing 
population.  24  If  there  was  a  consensus  that  the  government  should  address  the  issue 
of  elderly  poverty  after  the  war,  there  was  also  a  consensus  that  this  would'be 
expensive  and  problematic.  Predictably,  the  BEC  subscribed  to  this'sentiment  in  its 
evidence  to  the  1953  Phillips  Committee  on  pensions,  but  it  was  also  evident  in  the 
TUC's  reticence  in  pursuing  better  pensions  that  would  require  higher  national 
insurance  contributions  from  its  membership. 
Fo  owing  Labour's  electoral  victory,  the  TUC  initially  tried  to  obtain  a 
commitment  to  the  subsistence  principle  since  the  coalition  government's  pension 
levels,  24s  and  42s,  did  not  conform  to'Beveridge's  definition  of  subsistence.  But 
James  Griffiths,  the  new  Minister  of  National  Insurance,  was  unreceptive  to  its  claims 
and  refused  to'prioritise  pensions  over  other  national  insurance  ben'efits.  25  The  TUC 
Social  Insurance  Committee  now  quite  readily  accepted  his  argument  since  the 
23  C  Phillipson,  Capitalism  and  the  construction  ofold  age,  p.  28;  R  Crossman,  The  politics  of 
?  ensions,  p.  6. 
41  C  Phillipson,  Capitalism  and  the  construction  ofold  age,  p.  29.  25  MRC,  MSS.  292/161.1/4,  Jt.  SIC.  WC  &  FC  deputation  to  the  Minister  of  National  Insurance,  15  Nov. 
1945. 
75 Labour  government  promised  substantial  improvements  in  pensions.  26  Subsequently 
the  TUC  General  Council  proved  reluctant  to  challenge  the  Labour  government's 
pension  policy  in  relation  to  the  value  of  retirement  pensions.  Following  the  release 
of  the  1946  National  Insurance  Bill,  a  TUC  deputation  to  James  Griffiths  conveyed 
the  unions'  'general  approval'  of  the  Bill.  27  While  the  TUC  still  believed  that  pension 
levels.  were  too  low,  representatives  were  sympathetic  to  the  cost  of  retirement 
pensions  to  the  govenunent.  28  Pension  levels  continued  to  be  the  subject  of 
correspondence  but  the  TUC  put  little  pressure  on  the  government  for  improvement. 
In  1949  the  General  Council  rejected  a  Congress  resolution  calling  for  better  pensions 
because  it  required  significant  increases  in  contributions  and  would  break  with  the 
principle  of  uniforinity  of  benefit.  29  Its  unwillingness  to  countenance  higher 
contributions  and  undermine  the  principle  of  uniformity  in  order  to  secure  better 
pensions  suggests  that  the  TUC's  concern  with  elderly  poverty  was  not  to  be  pursued 
at  the  expense  of  its  current  membership's  interests.  30  Accordingly,  it  was  dissatisfied 
when  the  government's  1951  National  Insurance  Act  only  improved  provision  for  the 
over-70s  thus  abandoning  the  uniform  basis  of  national  insurance  benefits. 
The  TUC's  commitment  to  achieving  higher  standards  of  living  for  the  elderly  can 
b.  -.  questioned  on  the  basis  of  its  unwillingness  to  countenance,  higher  contributions 
from  workers.  In  addition,  certain  aspects  of  TUGlabour  policy  placed  older  people 
at  a  disadvantage  vis-A-vis  younger  employees.  Full  employment  permitted  greater 
26  MRC,  MSS.  292/150/1,  Document  re:  Notes  on  national  insurance  legislation,  undated. 
27  MRC,  MSS.  292/161.1/4,  Jt..  SI.  WC  &  FC,  14  Feb.  1946. 
29  MRC,  MSS.  292/150/1,  Notes  on  National  Insurance  legislation,  undated. 
29  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.2/1,  Consideration  of  a  1949  Congress  resolution  entitled  'Retirement 
Pensions',  undated. 
30  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.2/2,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Social  Insurance  Department  to  Councillor  Chas  A 
Howell,  Derby  and  District  Trades  Council,  4  Oct.  195  1;  TUC  Annual  Report  195  1,  pp.  229-30. 
76 tolerance  of  older  workers  and  led  the  TUC  to  endorse  government  policies  that 
31 
encouraged  later  retirement  but  it  continued  to  resist  statutory  intervention.  The 
TUC  undertook  consideration  of  improving  incentives  for  deferred  retirement  that 
meant  better  pensions  but  it  would  not  accept  measures  that  could  reduce 
opportunities  for  younger  workers.  For  instance,  in  1949  the  Social  Insurance 
Committee  endorsed  a  government  proposal  for  a  lump  sum  payment  to  be  paid  to 
workers  deferring  retirement,  but  by  1951  some  members  were  voicing  concern  that 
this  could  damage  younger  employees'  promotion  prospects.  32  The  Labour  Party  then 
dropped  the  policy  before  the  TUC  could  discuss  it  fin-ther  although  its  reservations 
were  by  then  obvious.  33  Similar  concerns  were  raised  by  the  1951  National  Insurance 
Act  and  the  1951  budget:  the  Act  doubled  the  earnings  limit  under  the  retirement 
condition,  from  20s  to  40s,  in  spite  of  TUC  opposition  while  the  budget  increased  the 
increments  for  deferred  retirement.  34  Ultimately  the  TUC's  ambivalence  towards 
financial  incentives  to  delay  retirement  and  its  opposition  to  the  relaxation  of  the 
retirement  condition  were  detrimental  for  older  workers  at  a  time  when  it  was  not 
actively  seeking  improvements  in  state  pensions. 
The  TUC  was  hardly  persistent  in  its  campaign  for  better  pensions  before  1951. 
This  may  be  explained  by  the  wider  feeling  that  Labour's  social  security  legislation 
had  successfully  addressed  the  problem  of  elderly  poverty.  35  At  the  same  time  there 
appeared  to  be  a  political  consensus  over  what  could  be  described  as  'the  problem  of 
31  LPA,  Research  Series  R.  D.  166/October  1948,  'The  Employment  of  Older  People;  Policy  and 
Publicity  Committee  9,21  Feb.  1949. 
.  32  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/8,  SIIwC,  15  Feb.  195  1;  SIIWC,  15  March  195  1. 
33  Ibid.,  SIIWC,  II  April  195  1. 
34  PRO,  CAB  130/66  Gen.  357/2,  National  Insurance  Scheme  interim  review  by  Chancellor  of 
Exchequer  and  Minister  of  National  Insurance,  14  March  195  1;  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.2/2,  General 
Secretary  to  Mr  A  Deakin,  4  June  195  1. 
35  R  Crossman,  The  politics  ofpensions,  p.  6;  C  Phillipson,  Capitalism  and  the  construction  ofold  age, 
p.  28. 
77 pensions'  to  which  the  TUC  and  the  BEC  both  subscribed.  There  is  no  record  of  the 
BEC's  views  on  developments  in  retirement  pensions  during  the  period  of  Labour 
government.  Nonetheless,  its  general  attitude  towards  developments  in  social  security 
suggests  that  it  was  reluctant  to  accept  reforms  but  was  aware  that  its  views  were 
impolitic.  Resource  considerations  were  never  absent  from  discussions  on  state 
pensions  from  the  date  of  publication  of  the  Beveridge  Report.  This  resulted  in  a  lack 
of  political  will  to  increase  pensions  between  1946  and  1951.  It  also  explains  why 
pensions  were  granted  such  a  high,  profile  Labour's  1953  discussions  on  social 
security  reform  and  how  they  were  also  the  first  aspect  of  the  national  insurance 
scheme  to  be  reviewed  by  the  independent  Phillips  Committee  in  advance  of  the 
Quinquennial  Review  -  of  the  national  insurance  scheme.  Finally,  in  1959,  the 
Conservative  government  introduced  earnings-relation  to  pensions  before  any  other 
national  insurance  benefit.  In  the  TUC,  awareness  of  demographic  change  and  the 
cost  of  pensions  seem  at  first  sight  to  have  informed  its  caution  in  pressing  for  higher 
pensions  but  the  TUC's  sympathy  in  this  respect  soon  dissipated  upon  the  election  of 
a  Conservative  government  in  1951.  Still  it  was  reluctant  to  consider  a  radical 
overhaul  of  the  state  pension  scheme.  Combined  with  the  BEC's  sheer  antipathy 
towards  public  expenditure,  these  two  interest  groups  had  little  to  offer  once  the 
&-bate  on  pension  reform got  underway  in  the  1950s. 
Conservative  governments 
The  Conservatives'  first  piece  of  social  security  legislation  was  passed  in  1952. 
Following  consultation  with  both  the  BEC  and  TUC,  the  Family  Allowances  and 
National  Insurance  Act  increased  benefits  and  pensions,  and  restored  the  uniform 
78 basis  of  national  insurance  in  the  process  which  satisfied,  the  TUC.  'The  levels  of 
benefits  were  not  so  satisfactory,  and  the  election  of  a  Conservative  government 
coincided  with  a  renewed  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  subsistence  benefits  by  the 
TUC.  36  It  soon  became  evident  that  the  TUC  would  not  tolerate  any  perceived 
neglect  of  the  national  insurance  scheme  by  a  Conservative  administration. 
Beveridge's  principle  of  uniformity  remained  important:  a  1952  Congress  resolution 
that  demanded  higher  pensions  was  accepted  by  the  General  Council  on  the  grounds 
that  it  would  require  increases  in  all  benefits.  37  The  1952  Act  was  more  in  line  with 
TUC  policy  than  that  of  the  BEC.  Employers'  representatives  now  voiced  antipathy 
towards  the  national  insurance  scheme  and  the  cost  of  national  insurance 
contributions.  They  suggested  that  contributions  should  be  increased  no  further  and 
that  means-tested  national  assistance  be  expanded  instead  of  national  insurance.  38 
Although  the  new  Conservative  government  made  early  improvements  to  social 
security,  the  cost  of  pensions  continued  to  be  contentious.  One  means  of  reducing 
pressure  on  the  national  insurance  fund  was  the  proposal  to  increase  the  pension  age. 
However,  this  made  little  progress  after  consultation  with  the  TUC  and  BEC  . 
39  The 
TUC  Social  Insurance  Committee  believed  that  union  opposition  had  been 
instrumental  in  the  government's  decision  not  to  pursue  this  line  of  poliCy. 
40 
Nonetheless  the  govenunent  approached  the  TUC  again  a  year  later.  Osbert  Peake,  the 
Minister  of  National  Insurance,  put  forward  two  suggestions:  an  increase  in  the 
36  MRC,  MSS.  292/16  1/10,  SIIWC,  II  March  1953. 
37  Ibid.. 
38  PRO,  PIN  46/79,  Note  of  meeting  with  British  Employers'  Confederation,  27  March  1952,  pp.  1-2. 
39  Ibid.,  p.  1;  MRC,  MSS.  292/20/36,  GC,  26  March  1952  and  23  April  1952. 
40  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.2/2,  Assistant  Secretary,  Social  Insurance  Department  to  Mrs  M  Craven,  24 
April  1952. 
79 pension  age  to  62/67  or a  smaller  pension  for  workers  who  retired  before  these  ages.  41 
The  TUC  rejected  both  the  goverment's  propositions. 
The  TUC  was  unresponsive  to  government  attempts  to  reduce  the  cost  of  pensions 
and  was  generally  reluctant  to  address  the  'problem  of  pensions'  actively.  In  spite  of 
its  belief  ý  that  national  insurance  contributions  could  not  be  raised  further  and  its 
knowledge  that  pensions,  had  consistently  lagged  behind-  increases  in  the,  cost  of 
living,  the  TUC  was  initially  unenthusiastic  when  the  Labour  Party  began  to  consider 
reform  of  the  national  insurance  scheme  in  1953.  This  disinterest  combined  with  its 
continued  commitment  to  a  compulsory  retirement  age  of  60/65  and  the  retirement 
condition,  which  adversely  affected  the  income  of  elderly  persons,  suggests  that 
labour  market  considerations  continued  to  be  more  important  than  the  situation  of  the 
aged  poor.  The  TUC's  resistance  to  increases  in  the  earnings  allowance  under  the 
retirement  condition  did  weaken  during  the  1950s  but  this  happened  only  gradually 
and  with  clear  reluctance  in  spite  of  the  strength  of  the  labour  movement  and  high 
levels  of  employment.  As  far  as  pensioners  in  the  fifties  were  concerned,  the  labour 
market  appeared  to  take  precedence  over  social  justice. 
Dissatisfaction  with  benefit  levels  nonetheless  did  lead  the  TUC  to  put  pressure  on 
the  government  for  an  early  Quinquennial  Review  of  the  national  insurance  scheme.  42 
Its  demands  were  deflected  by  the  appointment  of  the  Phillips  Committee  to  Review 
the  Economic  and  Financial  Problems  in  Providing  for  Old  Age  in  1953,  which 
highlighted  the  significance  of  pensions  in  the  growing  cost  of  the  welfare  state.  Both 
41  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/10,  SIIWC  14/1,13  May  1953. 
42  Ibid. 
80 the  TUC  and  the  BEC  were  represented  on  the  membership  of  the  committee  and 
submitted  written  and  oral  evidence.  43 
In  its  evidence  to  the  Phillips  Committee,  the  TUC  complained  about  the  growth  in 
numbers  of  elderly  national  assistance  claimants;  it  estimated  that  at  the  end  of  1952 
20  per  cent  of  those  claiming  assistance  were  pensioners.  44  The  TUC  believed  that 
the  increase  in  the  supplementation  of  national  insurance  pensions  by  means-tested 
benefits  was  undermining  'the  whole  concept  of  providing  a  minimum  through 
insurance'.  45  The  TUC  blamed  this  development  on  successive  governments'  failure 
46 
to  maintain  pensions  at  a  subsistence  level.  In  spite  of  inadequate  benefit  and 
pension  levels,  the  TUC  still  strongly  endorsed  flat-rate  national  insurance 
contributions.  It  also  refused  to  accept  increases  in  contributions  in  order  to  fund  the 
growing  deficit  in  the  national  insurance  fund  which  had  arisen  as  a  result  of  the  early 
entry  of  participants  who  had  not  made  sufficient  contributions.  This  was  perceived 
to  be  a  govemment  liability.  47 
The  TUC  failed  to  present  any  original  proposals  for  pension  reform  to  the  Phillips 
Committee,  or  to  the  Labour  Party.  Its  adherence  to  the  Beveridge  scheme  in  spite  of 
increasing  evidence  of  its  weaknesses  is  testimony  to  the  extent  of  the  TUC's 
conservatism  on  this  issue.  The  Phillips  Report  rejected  the  subsistence  principle 
43  The  TUC's  representatives  were  both  members  of  its  Social  Insurance  Committee,  Mr  C  Bartlett 
(COHSE)  and  Mr  A  McAndrews  (TGVX).  Sir  Cuthbert  Clegg,  past  president  and  Mr  FJC  Honey, 
Secretary,  were  nominated  by  the  BEC. 
44  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/1  1,  SIIWC  6/1,10  Dec.  1953;  SIIWC,  10  Dec.  1953  (Appendix  A,  Estimation 
of  supplementation  of  insurance  benefits  by  national  assistance  at  the  end  of  1952). 
45  Ibid.,  SIIWC  6/1,10  Dec.  1953. 
46  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/1,  Old  Age  (54)  Eighth  Meeting,  Note  of  TUC  oral  evidence  to  the  Phillips 
Committee,  13  May  1954. 
47  Ibid.,  MSS.  292/16  I  /11,  SIIWC,  10  Dec.  1954. 
81 because  of  the  inconsistency  between  the  principles  of  adequacy  and  uniformity.  48 
The  TUC  refused  to  address  this  contradiction  and  instead  insisted  that  not  only 
should  subsistence  continue  to  be  the  guiding  principle  for  benefit  levels  but  that  it  be 
re-assessed  in  order  to  take  into  account  improvements  in  standards  of  living  since 
Beveridge. 
49 
The  Phillips  Report's  suggestion  that  occupational  pension  schemes  should  be 
expanded  in  order  to  deal  with  the  funding  problem  received  a  mixed  response  from 
the  TUC.  While  its  Social  Insurance  and  Economic  Committees  favoured  the 
extension  of  occupational  provision  to  workers  who  were  currently  excluded,  they 
also  held  reservations  over  the  merits  of  occupational  pension  schemes.  Their 
ambivalence  was  based  on  the  nature  of  the  development  of  occupational  provision, 
which  had  tended  to  overlook  manual  worker's  and  displayed  considerable  disparities 
in  its  coverage.  These  inequities  in  access  and  coverage  were  perceived  to  increase 
inequalities  among  pensioners  in  relation  to  the  TUC's  interpretation  of  equality, 
which  was  based  on  the  principle  of  uniformity.  50  Ultimately,  the  TUC's  Social 
Insurance  Committee  and  Economic  Committee  supported  the  extension  of 
occupational  pensions  but  felt  that  the  advantages  of  this  provision  over  national 
51  insurance  had  been  exaggerated  by  the  Phillips  Committee. 
Overall  the  TUC's  main  concerns  with  state  social  security  were  to  maintain  the 
contributory  national  insurance  scheme  and  obtain  improvements  in  relation  to  the 
48  Phillips  Report,  p.  8  1. 
49  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/12,  SIIWC  6/3,12  Jan.  1955. 
30  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/2b,  Ref  Fi/SS/24.1.57,  'Pensions:  Labour  Party  National  Superannuation 
Scheme  -  Notes  on  Labour  Party  Study  Group  Draft  Memorandum  on  Security  and  Old  Age. 
51  Ibid. 
82 level  of  contributions,  benefits  and  pensions.  It  strongly  believed  that  these  should  be 
at  the  expense  of  the  state  if  actuarially-based  contributions  were  not  sufficient  to 
allow  adequate  benefits.,  It  was  unwilling  to  countenance  higher  contributions'  in 
order  to  pay  for  pensions,  the  cost  of  which  the  TUC  blamed  on  early  entry  to  national 
insurance  retirement  pensions.  The  TUC  also  expected  that  the  social  security  system 
should  provide  more  or  less  fully  -  for  the  financial  needs  of  the  elderly  and  was 
unwilling  to  make  -concessions  in  relation  to  labour  policy  that  would  have  reduced 
pressure  on  the  state  to  provide  for  the  old.  The  expansion  of  occupational  pensions 
was  passively  accepted  but  was  not  expected  to  supplant  state  provision  because  of 
the  implications  for  inequality. 
Meanwhile  the  BEC,  which  had  had  little  to  say  on  developments  in  pensions  prior 
to  the  appointment  of  the  Phillips  Committee,  was  interested  in  neither  elderly 
poverty  nor  inequality.  ,  Its  main  concern  was  that  the  state  was  doing  too  much  rather 
than  too  little  and  it  was  critical  of  the  national  insurance  scheme  in  its  meetings  with 
the  Phillips  Committee.  The  Confederation  claimed  that  the  national  insurance 
scheme  had  created  a  culture  of  dependency:  'successive  governments  have  led  the 
people  of  this  country  to  look  far  too  much  to  the  national  Exchequer  to  safeguard 
themselves  against  contingencies  for  which  it  was  formerly  considered  to  be  the 
52  responsibility  of  individuals  to  make  their  own  provision,  at  any  rate  in  part'.  It  also 
believed  that  the  growing  financW  difficulties  of  the  national  insurance  system  were  a 
result  of  excessive  generosity.  53  Subsistence  benefits  were  rejected  on  the  basis  that 
52  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C  1120  pt  1,  N.  C.  13746,  Undated  (c.  Nov.  1953  -  Jan.  1954).  53  MRC,  MSS.  292/16.6.21/1,  Old  Age  (54)  Eighth  Meeting,  Committee  on  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Problems  of  the  Provision  for  Old  Age,  Note  of  TUC  oral  evidence  to  the  Phillips  Committee,  13  May  1954. 
83 they  encouraged  too  much  reliance  on  the  state.  54  Still,  the  Confederation  did  not 
favour  the  abolition  of  the  insurance  scheme  because  it  would  be  unfair  to  deny 
benefits  to  people  who  had  contributed  during  the  past  five  years  . 
55  Neither  the  TUC 
nor  the  BEC  offered  any  positive  contribution  to  the  Phillips  Committee's  main 
problem:  how  to  address  the  emerging  deficit  in  the  national  insurance  fund.  Neither 
would  accept  an  increase  in  national  insurance  contributions  for  this  purpose  but 
while  the  TUC  expected  the  shortfall  to  be  addressed  by  national  taxation  the  BEC 
explicitly  rejected  this  solution.  Indeed,  the  BEC  believed  that  it  was  'absolutely 
essential'  to  reduce  national  expenditure  in  order  to  lower  levels  of  taxation.  56  The 
BEC's  position  was  somewhat  confused:  it  rejected  both  higher,  national  insurance 
contributions  and  greater  state  fundingof  social  security.  Implicitly  this  suggests  that 
the  BEC  believed  that  the  insurance  scheme  should  be  left  as  it  was  to  provide  only  a 
very  minimal  level  of  help  from  the  state  and  presumably  being  supplemented  by 
private  and  occupational  provision. 
The  BEC  was  also  hostile  towards  any  unsolicited  state  interference  in 
occupational  welfare,  particularly  in  view  of  the  growing  demands  for  transferability 
of  occupational  pension  schemes  in  order  to  encourage  greater  labour  mobility.  57  The 
Confederation  argued  that  labour  mobility  was  only  problematic  in  relation  to  manual 
workers  who  tended  not  to  be  covered  by  superannuation  in  any  case.  Moreover,  one 
of  the  objectives  of  the  establishment  of  occupational  pension  schemes,  to  reward 
long  service,  would  be  undermined  by  transferability.  BEC  representatives  claimed 
54  MRC,  MSS  200/B/3/2/C  1120  pt.  2,  N.  C.  14050,  April  1954,  pp.  1-3. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid.,  pp.  9-11. 
57  The  Labour  Party  adopted  a  policy  for  the  transfer  of  employers'  contributions  to  occupational 
pension  schemes  in  1953  (LPA,  Social  Services  Sub-Committee  (SSSC)  minutes  10,18  March  1953,  p. 
2.  ) 
84 that  employers  would  be  deterred  from  setting  up  this  provision  if  employees  were 
able  to  take  their  employer's  contributions  with  them  when  they  left.  58  The  Phillips 
Committee  was  sympathetic  to  the  BEC's  argument.  Although  it  supported  the 
expansion  of  occupational  provision,  it  recommended  against  making  such  schemes 
transferable  at  present  owing  to  employer  resistance.  59 
The  Phillips  Committee  also  took  up  the  Conservative  government's  proposals  for 
a  higher  retirement  age.  The  TUC  remained  implacably  opposed  to  an  increase  on  the 
grounds  of  both  practicality  and,  uniformity.  60  Within  the  trade  union  movement, 
opposition  was  most  marked  among  unions  based  in  heavy  industries  owing  to  the 
arduous  nature  of  this  type  of  work  .61 
The  TUC  itself  also  believed  that  existing 
pensioners  themselves  would  reject  a  higher  retirement  age.  62  It  proposed  that  later 
retirement  could  best  be  achieved  by  improving  financial  inducements,  which  did 
signal  a  relaxation  of  its  position  on  this  subjeCt.  63  At  first,  the  BEC  had  also  opposed 
an  increase  in  the  pension  age  because  it  thought  it  would  be  impolitic  to  change  the 
retirement  age  when  workers  were  expecting  to  receive  their  pensions  at  60/65.64  By 
1954,  its  position  had  changed;  the  BEC's  evidence  to  the  Phillips  Committee 
included  a  proposal  for  an  increase  in  the  minimum  pension  age,  and  the  introduction 
of  a  common  retirement  age  for  men  and  women.  65  The  Phillips  Report  subsequently 
recommended  an  increase  in  the  retirement  age,  to  63/68  over  a  period  of  five  years, 
58MRC,  MSS200/B/3/2/CI120pt.  1,  N.  C.  13938,12  March  1954. 
59  MRC,  MSS  200/B/3/2/C  1120  pt.  2,  N.  C.  14469,6  Dec.  1954. 
60  MRC,  MSS.  292/16  I  /11,  SIIWC  8/2,14  Jan.  1954. 
61  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/1,  Old  Age  (54)  eighth  meeting,  Note  of  TUC  oral  evidence  to  the  Phillips 
Committee,  13  May  1954. 
62  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/1  1,  SIIWC  8/2,14  Jan.  1954. 
63  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/1,  Old  Age  (54)  eighth  meeting,  Note  of  TUC  oral  evidence  to  the  Phillips 
Committee,  13  May  1954. 
64  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  137,  N.  C.  12618,19  March,  1952;  PRO,  PIN  46/79,  Note  of  meeting 
with  British  Employers'  Confederation,  27  March  1952,  pp.  1-2. 
65  MRC,  MSS  200/B/3/2/Cl  120  pt.  2,  N.  C.  14050,  April  1954,  pp.  1-3. 
85 but  retained  the  male/female  distinction.  This  was  opposed  by  the  TUC  members  of 
the  committee,  Mr  Bartlett  and  Mr  McAndrews,  who  published  a  minority  report  on 
this  issue.  Their  reservation  stated  that  '[wle  find  it  impossible  to  agree  with  the 
majority  recommendations  for  raising  -the  minimum  retirement  ages.  '  66  This  was 
based  on  their  argument  that  the  resulting  savings  would  not  be  sufficient  to  justify  a 
later  retirement  age.  67  The  TUC  endorsed  the  minority  report  and  rejected  the  Phillips 
Committee's  proposal.  68  Its  reaction  provoked  mixed  sentiment  within  the 
government.  The  Ministry  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance  was  also  opposed  to 
an  increase  in  the  pension  age  while  the  Ministry  of  Labour  and  National  Service 
considered  it  impractical  because  of  TUC  opposition.  69  The  Treasury  was  irate  that 
the  MPNI  had  so  promptly  dismissed  the  possibility  of  a  higher  retirement  age  in  the 
wake  of  the  Phillips  Report  but  its  officials  did  concede  that  the  TUC's  views  on  the 
subject  strongly  militated  against  an  increase.  70  A  Working  Group  on  Occupational 
Pension  Schemes  later  decided  in  favour  of  raising  the  pension  age,  however,  no 
further  action  was  ever  taken  during  this  period.  71 
Another  aspect  of  labour  policy  that  had  implications  for  pensions  policy  was  the 
retirement  condition.  Throughout  the  1950s  the  TUC  resisted  growing  criticism  of 
the  retirement  condition  and  opposed  any  proposals  to  raise  the  earnings  allowance, 
for  instance  the  Labour  government's  increase  in  1951  and  further  demands  for  a 
higher  earnings  limit  in  the  Labour  Party  in  1954.72  Conservative  governments  did 
66  Phillips  Report,  pp.  91-2. 
67  These  were  estimated  to  be  L55  million  in  1977-78. 
68  MRC'  MSS.  292/161/12,  SIIWC,  12  Jan.  1955. 
69  PRO,  T  277/49  1,  Note  of  a  meeting  held  at  the  Treasury,  17  Oct.  1956. 
70  PRO,  T  227/416,  K  Whalley  to  Mr  Bancroft,  3  Dec.  1954;  Note  to  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  on 
raising  the  old  age  pension  age,  9  Dec.  1954. 
71  Ibid.;  PRO,  T  227/491,  Working  Group  on  Occupational  Pension  Schemes,  summary  of  conclusions, 
undated. 
72  MRC,  MSS.  292/16  1/11,  SIIWC  9/1,10  Feb.  1954. 
86 not  seek  to  amend  the  retirement  condition  until  1955  following  repeated  complaints 
in  the  House  of  Commons.  73  The  government  then  asked  the  NIAC  to  consider  the 
implications  of  an  increase  -  in  the  earnings  allowance  from  40s  to  60s.  Initially  the 
TUC  strenuously  resisted  an  increase  for  the  same  reasons  that  it  had  given  in  the 
past:  it  believed  that  a  higher  earnings  limit  would  encourage  employers  to  use 
pensioners  as  cheap  labour  instead  of  younger  workers.  The  TUC  was  also  concerned 
that  higher  earnings  limits  could  lead  to  the  abolition  of  the  retirement  condition  and 
stressed  the  negative  implications  of  this  for  pensioners.  It  believed  that  pensions 
could  be  reduced,  or  the  retirement  age  increased,  in  the  absence  of  a  retirement 
condition  since  there  would  be  little  justification  for  a  universal,  subsistence  pension 
if  no  restrictions  were  placed  on  pensioners'  earnings.  74  In  view  of  the  NIAC's 
proposal  in  1955  to  recommend  a  20s  increase  in  the  earnings  limit,  the  TUC 
reluctantly  offered  a  compromise  of  10s  which  would  take  the  earnings  limit  to  50s.  75 
By  this  time  the  BEC  was  strongly  in  favour  of  the  relaxation  of  the  retirement 
condition.  It  wanted  the  limit  to  be  increased  by  at  least  10s  in  1956.76  This  was 
accepted  by  the  NIAC,  which  also  recommended  that  only  50  per  cent  of  earnings 
between  50s  and  70s  be  subject  to  deductions  under  the  retirement  condition.  These 
changes  were  then  incorporated  in  the  1957  National  Insurance  Act. 
By  1957,  the  failure  to  achieve  subsistence-level  pensions  was  beginning  to  create 
some  doubts  over  the  fairness  of  the  retirement  condition.  77  In  the  same  year,  the 
Labour  Party  decided  it  should  be  abolished  when  it  published  its  proposals  for 
73  Parliamentary  debates  (Commons),  1955-56,  vol.  546,  cols.  10  19-1023,21  Nov.  1955. 
74  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/13,  SIIWC  4/1,14  Dec.  1955. 
75  MRC,  MSS.  292/20/40,  GC  meeting,  21  Dec.  1955;  MSS.  292/161/13,  SIIWC,  13  Jan.  1956. 
76  PRO,  PIN  60/22,  N.  I.  A.  C.  I  10,  paper  19,27  March  1956. 
77  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/2a,  SIIWC,  13  Feb.  1957. 
87 earnings-related  pensions.  It  argued  that  about  60  per'cent  of  male  employees  over 
the  minimum  pension  age  would  be  better  off  if  there  was  no  retirement  condition.  78 
The  TUC  itself  realised  that  the  retirement  condition  was  becoming  increasingly 
unpopular  and  was  also  aware  that  it  restricted  the  income  of  certain  workers.  At  the 
same  time,  the  current  strength  of  the  trade  union  movement  had  also'reduced  fears  of 
79 
wage-cutting.  Still,  the  removal  of  the  retirement  condition  would  cost  E76  million 
in  the  first  year,  which  was  equivalent  to  a  1/5d  increase  in  contributioný.  The  TUC's 
Social  Insurance  Committee  was  unwilling  to  accept  such  an  increase  when  'only  40 
per  cent  of  (male)  workers  would  derive  any  benefit.  80  Furthermore,  the  prospect  of 
wage-related  pensions  raised  new  issues  in  relation  to  the'  retirement  condition: 
workers  who  had  to  retire  at  the  minimum  pension  age,  for  health  reasons,  would  be 
disadvantaged  because  they  would  then  have  a  poorer  contribution  record  and 
therefore  a  lower  rate  of  superannuation.  81  i 
In  1959,  the  TUC  General  Council  accused  the  government  of  increasing  earnings 
limits  instead  of  pensions  and  felt  it  had  little  choice  but  to  agree  with  a  10/-  increase 
in  the  absence  of  improvements  to  pensions.  82  Its  Social  Insurance  Committee  stated 
'[w]e  are  convinced  that  the  aim  should  be  to  provide  subsistence  pensions 
conditional  upon  retirement,  not  an  old  age  pension  unrelated  to  subsistence  which 
has  to  be  supplemented  by  part  I 
-time  earnings  in  the  case  of  thos  Ie  able  to  work  or  by 
National  Assistance  in  the  case  of  those  who  cannot.  '  83  The  BEC  continued  to 
78  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/14,  Minutes  of  ajoint  TUC  SIIWC  and  Labour  Party  Home  Policy  Committee 
(HPQ  meeting  on  22  May  1957,12  June  1957. 
79  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/2a,  SIIWC  minutes,  13  Feb.  1957. 
so  MRC,  MSS.  292/160/1,  Extract  from  TUC  Report  1957. 
81  Ibid.. 
92  Trades  Union  Congress  Annual  Report  1960,  p.  137.  93  MRC,  h4SS.  292/161/16,  SIIWC  minutes,  II  Feb.  1959. 
88 support  a  higher  earnings  limit  to  supplement  pensions.  84  The  1960  National 
Insurance  Bill  proposed  a  further  dilution  of  the  retirement  condition  by  removing  the 
restrictions  on  working  hours,  as  advocated  by  the  BEC,  and  increasing  the  earnings 
allowance  by  another  10S.  85  The  TUC's  Social  Insurance  Committee's  response 
reflected  its  increasing  ambivalence  towards  to  the  retirement  condition  as  some 
members  were  concerned  that  the  changes  were  a  step  closer  to  its  abolition,  while 
other  members  welcomed  the  end  of  the  restriction  on  working  hours;  this  was 
particularly  detrimental  for  the  low-paid.  86  The  government  made  further  increases  to 
the  earnings  limit  in  1962  and  1963  without  reference  to  the  NIAC.  The  TUC  later 
complained  about  the  lack  of  consultation  87  and  expressed  growing  concern  about 
exploitation  of  elderly  workers  as  by  1961  the  earnings  limit  permitted  low-paid,  full- 
time  work.  88  On  the  other  hand,  it  felt  unable  to  oppose  the  increases  because  of  the 
inadequacy  of  pension  levels.  In  1963,  it  suggested  that  the  goverment  should  hold 
an  inquiry  into  the  impact  of  the  increased  earnings  limit  on  elderly  employment.  89 
The  Advent  ofSuperannuation 
Other  important  changes  took  place  in  state  pension  policy  at  the  end  of  the  1950s 
vAth  the  establishment  of  a  state  superannuation  scheme  in  1959.  The  introduction  of 
state  eamings-related  pensions  had  its  roots  in  the  work  of  Brian  Abel-Smith  whose 
ideas  soon  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Labour  Party.  90  Labour  began  to  consider  the 
84  PRO,  PIN  46/115,  N.  I.  A.  C.  141,  Paper  3,23  Feb.  1959;  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4pt.  172,  N.  C. 
17534,26  Nov.  1959. 
95  Ibid. 
86  MRC'  MSS.  292B/161/13,  SlIWC  2,9  Nov.  1960. 
87  MRC,  MSS.  292B/161/17,  SllWC  3,11  Dec.  1963. 
88  MRC,  MSS.  292B/161/13,  SIlWC  4,11  Jan.  1961. 
89  MRC,  MSS.  29213/1  61/15,  SlIWC  4,9  Jan.  1963. 
90  B  Abel-Smith,  The  reform  ofsocial  security. 
89 reform  of  state  pensions  in  1953.  The  TUC  was  a  slow  and  reluctant  convert  to 
reform,  declining  the  party's  invitation  to  participate  in  plans  for  reforming  pensions. 
It  decided  to  send  its  representatives  to  the  Labour  Party's  meetings  as  observers 
rather  than  members.  The  Labour  Party  was  critical  of  the  TUC's  unwillingness,  or 
inability,  to  make  a  positive  contribution:  'very  little  help  can  be  expected  from  the 
T.  U.  C..  They  are  obviously  not  in  a  mood  to  consider  any  radical  changes  in  the 
present  position.  They  are  completely  wedded  to  the  present  contributory  system,  and 
it  will  take  lengthy  discussions  to  modify  their  views,  should  the  Party  wish  to  alter 
the  present  system'.  91 
In  spite  of  the  TUC's  recaltricance,  the  Labour  Party  formally  adopted  the  policy 
of  national  superannuation  in  1955  after  Richard  Crossman  had  presented  the 
principles  of  a  scheme  to  the  Annual  Conference.  Subsequently  the  party  set  up  a 
Study  Group  on  Security  and  Old  Age  in  1956  which  co-opted  Professor  Richard 
Titmuss,  Dr  Brian  Abel-Smith  and  Peter  Townsend  of  the  London  School  of 
Economics  as  members.  The  study  group  quickly  rejected  the  existing  national 
insurance  scheme  as  a  means  of  delivering  adequate  pensions  because  of  its  flat-rate 
principles  as  well  as  the  inbuilt  notion  of  a  fixed  level  of  subsistence  amid  rising 
postwar  standards  of  living.  Its  solution  was  a  state  earnings-related  pension  scheme 
which  would  'universalise'  the  benefits  and  advantages  of  private  provision.  92  This 
would  be  achieved  by  supplementing  the  existing  flat-rate  pension  with  a  wage- 
related  payment,  funded  by  earnings-related  contributions.  The  aim  of  the  scheme 
was  to  prevent  workers  from  experiencing  a  substantial  fall  in  income  upon 
91  LPA,  Policy  and  Publicity  Sub-Committee  (PPSC),  P-508/April  1955. 
92  LPA,  HPC,  Re.  130/January,  1957. 
90 retirement.  Those  who  were  already  members  of  'satisfactory'  occupational  or 
93 
private  schemes  would  be  permitted  to  opt  out  of  the  state  system. 
At  first  the  TUC  showed  little  interest  in  the  Labour  Party's  plan  for  national 
superannuation  but  it  was  becoming  increasingly  aware  of  the  deficiencies  of  the 
national  insurance  scheme.  Its  recognition  of  these  had  been  stimulated  by  the 
Phillips  Committee's  formal  rejection  of  the  subsistence  principle  and,  subsequently, 
94  the  government's  persistent  refusal  to  hold  an  inquiry  into  subsistence.  In  May 
1957,  the  Labour  Party  published  its  pamphlet  National  Superannuation  outlining 
proposals  to  raise  the  flat-rate  pension  by  J  Os  to  E3  per  week  while  the  total  pension, 
including  the  earnings-related  supplement,  would  eventually  reach  approximately  half 
of  average  earnings  and  would  be  uprated  in  line  with  inflation.  A  few  months  later 
the  195  7  TUC  Annual  Congress  stated  that  'the  General  Council  are  ...  recommending 
that  there  should  be  a  comprehensive  re-examination  of  the  Movement's  previous 
95  policy  embracing  all  aspects  of  social  insurance'.  Ultimately  the  TUC  endorsed  the 
Labour  Party's  proposals  but  still  continued  to  be  equivocal  over  the  principle  of 
earnings-related  pensions.  In  part,  this  was  because  the  TUC  believed  that  the  Labour 
Party's  scheme  had  potential  only  as  a  long-term  solution  to  the  problem  of  pensions, 
with  little  to  offer  current  pensioners  and  making  no  provision  for  other  national 
insurance  beneficiaries.  Heclo  suggests  that  the  TUC's  lack  of  enthusiasm  reflected 
concern  about  the  impact  of  state  superannuation  for  union  pension  plans.  96  There  is 
little  evidence  to  support  this  explanation:  the  TUC  quite  naturally  wished  to 
safeguard  established  pension  rights  in  trade  union  as  well  as  in  private  and 
93  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/14,  SllWC  14/1,12  June  1957. 
94  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/13,  SllWC  513,12  Jan.  1956. 
95  Trades  Union  Congress  Annual  Report  1957,  p.  140. 
96  H  Heclo,  Modern  socialpolitics,  p.  263 
91 t 
occupational  schemes  but  the  Labour  Party  plan  did  include  a  contracting  out 
provision  that  the  TUC  supported.  97  More  generally,  the  TUC  had  consistently 
favoured  increased  state  intervention  in  social  security  and  other  areas  of  social 
welfare  that  had  been  the  province'of  union,  voluntary  and  private  bodies  since  the 
1920s.  It  was  one  of  the  keenest  supporters  of  the  Beveridge  Report  in  1942,  which 
reduced  the  significance  of  many  union  schemes.  There  is  no  indication  in  TUC 
records  that  it  became  less  interested  in  state  social  reform  after  the  war. 
Meanwhile,  the  BEC's  response  to  Labour's  national  superannuation  scheme  was 
yet  more  negative.  In  particular,  it  opposed  the  proposal  to  make  occupational 
pension  schemes  transferable.  98  The  Confederation  had  already  recorded  -its 
objections  to  this  in  its  evidence  to  the  Phillips  Committee.  It  now  rejected  the 
argument  that  transferability  would  help  to  improve  labour  mobility  on  the  grounds 
that  this  was  already  too  high.  99  The  BEC  was  also  unhappy  with  the  prospective 
increase  in  state  control  that  would  accompany  the  establishment  of  'a  very  large  fund 
which  would  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Govermnent'.  100  The  ABCC  also  disliked 
Labour's  pension  plan,  describing  it  as  'wasteful,  oppressive  to  the  working 
population  and  dangerous  to  the  very  security  it  pretends  to  off6r.  "Ol  It  complained 
the  contributions  would  be  too  costly  for  workers,  that  the  scheme  itself  was 
inflationary  and  a  deterrent  to  private  savings,  and  would  undermine  occupational 
schemes  while  administration  would  be  complicated.,  Finally,  the  redistribution  of 
97  MRC,  MSS.  292/166.21/2b,  Notes  on  Labour  Party  Study  Group  -  draft  memorandum  on  Security 
and  Old  Age',  21  Jan.  1957. 
98  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/3n4O  pt.  1,  Note  of  a  meeting  on  16  Dec.  1957. 
99  Ibid.,  Notes  for  Lord  McCorquodale,  16  Jan.  1958;  Draft  bulletin  by  K  Burton,  23  Jan.  1958,  p.  2. 
100  PRO,  PIN  68/12,  Note  of  a  meeting  between  the  Minister  of  Pensions  and  the  Financial  Secretary  to 
the  Treasury,  and  Lord  McCorquodale  of  the  B.  E.  C.,  15  April  1958. 
101  PRO,  PIN  18/342,  HB  Lenin  to  Mr  Carswell,  27  June  1958,  p.  1. 
92 income  that  the  scheme  involved  was  condemned  as  a  'hidden  tax  on  higher 
earnings'.  102  Thus,  the  ABCC  favoured  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  flat-rate 
scheme  of  national  insurance,  operating  at  its  most  basic  level,  but  was  unable  to 
suggest  any  solution  to  the  problems  which  were  currently  arising  from  this 
provision.  103 
Following  the  Labour  Party's  lead,  the  Conservative  goverrunent  was  beginning  to 
consider  reforming  pensions  along  the  lines  of  earnings-relation.  It  invited  the  TUC 
and  BEC  to  participate  in  consultation  in  April  1958  when  the  Cabinet  was  still  trying 
to  choose  between  rival  plans  drawn  up  by  the  Treasury  and  the  Ministry  of  Pensions 
and  National  Insurance  respectively.  Consultation  was  instigated,  unusually,  by  the 
BEC  who  requested  a  meeting  to  discuss  the  implications  of  pension  reforms  for 
employers  in  April.  104  At  the  end  of  the  month,  the  government  approached  both  the 
BEC  and  TUC  for  consultation.  Its  objectives  were  to  gather  their  views  on 
provisions  for  contracting  out  of  the  state  scheme  and  to  assess  the  impact  of  a 
graduated  state  pension  scheme  on  occupational  provision.  105  The  government 
particularly  wished  to  discuss  contracting  out  with  the  BEC  because  of  the  sustained 
disagreement  within  the  government  on  this  issue  while  it  would  appear  that  its  only 
r--ason  for  consulting  the  TUC  was  to  avoid  criticism  for  not  doing  so.  106 
Both  the  TUC  and  BEC  desired  a  contracting  out  option,  the  TUC  recommending 
that  this  be  exercised  on  an  individual  rather  than  a  company  or  organisational 
102  Ibid.,  p.  1. 
103  Ibid.,  p.  2. 
104  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/3n4O  pt.  1,  Lord  McCorquodale  to  Derrick  Heathcoat  Amory,  3  April  1958. 
105  Ibid.,  John  Boyd-Carpenter  to  Mr  EJ  Hunter  (BEC),  22  April  1958. 
106  Ibid.;  PIN  68/12,  John  Boyd-Carpenter  to  lain  Macleod,  17  April,  1958. 
93 basis.  107  Further  matters  of  interest  to  the  TUC  included  the  level  of  earnings-related 
contributions  and  the  flat-rate  pension:  it  required  improvements  to  the  existing 
scheme  before  it  would  endorse  the  principle  of  earnings  relation.  108  The  BEC's  main 
concern  was  to  ensure  that  graduated  pensions  would  not  precipitate  earnings-related 
unemployment  and  sickness  benefit,  which,  as  shown  in  the  previous  chapter,  was 
unacceptable  in  principle.  109 
The  government  published  a  White  Paper,  Provision  for  Old  Age,  on  14  October 
1958  containing  details  of  its  plans  for  pensions.  It  intended  to  introduce  earnings- 
related  pensions  for  those  earning  between  E9  and  f  15  per  week  only,  which  would  be 
funded  by  contributions  from  employers  and  employees  and  a  fixed  annual 
contribution  from  the  Exchequer  of  f.  170  million.  The  TUCýwas  critical  of  several 
aspects  of  the  government's,  scheme.  Firstly,  its  failure  to  uprate  the  basic  pension 
caused  concern  that  this  would  lead  to  further  expansion  of  national  assistance.  110 
Secondly  it  was  unhappy  that  only  workers  within  the  f9-fl5  wage  band  would  be 
included  and  that  their  earnings-related  pension  would  not  be  protected  against 
inflation.  "'  The  narrow  scope  of  the  scheme  meant  that  its  redistributive  impact 
would  be  limited.  The  TUC  was  also  disappointed  that  the  reforms  did  not  address 
the  problem  of  the  shortfall  in  the  national  insurance  fund!  12  Finally,  it  was  irate  that 
107  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/15,  SIIWC,  9  May  1958.  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/3/740  pt.  1,  Notes  for  Lord 
McCorquodale  -  National  Insurance  Scheme,  Note  on  views  of  Confederation's  committee  on  proposed 
modifications,  undated. 
log  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/15,  SIIWC,  9  May  1958. 
109  MRC,  MSS.  200/13/3/3/740  pt.  1,  Notes  for  Lord  McCorquodale  -  National  Insurance  Scheme,  Note 
on  views  of  Confederation's  committee  on  proposed  modifications,  undated. 
110  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/16,  SIIWC  minutes,  20  Oct.  195  8. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid. 
94 the  govcmment  had  not  acceptcd  its  recommcndation  for  contracting  out  on  an 
113  individual  basis. 
The  BEC's  response  to  the  White  Paper  was  also  lukewarm  although  for  different 
reasons.  It  was  most  interested  in  the  administrative  and  technical  aspects  of  reform. 
These  included  the  provisions  for  workers  with  fluctuating  earnings  and  the 
arrangements  for  contracting  out.  With  regard  to  the  former,  the  Confederation 
complained  that  such  employees  would  pay  lower  contributions  and,  consequently, 
receive  a  smaller  pension  than  those  workers  with  very  similar,  but  more  stable, 
incomes.  The  BEC  also  %N-anted  bonuses  to  be  excluded  from  calculation  of  graduated 
contributions  owing  to  its  concern  that  workers  would  seek  different  arrangements  for 
the  payment  of  these  bonuses,  which  in  turn  would  cause  inconvenience  to 
employers.  114  T11e  employers  believed  the  conditions  for  contracting  out  were  too 
stringent.  115  It  opposed  the  government's  recommendation  that  employers  and 
workers  be  required  to  make  a  payment  to  the  national  insurance  fund  based  on 
earnings  of  LIS  per  week  when  leaving  a  contracted  out  pension  scheme  to  join  a 
company  which  had  not  opted  out.  116 
Ile  TUC  and  BEC's  criticisms  had  little  effect  on  the  goverrunent's  thinking:  the 
1959  National  Insurance  Bill  diffcrcd  little  from  the  White  Paper  other  than  to 
increase  the  Exchequer's  contribution  and  the  increments  for  deferred  retirement.  1  17 
113  Ibid. 
114  PRO,  PIN  34/12  1.  Note  by  JA  Atkinson  -  meeting  between  officials  of  the  Ministry  of  Pensions  and 
National  Insurance  and  the  BEC  to  discuss  the  method  of  collecting  contfibutions  under  the  White 
Paper  proposals.  18  Dec.  195  8. 
113  PRO,  PIN  43/130.  National  Insurance  Bill  -  Statement  by  the  British  Employers'  Confcderation,  23 
Jan.  1959. 
116  MC,  NISS.  200,  UI4/l/19.  ReE  N.  C  17800.  BEC  Annual  Report,  1959,  pp.  11-13. 
'17  PRO.  PIN  43/121.  Note  for  lobby  journalists,  fourth  draft  -  National  Insurance  Bill,  undated;  MRC, 
NISS192/161/16,  SIIWC  716,14  Jan.  1959. 
95 The  TUC  reftised  to  endorse  the  Conservative  government's  scheme  following  the 
1959  National  Insurance  Act.  118  Neither  did  the  BEC  welcome  the  legislation,  issuing 
a  public  statement  that  criticised,  the  lack  of  opportunity  to  discuss  the  content  of  the 
White  Paper  prior  to  the  publication  of  the  Bill!  19  The  Confederation  continued  to 
hold  reservations  over  the  arrangements  for  assessing  and  collecting  graduated 
contributions,  and  the  'unnecessarily  severe'  conditions  for  contracting  out  of  the  state 
scheme.  120  It  also  still  opposed  arrangements  for  the  preservation  of  occupational 
pension  rights  following  a  change  of  employment.  This  was  based  on  its  argument 
that  occupational  pension  schemes  were  often  established  in  order  to  attain  stability  in 
the  labour  force  and  that  greater  mobility  of  manual  workers  was  not  desirable.  121 
This  argument  was  later  contradicted  when  the  BEC  participated  in  consultation  on 
earnings-rclated  unemployment  and  sickness  benefit. 
Conclusion 
Both  the  TUC's  and  BECs  pension  policies  were  clearly  informed  by  wider  concerns 
than  the  alleviation  of  aged  poverty.  Like%vise  successive  governments  were 
continually  examining  %%2ys  of  reducing  the  cost  of  retirement  pensions  to  the  state  in 
view  of  demographic  changes.  The  TUC  %%-as  sympathetic  to  Labour  government 
problems  in  this  area  while  the  BEC  favoured  less  state  expenditure  on  pensions,  thus 
both  groups,  perhaps  inadvertently,  were  participants  in  a  political  consensus  that 
provision  for  old  age  %N-as  costly  and  complex.  The  TUC  withdrew  from  this 
consensus  during  the  1950s  not  because  it  became  more  tolerant  of  the  cost  of 
"s  MRC,  MSS292/161/17,  SllWC  13/2.13  July  1960. 
119  MRC,  MSSI20QB5,2/C4  pL  168,  N.  C.  17028,  Jan.  1959,  p.  11. 
120  lbid,  p.  12. 
121  MRC,  mss.  2oowrvc4  pL  19  1,  N.  C.  I  W2,12  May  196  1;  N.  C.  19430,5  May  1961. 
96 pensions  but  because  it  would  not  tolerate  cuts  or  restrictions  in  any  area  of  social 
policy  by  a  Conservative  government.  At  the  same  time,  it  was  reluctant  to  accept 
any  concessions  that  would  impact  upon  other  union  policies  such  as  the  relaxation  of 
the  retirement  condition  in  spite  of  its  financial  benefits  for  many  elderly  people. 
Accordingly  it  is  clear  that  the  TUC's  concern  for  elderly  standards  of  living  was  not 
completely  devoid  of  self-interest.  Neither  the  TUC  nor  the  BEC  made  a  positive 
contribution  to  debates  on  pension  reform  at  this  time.  Both  organisations  adopted  a 
very  conservative  stance,  the  TUC  because  it  was  wedded  to  the  Beveridge  scheme 
with  its  flat-rate  principles,  and  the  BEC  because  it  was  loath  to  countenance  any 
finther  state  intervention  in  economic  and  social  life. 
The  TUC  and  BEC  were  involved  in  discussions  that  preceded  any  significant 
amendments  to  pensions  policy,  from  the  establishment  of  the  Beveridge  Committee 
to  the  introduction  of  earnings-related  pensions  in  1959.  It  is  possible  to  identify 
areas  and  times  where  they  appear  to  have  had  some  influence  in  policy.  For 
instance,  the  TUC  effectively  persuaded  Beveridge  to  introduce  the  retirement 
condition  and  the  BEC  appear  to  have  convinced  the  Phillips  Committee  not  to 
recommend  transferability  of  occupational  pension  schemes.  Ultimately,  however, 
their  potential  importance  v6-as  diminished  by  their  own  unwillingness  to  actively 
participate  in  formulating  a  positive  solution  to  the  'problem  of  pensions'  in  the 
1950s.  Nonetheless  this  should  not  detract  from  the  fact  that  both  Labour  and 
Conservative  administrations  seem  to  have  regarded  consultation  with  these  interests 
a  prerequisite  to  any  significant  changes  in  policy. 
97 Chapter  Four  Health  PpHicy 
The  previous  two  chapters  examined  the  attitudes  of  the  British  Employers' 
Confederation  and  the  Trades  Union  Congress  towards  government  policy  on  social 
security  and  pensions  policy,  and  their  role  in  its  formulation  between  1939  and  1964. 
The  findings  of  these  chapters  allowed  us  to  begin  to  consider  the  degree  to  which  a 
'welfare  consensus'  existed  outside  Whitehall,  with  particular  reference  to  these 
powerful  interest  groups  that  were  interested  in  the  making  of  social  policy  but  whose 
raison  d7tre  %%-as  not  explicitly  linked  to  welfare  issues.  The  involvement  of  the  BEC 
and  the  TUC  in  health  policy  formulation  provides  a  fiu-ther  opportunity  to  assess  the 
validity  of  Keith  hliddlcmas'  thesis  of  'corporate  bias'  outside  the  particular  confimes 
of  economic  and  industrial  policy.  Herein  the  discussion  addresses  only  the  role  of 
the  TUC  since  the  BEC  seldom  discussed  health  policy  matters  and  did  not  seek 
consultation  %%ith  government  in  this  area  of  policy  making.  This  prevents  us  from 
examining  the  extent  of  agreement  between  the  representatives  of  labour  and  capital 
on  state  health  care  issues,  but  the  BEC's  apparent  indifference  to  health  policy  still 
has  implications  for  the  consensus  thesis  and  the  existence  of  corporate  bias.  The 
quite  different  approach  of  the  TUC  in  the  health  policy  sphere  highlights  the 
complexity  of  attitudes  to%%-ards  the  welfare  state  as  a  single  entity  and,  thus,  the 
weaknesses  of  a  model,  such  as  consensus,  which  seeks  to  gcneralise. 
Employers.  tmde  unions  and  state  health  care  before  1939 
Prior  to  the  outbreak-  of  world  war  two,  medical  care  for  manual  workers  earning  less 
than  L250  a  year  was  pro%ided  under  the  1911  National  Insurance  Act's  contributory 
98 National  Health  Insurance  (NHI)  scheme.  Provision  was  usually  confined  to  services 
offered  by  local  doctors,  generally  excluding  hospital  care,  and  seldom  covered 
dependants.  The  range  of  services  that  were  offered  under  NHI  tended  to  vary 
because  it  was  administered  by  separate  'approved  societies'.  The  lack  of  uniformity 
in  the  system  and  its  limited  coverage  provoked  much  dissatisfaction  with  National 
Health  Insurance  in  the  intcr%-.  -ar  period.  A  number  of  reports  all  recommended 
reform  of  state  health  services:  these  included  the  1920  Dawson  Report,  the  1926 
Royal  Commission  on  National  Health  Insurance  together  with  statements  by  the 
British  Medical  Association  (BMA)  in  1930,  and  the  Socialist  Medical  Association 
(SMA)  in  1933.1  By  the  1930s,  Political  and  Economic  Planning  (PEP),  the  Fabians, 
and  the  Nuffield  Trust  were  all  agitating  for  reform.  2  Both  the  Labour  Party  and  the 
TUC  participated  in  this  movement.  The  Labour  Party  had  published  a  report  in  1918 
entitled  The  organisation  ofthe  preventive  and  curative  medical  services  and  hospital 
and  laboratory  s),  stems  under  a  Alinistty  ofHealth  that  called  for  the  establishment  of 
a  free  nationwide  health  service  with  doctors  in  full-time  salaried  service  and  a 
3 
comprehensive  network  of  health  centres.  The  TUC  was  unhappy  with  perceived 
deficiencies  in  NIII  and  the  involvement  of  the  insurance  industry,  which  it  believed 
acted  as  an  obstacle  to  improvements  in  public  health  services.  4  Ile  National 
Confederation  of  Employers'  Organisations,  like  the  industrial  assurance  companies 
and  the  voluntary  hospitals,  %vas  not  reform-minded  in  the  least.  It  believed  that 
substantial  changes  were  unnecessary  particularly  if  they  would  require  greater  state 
intervention.  Instead  of  seeking  improvements  in  National  Health  Insurance,  the 
1R  Klein.  77ie  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service,  p.  4;  R  Lowe,  The  wetOre  state  in  Britain 
since  1945.  p.  167. 
2C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  pp.  5&7;  PRO,  MH  77/30A,  Mr  Wrigley  to  Sir Laurence 
Brock,  25  Aug.  194  1. 
1B  Watkin,  The  national  health  service,  P.  12. 
4F  flonigsbaum,  Ifealth  happiness.  andsecurity,  p.  9. 
99 NCEO  lobbied  the  goverrument  to  reduce  NHI  contributions  in  order  to  lessen  the 
burden  on  industry.  5 
Planninp,  health  care  reform  in  %-aftime 
In  spite  of  the  BEC's  antipathy,  the  outbreak  of  the  second  world  war  and  the 
successful  establishment  of  the  Emergency  Medical  Service  served  to  advance  the 
case  of  those  who  did  favour  reform.  6  By  1945  proposals  for  the  introduction  of  a 
national  medical  service  had  been  %videly  discussed  and  agreement  had  been  reached 
on  the  basic  principles  though  not  on  how  they  were  to  be  put  into  practice.  The  BEC 
declined  to  participate  in  these  discussions  and  negotiations  while  the  TUC  strove  to 
ensure  that  the  government  would  take  on  board  its  views  when  making  policy 
decisions.  'niere  was  fierce  competition,  however,  from  more  immediate  interests 
that  also  urished  to  shape  the  future  of  British  health  policy.  Civil  servants  in  the 
Department  of  Health  had  started  drawing  up  plans  for  reform  in  1938!  The 
representatives  of  the  medical  profession,  local  government  and  voluntary  hospital 
organisations;  also  had  a  far  more  direct  and  identifiable  interest  in  state  health  care 
than  the  TUC.  It  is  the  influence  of  these  latter  groups  that  has  been  most  widely 
rccognised  by  historians,  the  doctors  in  particular!  Before  1948,  the  role  of  the  TUC 
appears  to  be  insubstantial  by  comparison,  but  its  significance  lies  in  its  involvement 
in  a  broad  coalition  of  forces  that  had  pursued  reform  since  the  1920s,  and  in 
5  MRC,  MSSI00iW/2IC645  pt.  2,  CEO  deputation  to  the  Rt.  Hon.  Neville  Chamberlain,  17  July 
1925;  Ref.  N.  C.  1285,  Widows',  Orphans'  and  Old  Age  Contributory  Pensions  Bill,  note  for  deputation 
to  Minister  of  Ilealth,  17  July  1925. 
6C  Webster,  77je  national  health  service,  pp.  6-7;  K  Jefferys,  'British  politics  and  social  policy  during 
the  second  world  war',  p.  133. 
R  Klein,  The  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service,  pp.  7-8. 
R  Lowe,  The  wey;  zrestate  in  Britair4  p.  171;  R  Klein,  The  newpolitics  ofthe  national  health  service, 
p.  8;  C Webster,  The  national  health  service,  pp.  8&  12. 
100 promoting,  disseminating,  and  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  trade  union  movement  for 
the  fundamental  principles  that  were  to  underpin  the  emerging  NHS.  Moreover,  as 
Klein  highlights,  it  is  difficult  to  assess  the  contribution  of  individual  interest  groups 
because  of  the  inherent  interaction  between  them,  thus  he  warns  against  taking  an 
approach  where  it  is  presumed  that  'the  sets  of  actors  involved  were  discrete  and 
homogeneous'.  9 
Combined  with  the  role  of  prewar  pressure,  interest  groups  and  the  impact  of  the 
war  on  social  change  -.  %ms  the  1942  publication  of  the  Beveridge  Report.  Although  the 
Beveridge  Committee  was  primarily  concerned  with  income  maintenance  and 
poverty,  the  TUC  deputation,  which  is  widely  credited  with  committee's 
establishment,  was  in  fact  sent  to  complain  about  NHI.  Trade  union  representatives 
complained  about  its  limited  coverage,  the  failure  to  make  provision  for  dependants, 
and  disparity  between  benefits  in  different  approved  societies'  schemes.  10  In  the 
course  of  their  discussions  on  health  policy,  Beveridge  and  the  TUC  reached 
agreement  on  the  need  to  remove  the  industrial  insurance  companies  from  National 
Health  Insurance  administration,  and  also  on  -the  general  principles  of  a  national 
health  service.  "  In  his  report,  Beveridge  argued  that  his  contributory  social  insurance 
szheme  could  only  work  if  the  government  paid  family  allowances,  guaranteed  a  high 
and  stable  level  of  employment,  and  provided  a  national  medical  service.  Webster 
and  Brown  believe  that  the  report's  recommendations  and  Beveridge's  own  interest  in 
health  policy  prompted  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  quicken  the  pace  of  reform  if  only  to 
9R  Klein,  Ilse  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service,  p.  25. 
10  NIRC.  MSS.  292/15531/4.  Health  insurance  reform:  history  of  case,  1941. 
"F  llonigsbaum.  Ilealth.  happiness  andsecurity.  p.  35. 
101 pre-empt  a  further  Beveridge  Report  on  health.  12  If  the  Beveridge  Report  did  indeed 
act  as  such  a  catalyst  to  health  reform  then  the  TUC's  role  in  the  establishment  of  the 
Beveridge  Committee  has  yetwider  implications  than  have  been  previously  realised. 
The  TUC  itself  released  a  statement  on  health  policy  in  March  1943.13  This 
statement  and  a  further  document  were  sent  to  Ernest  Brown,  the  Minister  of  Health, 
in  the  autumn  A%ith  the  hope  of  influencing  government  health  policy,  and  creating  a 
consultative  relationship  with  the  Ministry  of  Health.  The  TUC's  statement  indicates 
the  nature  and  degree  of  its  interest  in  health  care  refonn  and  the  extent  to  which  its 
ideas  coincided  with  those  of  other  groups  while  contrasting  strongly  with  the  BEC's 
apparent  indifference.  Still  its  influence  was  somewhat  limited  at  this  stage;  Ernest 
Brown  rejected  the  TUC's  request  for  a  meeting,  suggesting  that  consultation  should 
take  place  after  the  publication  of  the  government's  White  Paper  on  health  policy.  14 
. 
In  its  statement  on  health  policy,  the  TUC  had  reiterated  its  dissatisfaction  with 
National  Health  Insurance,  outlined  other  areas  of  health  policy  with  which  it  was 
unhappy  together,  and  provided  a  prescription  for  reform.  Reorganisation  was  of 
primary  importance:  as  %vith  social  security,  several  different  government.  ministries 
were  responsible  for  health  policy  which  was  perceived  to  result  in  a  fragmented  and 
disorganiscd  scrvicc.  's  The  TUC  recommended  that  a  single  government  department 
take  sole  charge  of  health  policy  with  a  view  to  securing  equity  and  uniformity  in 
12  C  Webster,  7be  health  services  since  the  war  vol.  1,  p.  36;  J  Brown,  The  British  weyizre  state,  p.  90. 
13  MRC,  MSS192/947/2,  Stale  medical  service  memorandum  by  Dr  HB  Morgan,  17  March  1943. 
14  PRO,  MH  77n3,  Ernest  Brown  to  Walter  Citrine,  10  Nov.  1943. 
15  At  this  time  the  Ministry  of  Health  was  responsible  for  national  health  insurance,  the  care  of  certain 
diseases  such  as  tuberculosis,  local  authority  hospitals,  maternity  and  child  welfare,  public  health  and 
housing  while  the  Home  Office  was  in  charge  of  industrial  health,  medical  research  was  supervised  by 
the  Privy  Council  and  the  Board  of  Education  organised  the  school  medical  service.  The  TUC's 
criticisms  of  these  arrangements  are  discussed  in  MRC.  MSS.  2921847/2,  State  medical  service 
memorandum  by  Dr  If  B  Morgan,  17  March  1943. 
102 provision-  Besides  being  critical  of  the  wider  organisation  of  health  services,  the 
TUC  was  particularly  unhappy  with  the  structure  of  the  hospital  system,  and  the 
separate  administration  of  public  and  voluntary  hospitals.  This  sentiment  was  widely 
held:  Lord  Dawson  of  Penn,  the  architect  of  the  1920  Dawson  Report  on  the  health 
services,  had  criticised  the  hospital  system  and  the  voluntary  hospitals  were  quite 
evidently  in  financial  difficulties  by  the  1930s.  16  The  trade  union  movement  had 
strong  links  with  the  voluntary  hospitals  through  hospital  contributory  schemes  but 
their  financial  instability  led  the  TUC  to  favour  a  policy  of  nationalisation  and  the 
introduction  of  a  single  state  hospital  system.  17  This  proposition  was,  of  course, 
opposed  by  the  voluntary  hospital  organisations.  The  government  also  currently 
favoured  retention  of  the  voluntary  hospitals,  a  policy  that  the  TUC  described  as 
'unfortunate  and  undesimble  because  there  will  never  be  a  really  unified  hospital 
system  in  Great  Britain  %vith  two  different  systems  of  hospital  administration,  on 
entirely  different  lines,  one  private,  the  other  ...  public'.  18  Dissatisfaction  with 
arrangements  for  hospital  care  and  its  belief  that  state  health  services  focused 
excessively  on  curing  rather  than  preventing  ill-health  provided  the  basis  for  the 
TUC's  long-standing  interest  in  health  centres.  19  The  health  centre  idea  also  had  its 
roots  in  the  interwar  period:  both  the  Labour  Party  and  the  1926  Royal  Commission 
had  favoured  their  widespread  introduction.  20  The  TUC  hoped  that  health  centres 
would  permit  and  encourage  different  branches  of  the  medical  profession  to  work 
together,  again  promoting  a  more  integrated  and  cohesive  health  care  system.  21  - 
16  R  Lowe,  7he  wetrare  state  since  1945.  p.  169,  C Webster,  The  national  health  service,  p.  5. 
17  MRC.  hISS292/947f4  State  medical  service  memorandum  by  Dr  HB  Morgan,  17  March  1943. 
11  [bid.,  A  SIC.  WC  &  FC  1/1,20  Oct.  1943. 
19  [bid,  State  medical  service  memorandum  by  Dr  HB  Morgan,  17  March  1943. 
20  B  Watkin,  The  national  heafth  service,  p.  12;  R  Lowe,  The  wey'are  state  since  1945,  p.  167. 
21  MRC,  NISS192/847/2.  State  medical  service  memorandum  by  Dr  HB  Morgan,  17  March  1943. 
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most  fundamentally  it  wanted  a  health  service  that  promoted  equality  by  providing 
universal  and  free  access  to  health  care  on  the  basis  of  need,  a  concept  which  by  1943 
attracted  little  controversy.  22  Nonetheless  the  differences  regarding  details  and  the 
implementation  of  policy  did  become  increasingly  acute  as  plans  for  reconstruction 
developed.  The  coalition  government  published  its  VVIIite  Paper,  A  National  Health 
Service,  in  February  1944.  Ile  production  of  this  joint  Labour-Conservative 
document  has  seldom  been  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  consensus.  The  Labour  Party 
viewed  it  as  a  compromise  while  the  Conservative  Party  would  withdraw  from  its 
proposals  as  soon  as  it  could.  23  Neither  did  the  White  Paper  elicit  a  positive  response 
from  the  medical  profession  or  from  voluntary  hospital  organisations.  24  The  TUC 
itself  was  ambivalent:  it  described  the  W`hite  Paper  as  'a  basis  for  discussion'  and  'a 
considerable  advance  on  present  medical  services  but 
...  not  a  comprehensive 
National  Service'.  25  It  was  pleased  with  the  absence  of  direct  charges  and  the 
apparent  endorsement  of  health  ccntres  while  the  intention  of  retaining  the  voluntary 
hospitals  in  their  present  role  , vas  less  welcome.  26  The  voluntary  hospitals  would  be 
encouraged  to  cooperate  and  coordinate  their  provision  with  state  hospitals  but  formal 
participation  would  not  be  required.  The  TUC  had  been  very  keen  on  an  integrated 
hospital  system  and,  %%-as  anxious  that  the  principle  should  not  be  ftu-ther  undermined 
by  allowing  those  -%ho,  contributed  to  a  voluntary  hospital  scheme  to  opt  out  of  the 
state  health  service.  27  Finally  the  TUC  considered  the  arrangements  for  public 
22  Ibid.,  A  SIC.  WC  &-  FC  1/1,20  Oct.  1943;  R  Lowe,  71e  wey'are  state  since  1945,  p.  167;  C  Webster, 
Ae  national  health  service,  p.  17. 
"K  Je  fferys  ,  ed-.  Labour  and  the  m-artime  coalition,  p.  14;  R  Klein,  The  new  politics  ofthe  national 
health  service.  p.  14;  R  Lowe,  'The  second  world  war,  consensus,  and  the  foundation  of  the  wel  fare 
state',  p.  164. 
24  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  p.  10. 
23  MRC,  MSS.  292/947/2,  Jt  SICWC  &  FC  4/1.1  March  1944. 
'16  Ibid. 
27  MRC,  MSS.  292/161.1/3,  Jt  SICWC  &  FC,  9  March  1944. 
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28 
which  was  to  become  a  particular  issue  for  the  TUC  in  the  postwar  peno  . 
Following  the  publication  of  the  White  Paper,  the  TUC  finally  was  able  to  discuss 
health  policy  with  the  government.  Thomas  Johnston,  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Scotland,  requested  a  meeting  with  TUC  representatives  when  he  received  its  report 
on  the  White  Paper.  29  'Me  TUC  also  met  with  Henry  Willink,  the  new  Minister  of 
Health,  in  March  1945.  Its  representatives  asked  for  his  assurance  that  the  state  health 
service  would  be  universal  in  its  scope  and  that  there  would  be  no  option  for 
individuals  to  contract  out  Willink  vouched  for  the  comprehensive  nature  of  the 
scheme  with  the  proviso  that  the  right  to  engage  in  private  practice  would  be 
retained.  30  Shortly  after  this  meeting  the  Labour  Party  resigned  from  the  government, 
which  precipitated  further  changes  in  government  policy.  Willink  amended  the 
proposals  contained  in  the  White  Paper  in  order  to  placate  the  medical  profession  and 
the  voluntary  hospitals.  His  memorandum  entitled  'Progress  with  the  Proposals  of  a 
National  Health  Service'  rejected  a  salaried  GP  service  and  controls  over  distribution 
of  practices.  Ile  health  centre  project  %ras  also  to  be  administered  centrally  rather 
than  by  local  authorities.  31 
In  fact  the  election  of  a  Labour  government  and  the  appointment  of  Aneurin  Bevan 
as  Minister  of  Health  upset  Willink's  plans.  In  1945  consent  had  been  secured  on  the 
basic  principles  of  state  health  care,  but  there  was  still  substantial  disagreement  with 
respect  to  the  actual  structure  of  the  proposed  health  service.  Willink's  concessions  to 
22  NIRC,  mss.  292twa,  A  SIC-WC  &-  FC  411,1  March  1944. 
19  MRC.  NISS192/947/3,  T'homas  Johnston  to  Walter  Citrine,  19  Dec.  1944. 
30  thid,  R  SIC.  WC  &  FC  9/Z  8  March  1945. 
3'  C  Webster.  The  health  services  since  the  war  volume  1,  p.  74. 
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from  those  quarters  but  in  the  process  had  alienated  the  labour  movement.  The 
Ubour  Party's  electoral  victory  on  5  July  1945  precipitated  a  new  set  of  tensions  and 
disagreements  that  were  to  threaten  the  very  establishment  of  the  NHS. 
The  National  Health  Service  under  Labour.  1945-1951 
It  follows  that  signs  of  consensus  diminished  rather  than  increased  between  1945  and 
1948.  In  the  political  sphere,  the  Conservatives  had  already  withdrawn  from  some  of 
the  White  Paper  proposalswhile  the  new  Labour  government  made  it  clear  that  it  had 
compromised  itself  in  agreeing  to  the  publication  of  the  White  Paper.  32  While  a 
cross-party  consensus  was  sustained  on  the  basic  principles  of  universalism  and  the 
provision  of  health  care  free  at  the  point  of  use,  agreement  existed  on  little  else.  The 
protracted  negotiations  with  the  medical  profession  that  followed  detracts  finther  from 
the  notion  of  a  health  policy  consensus.  Local  government  associations  and  voluntary 
hospital  organisations  gradually  dropped  their  resistance  but  the  medical  profession 
33 
remained  hostile  to  government  plans  virtually  until  the  appointed  day. 
Relations  between  Bevan  and  the  BMA  deteriorated  after  the  publication  of  the 
Labour  government's  National  Health  Service  Bill.  Pri6r  to  this,  it  has  been 
suggested  that,  Bevan  paid  little  attention  to  outside  interests  while  he  was  devising 
'"  Rivett  believes  that  Bevan  did  not  reveal  his  plans  to  any  interest  his  reforms., 
32  NIRC,  NISS192,147/4,  Deputation  to  Minister  of  Health  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Scotland,  8 
Jan.  1946;  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  p.  13. 
11  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  P.  25. 
34  G  Rivett,  From  cradle  to  grave,  p.  29;  C Webster.  7he  national  health  service,  pp.  14-15. 
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Webster  is  a%rare,  Bevan  informed  the  TUC  of  his  intentions  at  a  meeting  in  January 
1946,  more  than  two  months  before  the  introduction  of  the  Bill.  36  Whether  as  a 
consequence  of  the  close  relationship  between  the  Labour  Party  and  the  TUC,  or  a 
product  of  'corporate  bias',  the  TUC  appear  to  have  been  the  first  and  only  external 
organisation  to  have  been  informed  of  the  Labour  government's  health  policy  before 
it  was  made  public.  This,  of  course,  does  not  necessarily  suggest  that  the  TUC  had  an 
undue  influence  on  the  government's  policy,  not  that  a  great  deal  of  discord  existed 
on  this  subject  bem-een  these  two  bodies  in  any  case. 
The  meeting  largely  served  the  purpose  of  advising  the  TUC  of  government  policy; 
Bevan  told  TUC  representatives  of  his  intention  to  nationalisc  the  hospital  service, 
and  the  decision  not  to  introduce  a  salaried  GP  service  or  to  abolish  private  practice  in 
view  of  the  opposition  these  policies  would  incite.  The  only  matter  that  provoked  real 
disagreement  at  the  meeting  concerned  the  representation  of  the  general  public  in  the 
administration  of  the  health  services;  the  'IUC  argued  that  this  would  be  inadequate 
while  medical  participation  Nvas  excessive.  Bevan  defended  his  plans  on  the  basis  that 
doctors  would  be  involved  in  all  areas  of  the  National  Health  Service  while  other 
h.  -alth  workers,  %%ith,  %%-hom  the  TUC  %%-as  also  concemed,  had  a  more  limited  role.  37 
Trade  unions  could  also  make  nominations  for  the  Regional  Hospital  Boards  (RHBs), 
which  would  organise  hospital  and  specialist  provision  for  the  region,  and  to  Hospital 
Management  Committees  (IINICs).  Iliese  appointments  would,  however,  be  made  on 
35  G  Rivett.  From  crade  to  grave.  p.  29. 
36  MRC,  MSS.  2921847/4,  Deputation  to  Minister  of  Health  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Scotland,  8 
Jan.  1946;  C Webster,  7he  health  services  since  the  war  volume  1,  p.  89. 
3"  PRo,  imi  77n3.  National  IleaM  Service  Bill,  deputation  to  the  Minister  from  the  Trades  Union 
Congress,  17  June  1946;  Aneurin  Bevan  to  Sir  Walter  Citrine,  18  July  1946. 
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represent  particular  organisations.  38 
Bevan's  proposals  were  published  in  the  National  Health  Service  Bill,  which  was 
introduced  to  the  House  of  Commons  on  19  March  1946.  The  greatest  opposition 
came  from  the  medical  profession,  in  particular  the  general  practitioners,  while  the 
aversion  of  the  Conservative  Party,  local  government,  and  voluntary  hospitals  was 
muted  by  comparison  and  dissipated  more  quickly.  39  The  TUC  continued  to  be 
equivocal  although  it  did  prefer  the  Bill  to  the  1944  White  Paper.  The  nationalisation 
of  the  hospital  system  and  the  prohibition  on  the  sale  of  general  practices  were 
particularly  welcomed  but  it  A-as  more  critical  of  other  proposals.  40  These  included 
the  failure  to  include  industrial  medical  services  in  the  new  health  service  and  the 
absence  of  a  greater  commitment  to  preventing  illness 
.41 
The  TUC  recognised  the 
problems  involved  in  abolishing  private  practice  but  suggested  that  it  should  be 
monitored.  It  also  %%-anted  guarantees  that  private  medical  care  would  not  be  superior 
to  the  national  health  service,  and  that  NHS  services  would  not  be  contracted  out  to 
private  firms.  Its  greatest  reservation  continued  to  be  the  under-representation  of 
NHS  patients  and  health  workers  together  with  medical  domination  over  the 
administration  of  the  NHS.  42  Consequently  it  asked  Bevan  to  make  provision  for 
representation  of  all  grades  of  health  workers  on  health  service  committees,  and  on 
the  new  Central  Health  Scnices  Council  (CHSC)  which  would  advise  the  Minister  of 
3s  PRO,  Nm  77n3.  Aneurin  Bevan  to  Sir  Walter  Citrine,  19  July  1946. 
"MI  fill,  The  wetlare  state  in  Britain,  p.  33;  R  Klein,  7he  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service, 
pp.  16-23;  M  Sullivan,  The  development  ofthe  British  wett4re  state,  p.  168;  C Webster,  The  national 
health  service,  pp.  25-28. 
40  MRC,  NISS292/161.1/4,  A  SIC.  WC  &  FC,  National  Health  Service  Bill,  28  May  1946. 
41  [bid-,  Jt  SIC.  WC  &  FC  8.11  April  1946;  Jt  SIC.  WC  &  FC,  National  Health  Service  Bill,  29  May 
1946;  A  SIC.  WC  &  FC  11/1,18  June  1946. 
42  Ibid.,  Jt  SIC.  WC  &-  FCý  National  Health  Service  Bill,  28  May  1946. 
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Health  on  technical  aspects  of  policy.  43  Charles  Webster  believes  that  the  trade  union 
movement  welcomed  representation  on  RHBs.  44  This  is  true  but  the  level  of 
representation  uras  seldom  satisfactory.  Moreover,  it  was  never  held  to  compensate 
for  what  was  perceived  to  be  excessive  medical  participation  at  the  expense  of  other 
groups  of  health  workers. 
From  producer  interest  to  consumer  representation 
The  TUC  had  been  unhappy  with  the  arrangements  for  representation  in  NES 
administration  from  the  outset  It  continued  to  express  its  dissatisfaction  after  the 
legislation  of  the  1946  National  Health  Service  Act  Walter Citrine,  the  TUC  General 
Secretary,  wrote  to  Bevan  to  question  the  position  of  health  workers  other  fl= 
medical  staff.  The  Minister  of  Health  adhered  to  his  original  position:  the  medical 
profession  should  comprise  a  majority  membership  on  the  Central  Health  Services 
Council,  and  health  workers  could  participate  via  Advisory  Committees.  In  relation 
to  RfIBs  and  HNICs,  Bevan  stressed  that  appointments  reflected  relevant  experience 
and  aptitude  (although  measurement  of  these  was  never  explicitly  defined)  rather  than 
the  capacity  to  represent  certain  groUPS.  45  Bevan  and  TUC  representatives  met  to 
discuss  this  matter  further.  The  TUC  made  little  progress;  Bevan  vetoed  their 
suggestion  that  trade  unions  nominate  health  workers  for  RHBs  in  order  to  secure  a 
greater  role  for  these  people.  He  also  maintained  his  reftisal  to  consider  TUC 
representation  on  the  CHSC  because  the  body  dealt  with  technical  aspects  of  health 
carc.  In  1951,  aftcr  fivc  ycars  of  Labour  goverruncrit,  the  TUC  was  still  complaining 
41  Ibid.,  Jt  SIC.  WC  &  FC  11,19  June  1946. 
"C  Webster,  7he  health  services  since  the  war  volume  1,  p.  89. 
45  MRC,  f-ISS192/161.1/4,  Jt  SIC.  WC  &  FC  1313,18  July  1946. 
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health  service.  4;  Hilary  Marquand,  the  new  Minister  of  Health,  was  more  responsive 
to  its  complaints  and  published  a  circular  that  advised  RHBs  that  Management 
Committee  officers  could  be  appointed  to  committees  outside  their  own  area  of  work 
if  they  were  suitable  for  the  position.  47  The  General  Council  was  still  not  satisfied 
because  the  circular  did  not  specifically  recommend  hospital  staff  for  these 
appointments. 
48 
Since  Bevan  had  denied  the  TUC  a  representative  role  on  Regional  Hospital 
Boards  and  prohibited  its  nomination  of  health  service  workers,  the  TUC  began  to 
manufacture  itself  as  a  representative  of  NHS  patients  or  'consumers'.  ne 
government  too  initiated  and  subscribed  to  this  interpretation  of  its  role:  in  November 
1946,  Bevan  %%Totc  to  the  TUC  asking  for  advice  on  'consumer  representation'  on 
NHS  Executive  CO=CilS.  49  This  was  followed  by  a  finther  request  for  a  TUC 
nomination  to  the  Medical  Certificates  Committee  who  would  represent  the  'general 
public'.  50  Although  this  new  function  allowed  the  TUC  greater  scope  in  its  claims  for 
representation,  it  %%-as  disappointed  NNith  the  results  of  its  first  nominations  to  the  14 
Regional  Hospital  Boards  in  1947  particularly  since  it  had  been  denied  representation 
on  the  Central  Health  Services  Council.  "  Bevan  was  not  receptive  to  the  TUC's 
request  that  its  nominations  be  considered  for  vacancies  which  arose  during  the  year, 
he  emphasised  again  that  members  of  Regional  Hospital  Boards  would  be  appointed 
on  the  basis  of  their  experience,  and  that  he  would  only  consult  the  TUC  when  it  was 
"  MRC,  MSS192/161/8,  SIIWC  10/1.15  Feb.  1951. 
47  [bid,  SIIWC  12,15  hfamh  1951. 
4'  [bid. 
49  SIRC,  MSS192/161.1/4,  A  SICWC  &  FC  15.14  Nov.  1946. 
Ibid.,  Jt  SIC.  WC  &  FC  1.9  Om  1947. 
Ibid.,  A  SIC.  WC  &  FC  3.13  Feb.  1947;  A  SIC-WC  &  FC  4,3  March  1947. 
110 appropriate  to  do  so.  52  He  then  insisted  that  there  was  no  medical  overweighting  on 
the  regional  boards  and  that  new  appointments  reflected  the  existing  balance  between 
medical  and  non-medical  members.  53  Bevan's  indifference  towards  TUC  complaints 
meant  that  representation  of  NHS  patients  was  also  a  contentious  subject  in  1951. 
Yet,  in  principle  at  least,  Bevan  had  accepted  that  the  TUC  had  a  role  to  play  in  the 
running  of  the  NHS.  While  the  qualifications  for  RHB  membership  remained  ill- 
deflined,  the  notion  of  patient  representation  and  the  TUCs  ability  to  fulfil  this 
function  had  been  bom.  This  cast  the  TUC  in  a  new,  broader  role  beyond  that  of  an 
interest  group  directly  concerned  with  only  its  own  membership.  This  wider 
perspective  had  been  a  feature  of  TUC  social  security  and  pensions  policy  but  self- 
interest  had  undermined  its  effectiveness.  The  NHS,  funded  from  taxation  rather  than 
direct  contributions,  created  no  such  conflicts  of  interest,  permitting  the  TUC  to  take 
on  board  important  issues  . %ithout  compromising  its  own  members'  interests. 
The  Labour  government  and  thefunding  'crisis  9 
Of  course  the  dcmands  of  union  members  was  not  the  only  constraint  on  TUC  policy. 
The  election  of  a  Labour  govcmmcnt  produced  another  source  of  compromise  that  led 
to  inconsistencies  in  TUC  social  policy.  This  was  most  pronounced  in  relation  to 
MIS  financial  issues.  MIS  funding  very  quickly  became  a  great  source  of  concern  to 
the  Labour  Party.  Expenditure  was  expected  to  fall  once  the  'backlog'  of  illness  had 
been  treated  and  the  availability  of  free  health  care  produced  a  healthier  population.  54 
Instead  the  MIS  exceeded  its  budget  substantially  in  both  1947  and  1948  while 
12  IbidL,  A  SICWC  &  FC  1.9  Om  1947. 
53  NIRC,  16ISS192/161/6,  SIIWC  3,10  Nov.  1948. 
54  C  Ham,  Ilealth  Policy  in  Britain,  P.  17. 
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Bevan's  argument  that  spending  would  gradually  fall  was  ineffectual.  In  1949  the 
government  introduced  the  National  Health  Service  (Amendment)  Act  which  made 
provision  for  a  prescription  charge.  The  charge  was  not  actually  introduced  because  it 
transpired  that  it  would  not  save  as  much  money  as  had  been  anticipated.  This 
discovery  caused  the  government  to  set  up  the  Cabinet  Committee  on  the  National 
Health  Service  to  undertake  a  broader  review  of  NES  expenditure.  56  The  comn-dttee 
advocated  the  introduction  of  charges  for  dentures  and  spectacles,  the  acceptance  of 
which  by  the  Cabinet  followed  a  heated  debate  resulting  in  the  resignation  of  Aneurin 
Bevan,  now  the  Minister  of  Labour  together  with  Harold  Wilson  and  John  Freeman,  a 
junior  minister.  The  government  also  took  further  measures  to  contain  health 
spending:  the  Exchequer  introduced  a  ceiling  on  NES  expenditure  from  taxation  at 
57  E400  million  (1950  prices).  This  was  followed  by  a  freeze  on  improvements  that 
were  not  considered  'essential  and  urgent'.  59 
In  stark  contrast  to  the  upset  caused  in  the  Labour  Party  by  Bevan's  resignation, 
the  spending  cuts  and  the  introduction  of  charges  caused  barely  a  ripple  in  the  TUC. 
Its  muted  response  was  curiously  so:  not  only  did  the  government's  policy  contravene 
that  of  the  TUC  but  the  government  had  also  failed  to  consult  the  TUC  beforehand, 
usually  a  source  of  friction.  Yet  the  TUC  Social  Insurance  Committee  did  not  even 
discuss  the  content  of  the  1949  Act  nor  its  implications  for  NHS  patients  while  the 
Economic  Committee  merely  made  a  note  of  the  introduction  of  charges  in  1951.59 
55  C  Webster,  77ie  national  health  service,  p.  3  1. 
56  PRO,  MI  I  135n5.  Proposal  for  a  standard  charge  for  prescriptions,  undated;  C  Webster,  The  health 
services  since  the  war  volume  1,  p.  134. 
57  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  p.  37- 
52  PRO,  M  1[  137/28,  National  Health  Service,  revised  estimates  for  1950-5  1:  estimates  for  1951-52,21 
Sept.  1950. 
"  MRC,  mss.  292mo.  in.  Economic  Committee  (EC)  812,9  May  1951. 
112 Furthermore  the  Economic  Committee  rejected  a  complaint  about  the  charges  by  the 
Civil  Service  Clerical  Association  because  they  were  preferable  to  cuts  in  the  hospital 
sector.  on  this  basis,  'the  necessity  for  the  Government's  action  was  accepted'.  60 
Complaints  at  the  1951  Annual  Congress  were  similarly  deflected:  the  General 
Council  defended  the  Labour  government's  charges  because  children  and  national 
assistance  claimants  were  exempted  and  those  who  experienced  fmancial  difficulty  as 
a  result  of  the  charges  could  seek  a  refund  from  the  National  Assistance  Board 
. 
61  MS 
was  remarkable  advice  that  was  completely  incongruous  with  TUC  policy  on  national 
assistance  more  generally.  In  1951  the  TUC  had  complained  to  the  government  about 
the  growth  of  national  assistance.  62  The  TUC's  position  may  be  explained  by  its 
loyalty  to  the  Labour  government  although  it  had  also  believed  the  charges  to  be 
temporary:  the  provision  was  due  to  expire  in  1954.63  The  former  is  more  convincing 
since  the  TUC  accepted  lower  retirement  pensions  as  well  as  changes  to  NHS  funding 
because  of  economic  problems.  Lincoln  Evans  of  the  General  Council  suggested  to 
the  1951  Congress  that  '[I]t  is  not  absence  of  the  will  of  the  Government,  it  is  absence 
of  the  means,  and  I  think  they  have  taken  care  to  see  that  the  right  priority  is 
established  here.  '64 
Ile  one  exception  in  the  TUC's  apparent  complacency  to,  %vards  health  service 
charges  %%-as  the  government's  decision  to  abolish  refunds  for  hospital  travelling 
expenses.  Travel  costs,  clearly  more  so  than  charges  for  dentures  and  spectacles,  were 
believed  to  be  a  real  impediment  to  receiving  hospital  care  because  the  new 
60  lbidL 
61  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Repom  195  1,  p.  503. 
62  Chapter  2.  p.  47. 
Ile  change  in  TUC  attitudes  towards  N1  IS  charges  is  discussed  further  on  pp.  117-18. 
Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  195  1,  p.  504. 
113 arrangements  required  patients  to  pay  their  fares  and  then  claim  a  refund  from  the 
National  Assistance  Board.  Ile  TUC  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  Health  to  advise  him 
that  the  change  in  policy  was  resulting  in  financial  problems  ý  for  some  hospital 
patients.  65  Bevan  wras  unsympathetic  as  he  believed  that  the  previous  system  had 
been  abused.  66  Ile  TUC  disagreed  with  this  contention  and  sought  a  compromise;  it 
suggested  that  the  policy  be  amended  for  those  travelling  long  distances,  or  on  a 
regular  basis,  to  hospital.  The  new  Minister  of  Health,  Hilary  Marquand,  was  more 
amenable  to  the  TUC's  complaints  but  Ministry  officials  were  somewhat  less  so 
because  NHS  spending  was  already  too  high  and  an  increase  in  national  assistance 
was  imminent.  67  Consequently  Marquand  was  unwilling  to  make  any  concessions 
since  they  would  require  cuts  in  other  areas  of  the  NES.  This  could  not  be  justified 
when  there  was  little  evidence  that  the  abolition  of  refunds  for  travel  costs  by 
hospitals  themselves  had  caused  widespread  financial  difficulty.  69 
Health  Centres 
A  Labour  government  may  easily  have  won  TUC  acceptance  of  health  service  charges 
but  the  trade  union  movement  was  less  compliant  over  procrastination  in  the 
dp.  velopmcnt  of  health  centres.  In  July  1947,  Ministry  of  Health  officials  admitted 
that  shortages  in  the  building  industry  would  impede  the  establishment  of  the 
goverranent's  programme.  69  In  February  1948,  a  Ministry  circular  announced  that 
65  MRC,  MSS192/161/8,  SllWC  6,14  Dec.  1950. 
"  [bid.,  SllWC  10,15  Feb.  195  1. 
67  lbid,  SllWC  l5f2,10  May  195  1;  PRO,  MH  99188,  note  on  hospital  patients  travelling  expenses  - 
C),  ssible  concession  for  long  distances,  undated;  PRO,  MH  99/88,  JE  Pater  to  Mr  Ariner,  26  July  195  1. 
PRO,  MH  99,188,  Minister  to  Sir  Vincent  Tewson,  National  Health  Service  hospital  patients 
travelling  expenses,  25  July  195  1. 
"  PRO,  Nil  1134/48,  Health  centres,  note  of  discussion,  9  July  1947;  MH  134/49,  draft  circular  by 
Ministry  of  Health  to  County  and  County  Borough  Councils  and  other  local  authorities,  1947. 
114 shortage  of  building  materials  and  a  lack  of  research  on  the  best  model.  Initially  the 
General  Council  resigned  itself  to  these  delays  as  it  did  not  want  building  problems  to 
result  in  poor  quality  centres.  70  Eighteen  months  later  it  was  becoming  anxious  for 
some  progress:  a  Congress  resolution,  demanding  the  establishment  of  health  centres, 
71  was  sent  to  the  Minister  of  Health.  In  March  1951  a  TUC  deputation  met  with 
Marquand  to  complain  of  unacceptable  delays  in  hospital  surgeries  and  public 
frustration.  The  TUC  representatives  suggested  that  health  centres  be  introduced  on  a 
limited  basis  for  the  time  being.  n  'Me  Minster  cited  the  problem  of  building 
shortages  and  inexperience,  but  advised  the  TUC  that  the  CHSC  had  set  up  a  Health 
Centres  Committee  to  review  the  situation.  Marquand  agreed  that  the  government 
would  set  up  a  small  number  providing  that  local  authorities  minimised  their  cost.  73 
This  represented  a  small  success  for  the  TUC  even  though  the  imminent  election 
prevented  implementation.  Not  that  the  TUC  had  made  excessive  demands  on  the 
Attlee  govcnunents'  health  policy-,  aside  from  the  dispute  over  travel  costs  and  the 
TUC's  strong  support  for  the  lapsed  health  centre  programme,  it  was  generally 
acquiescen4  particularly  %%ith  regard  to  the  issue  of  charges.  This  tolerance  was  soon 
to  diminish  upon  the  election  of  a  Conservative  government  in  195  1.  Thereafter  NHS 
funding  issues  and  charges  were  to  become  the  main  source  of  the  TUC's  growing 
disconsolation  with  the  health  service.  Consumer  representation  also  continued  to  be 
an  important  issue.  Ile  campaign  for  health  centres,  however,  slowly  petered  out  as 
the  TUC  turned  its  attention  to  problems  in  the  hospital  sector. 
"  MRC,  MSS2921161/6.  SllWC  6.12  Feb.  1948;  SlIWC  7,11  March  1948. 
71  MRC,  MSS.  292/161n.  SllWC  4.10  Nov.  1949. 
72  MRC,  MSS.  292/16118.  SllWC  document.  Congress  resolution  on  health  ccntres  -  note  of  deputation 
to  Minister  of  Health,  6  March  195  1. 
73  lbid,  SllWC  document,  Congress  resolution  on  health  centres  -  note  of  deputation  to  Minister  of 
I  lealth,  6  March  195  1. 
115 The  NES  under  the  Conservatives 
The  election  of  a  Conservative  administration  represented  an  opportunity  for  policy 
changes,  but  there  were  few  radical  moves.  Charles  Webster  believes  that  political 
consensus  underpinned  the  NIIS  after  1951  on  the  basis  of  significant  similarities  in 
Labour  and  Conservative  health  policy.  For  instance,  Labour  introduced  health 
service  charges,  which  the  Conservatives  simply  extended.  74  Dutton  also  cites  the 
introduction  of  charges  by  Labour,  the  substantial  increase  in  NHS  spending  which 
took  place  under  the  Tories,  Conservative  acceptance  of  the  findings  of  the 
Guillebaud  Committee,  and  the  1962  Hospital  Plan.  75  Other  historians  have  explained 
continuity  not  in  terms  of  consensus  but  as  a  consequence  of  constraints  on  policy- 
making. 
76  For  Klein,  consensus  was  achieved  by  involving  the  relevant  interest 
77 
groups  in  policy-making  in  order  to  preclude  discord 
. 
According  to  Harriet  Jones, 
external  groups,  including  the  TUC,  acted  to  prevent  changes  in  policy.  78  The  nature, 
or  absence  of,  consensus  in  this  respect  ý  is  considered  below.  Generally  the  TUC 
became  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  a  number  of  aspects  of  health  policy  under  the 
Conservative  governments.  This  together  with  its  more  aggressive  approach  towards 
health  policy  under  the  Conservatives  suggests  that  political  sympathies  played  a  role 
here.  The  BEC  continued  to  ignore  developments  in  health  policy  and  declined 
opportunities  to  participate. 
74  C  Pierson,  'Social  policy',  p.  148;  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  p.  34. 
75  D  Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945  (1997),  pp.  59-60. 
76  N  Ellison,  'Consensus  here,  consensus  there',  p.  18;  H  Jones,  'New  tricks  for  an  old  dog?  '  p.  34;  R 
Lowe,  'Second  world  war,  consensus  and  the  foundation  of  the  welfare  state',  p.  160. 
77  R  Klein,  The  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service,  p.  29. 
79  H  Jones,  'New  tricks  for  an  old  dog?  ',  p.  34. 
116 NHSfunding  and  health  charges 
The  TUC  first  approached  the  new  Minister  of  Health,  HFC  Crookshank,  to  discuss 
hospital  travel  expenses.  Like  his  Labour  predecessors,  he  also  refused  to  amend  the 
regulations.  79  Further  dissatisfaction  resulted  from  the  introduction  of  finther  health 
service  charges;  the  1952  National  Health  Service  Bill  contained  proposals'  for 
charges  for  drugs,  medicines,  appliances,  dentistry,  and  day  nursery  care.  The  TUC 
responded  very  negatively  to  the  Bill;  it  rejected  the  government's  argument  that 
prescription  charges  were  necessary  to  prevent  abuse  and  suggested  that  controls  on 
GPs'  prescribing  allocation  should  be  introduced  to  address  any  such  problem.  80 
Neither  did  the  TUC  accept  economic  difficulties  as  a  suitable  explanation  even 
though  this  had  been  the  reason  accepted  and  produced  by  the  General  Council  to 
justify  similar  policies  of  the  Attlee  governments.  The  TUC  was  now  much  more 
worried  about  the  financial  impact  of  charges  on  the  low-paid  and  openly  denied  that 
this  was  a  product  of  the  change  in  government.  In  the  words  of  one  member  of  the 
General  Council,  '[t]he  strong  indignation  aroused  by  the  proposals'was  not  simply  a 
matter  of  political  difference;  it  arose  from  a  conviction  that  the  charges  were  unjust, 
a  retrograde  step  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  nation's  health,  and  as  sacrifice  of  the 
principles  of  the  Health  Scheme.  81  Also  the  TUC  cited  the  temporary  nature  of 
Labour's  charges  as  a  reason  for  its  compliance. 
This  degree  of  inconsistency  in  policy  may  reflect  partiality  but  it  is  also  likely  that 
the  TUC  simply  had  greater  trust  in  the  Labour  Party  to  safeguard  the  NHS.  This 
would  have  been  encouraged  fin-ther  by  the  Labour  Party's  election  campaign  in 
79  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/9,  SIIWC  7,13  Dec.  1951. 
110  Ibid.,  SIIWC  9/6,13  Feb.  1952. 
g'  Ibid.,  SIIWC  11/1,9  April  1952. 
117 1951,  which  suggested  that  the  Conservatives  would  dismantle  the  welfare  state.  The 
speed  with  which  the  Churchill  government  introduced  new  charges  may  well  have 
caused  the  TUC  to  fear  for  the  principles  of  universal  health  care,  free  at  the  point  of 
use,  thus,  precipitating  such  a  fierce  reaction.  It  also  believed  that  charges  for  dental 
care  would  have  a  deterrent  effect  and  cause  people  to  neglect  their  teeth.  82 
Crookshank  reftised  to  advise  the  TUC  on  whether  the  charges  were  permanent  or  if 
the  government  intended  to  introduce  ftirther  charges  since  these  would  be  dependent 
upon  the  economic  situation.  To  placate  the  TUC,  he  did  promise  that  'the 
fundamental  structure  of  the  Service  would  not  be  undermined',  and  also  pointed  out 
that  the  National  Assistance  Board  would  help  those  for  whom  the  charges  did  cause 
financial  problems,  advice  that  the  TUC  had  of  course  already  given  its  own  members 
in  195  1.83  Tle  TUC's  antipathy  towards  the  charges  was  then  further  intensified 
when  Hilary  Marquand  pledged  to  the  House  of  Commons  that  a  Labour  government 
would  abolish  all  direct  health  service  charges  and  review  provision  for  those  who 
experienced  hardship  when  travelling  long  distances  for  hospital  care.  84 
The  finances  of  the  NHS  were  also  a  source  of  disagreement  within  the 
gover=ent  itself.  The  Treasury  in  particular  was  unhappy  with  spending  levels  and 
growth  in  the  health  service's  annual  budget.  It  therefore  proposed  that  the 
govermnent  should  set  up  an  independent  conunittee  to  review  the  cost  of  the  NHS 
with  the  clear  expectation  that  this  committee  would  be  able  to  offer  means  of  saving 
money.  Webster  claims  that  the  Ministry  of  Health  opposed  the  Treasury's  idea 
because  it  believed  that  such  an  enquiry  would  find  evidence  of  underfunding  in 
32  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
34  MRC,  MSS292/161/1  1,  SIIWC  11/3,10  March  1954. 
118 provision  for  tuberculosis,  mental  health,  mental  handicap,  the  aged  and  those  with 
chronic  health  care  needs.  85  In  spite  of  the  Ministry  of  Health's  warning,  the 
government  set  up  the  Committee  of  Enquiry  into  the  Cost  of  the  National  Health 
Service  in  May  1953  with  Mr  Claude  W  Guillebaud,  a  Cambridge  economist,  in  the 
chair.  The  Committee's  terms  of  reference  were:  - 
To  review  the  present  and  prospective  cost  of  the  National  Health  Service; 
to  suggest  means,  whether  by  modifications  in  organisation  or  otherwise, 
of  ensuring  the  most  effective  control  and  efficient  use  of  such  Exchequer 
funds  as  may  be  made  available;  to  advise  how,  in  view  of  the  burdens  of 
the  Exchequer,  a  rising  charge  upon  it  can  be  avoided  while  providing  for 
the  maintenance  of  an  adequate  Service;  and  to  make  recommendations.  86 
Miss  BA  Godwin,  a  member  of  the  General  Council,  represented  the  TUC  on  the 
Guillebaud  Committee.  It  also  submitted  both  written  and  oral  evidence,  which 
focused  chiefly  on  health  service  charges.  The  TUC  argued  that  charges  had  a 
detrimental  impact  on  NHS  patients  because  they  discouraged  consumption  of 
medicines,  and  use  of  dental  and  ophthalmic  services.  This  contention  was  supported 
by  evidence  of  a  substantial  reduction  in  the  demand  for  spectacles,  with  expenditure 
falling  from  f2l.  7  million  in  1949-50  to  flO.  1  million  in  1952-3,  following  the 
introduction  of  charges.  87  There  had  also  been  a  significant  decrease  in  spending  on 
dental  care  although  the  role  of  the  introduction  of  charges  was  less  clear  since 
dtmand  for  dentistry  had  been  in  decline  beforehand.  88  The  TUC  also  argued  that  the 
cost  of  travelling  to  hospital  led  to  financial  difficulties  and,  therefore,  impeded  access 
to  medical  care.  89  In  order  to  address  the  NHS's  financial  problems  without 
impinging  upon  the  well-being  of  its  patients,  the  TUC  suggested  the  government 
$5  C  Webster,  The  health  services  after  the  war  vol.  1,  p.  204 
86  Guillebaud  Report,  p.  1. 
87  MRC,  MSS.  292/16  1/11,  SIIWC  7/1,13  Jan.  1954. 
8'  Ibid. 
'9  Ibid.,  SIIWC  12/2,14  April  1954,  p.  3 
119 introduce  controls  on  prices  of  medical  supplies,  undertake  bulk  purchase  and  central 
contracting  of  medical  goods  and  services,  and  investigate  the  remuneration  of 
chemists  and  dentists.  90 
The  Guillebaud  Report  was  published  in  January  1956.  Contrary  to  Treasury 
expectation  it  found  little  evidence  of  inefficiency  or  waste  in  the  NHS.  91  In  fact  it 
identified  certain  areas  where  more  funds  were  required  owing  to  the  accumulative 
impact  of  underspending  and  was  critical  of  inadequate  levels  of  capital  investment. 
Neither  did  the  Guillebaud.  committee  support  the  extension  of  charges:  it  ý  was 
ambivalent  about  the  prescription  charge  but  recommended  the  abolition  of  the 
charges  for  ophthahnic  and  dental  care  because  of  their  deterrent  effects  once  this  was 
financially  viable.  92  With  regard  to  health  centres,  the  committee  agreed,  with  the 
status  quo  that  they  should  be  set  up  on  an  experimental  basis  only  for  the  time 
being.  93  The  Guillebaud  Committee  did  not  make  any  recommendations  with  regard 
to  wider reorganisation  of  the  health  service,  and  has  been  criticised  for  doing  so,  but 
it  did  note  that  the  medical  profession  was  too  dominant  in  the  current  structure  of 
administration.  94  Accordingly  it  recommended  that  medical  appointments  should 
comprise  no  more  than  25  per  cent  of  the  membership  of  Regional  Hospital  Boards  or 
Pospital  Management  Committees.  95 
Both  Geoffrey  Rivett  and  David  Dutton  have  suggested  that  the  Guillebaud  Report 
helped  to  consolidate  the  political  consensus  over  the  NHS.  Riven  believes  that  this 
90  Ibid.,  pp.  4-6 
91  Guillebaud  Report,  p.  269. 
92  Ibid,  pp.  260-6  1. 
93  Ibid..  p.  262. 
94  R  Lowe,  The  weU4re  state  since  1945,  p.  18  1. 
95  Guillebaud  Report,  p.  247. 
120 was  because  its  findings  denied  the  Conservatives  a  mandate  for  significant  change.  96 
Dutton  claims  that  the  Tory  government  accepted  the  committee's 
recommendations.  97  Yet  Conservative  governments  did  increase  and  extend  direct 
charges  while  the  process  of  reducing  medical  membership  was  a  lengthy  one.  This 
does  not  necessarily  militate  against  the  existence  of  political  consensus  since  a 
Labour  administration  did  indeed  introduce  charges  in  the  first  instance,  and  Bevan 
had  strongly  defended  medical  representation  in  NHS  administration.  These  two 
issues,  however,  were  the  source  of  growing  antagonism  towards  government  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  TUC.  The  TUC  had  been  fairly  satisfied  with  the  content  of  the 
Guillebaud  Report,  particularly  its  views  on  charges  and  medical  participation  in  the 
nmning  of  the  NHS.  98  The  committee's  endorsement  of  TUC  policy  together  with  the 
government's  refusal  to  indicate  whether  it  intended  to  comply  with  the  Guillebaud 
Report's  recommendations  precipitated  a  more  vigorous  TUC  campaign  against  NHS 
charges  which  now  sought  complete  abolition. 
TUC  representatives  met  with  RH  Turton,  a  new  Minister  of  Health,  on  I  March 
1956  to  ask  for  the  removal  of  NHS  charges,  and  a  change  in  government  policy 
towards  the  refund  of  hospital  travel  costs.  The  Minister  rejected  both  of  these 
requests;  he  argued  that  the  income  foregone  would  require  cuts  in  other  areas  of  the 
NHS  or  a  reduction  in  the  hospital  building  programme.  99  The  government  was 
presently  taking  a  hard  line  on  social  policy  spending:  Butler  prohibited  a  substantial 
increase  in  expenditure  on  the  social  services  and  had  commissioned  a  survey  of  the 
96  G  Rivett,  From  cradle  to  grave,  p.  114. 
97  D  Dunon,  British  politics  since  1945  (1997),  p.  60. 
93  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/13,  SIIWC  8,9  Feb.  1956. 
99  Ibid.,  SIIWC  10/1,15  March  1956;  MSS.  292/161/14,  SIIWC  5,9  Jan.  1957. 
121 prospective  growth  in  social  expenditure  over  the  next  few  years.  100  This  survey 
anticipated  an  increase  in  NHS  spending  of  15.4  per  cent  by  1960/1,  which  led  to  the 
establishment  of  a  committee  of  ministers  to  review  the  cost  of  the  social  services  as  a 
whole.  101  With  regard  to  the  NHS,  the  ministerial  committee  recommended  that  a 
charge  be  applied  to  each  item  of  medicine  rather  than  each  prescription  slip  in  order 
to  raise  E5  million.  102  The  TUC  immediately  condemned  the  proposal  and  asked  the 
goverrunent  to  reconsider.  103  Both  the  Minister  of  Health  and  the  Minister  of 
Pensions  and  National  Insurance  defended  the  policy:  Turton  insisted  that  the  increase 
was  necessary  in  light  of  the  current  economic  climate  but  asked  the'TUC  to  let  him 
know  of  any  instances  of  hardship  arising  from  the  new  policy.  104  Boyd-Carpenter 
reminded  the  TUC  that  the  National  Assistance  Board  would  refund  the  charges  to  the 
low-paid.  105 
Four  months  later,  the  government  also  increased  the  NHS  element  in  the  national 
insurance  contribution.  The  TUC  issued  a  press  statement  expressing  its  opposition  to 
financing  the  NHS  from  direct  charges  and  contributions.  106  The  Social  Insurance 
Committee  wrote  to  the  Prime  Minister,  *the  Minister  of  Health,  and  the  Minister  of 
Pensions  and  National  Insurance  to  express  its  dissatisfaction  with  goverment  policy 
but  to  little  effect.  107  Its  campaign  against  health  service  charges  continued 
regardless.  In  1957  it  sent  an  Annual  Congress  resolution  to  the  Minister  of  Health 
that  condemned  prescription  charges,  national  insurance  contribution  increases  and 
100  C Webster,  The  health  services  after  the  war  volume  I,  p.  212. 
101  Ibid. 
102  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/14,  SIIWC  3,15  Nov.  1956. 
103  Ibid.;  MSS.  292/847.18/4,  Vincent  Tewson  to  J  Boyd-Carpenter,  20  Nov.  1956;  Vincent  Tewson  to 
HR  Turton,  20  Nov.  1956. 
104  Ibid.,  RH  Turton  to  Vincent  Tewson,  6  Dec.  1956. 
105  Ibid.,  J  Boyd-Carpenter  to  Vincent  Tewson,  30  Nov.  1956. 
106  Ibid.,  SIIWC  11,14  March  1957. 
107  Ibid. 
122 limits  on  capital  expenditure  to  the  Minister  of  Health.  108  The  government  clearly 
ignored  TUC  feeling  on  the  matter  because,  without  consulting  the  TUC,  it  introduced 
a  National  Health  Service  Bill  in  1958  that  proposed  to  increase  further  the  NHS 
contribution.  TUC  complaints  once  again  met  with  a  lack  of  response.  109 
A  deputation  to  the  Minister  of  Pensions  and  National  Insurance,  John  Boyd- 
Carpenter,  in  July  1960  raised  the  matter  of  hospital  travel  costs  again.  '  10  In  1961,  a 
further  rise  in  the  NHS  contribution  of  10d,  a  100  per  cent  increase  in  the  cost  of 
prescriptions,  and  higher  prices  for  dentures,  spectacles,  hospital  amenity  beds,  and 
welfare  foods  exacerbated  the  TUC's  concems  about  the  govemment's  policy. 
Concessions  had  been  made  for  expectant  and  nursing  mothers  and  children  with 
regard  to  dentures  and  spectacles  but  the  TUC  still  opposed  the  new  charges.  "'  It 
issued  another  press  statement  denouncing  the  increase  in  charges,  the  shifting 
emphasis  towards  direct  financing  of  the  NHS,  and  also  the  government's  failure  to 
consult  the  TUC.  1  12  The  latter  is  a  somewhat  surprising  grievance  as  there  is  no 
evidence  that  the  TUC  was  consulted  on  previous  changes  to  the  health  service 
charging  policy  by  either  Labour  or  Conservative  govermnents.  Enoch  Powell,  who 
had  been  appointed  Minister  of  Health,  made  no  attempt  to  justify  his  actions  to  the 
TUC;  he  simply  referred  it  to  the  parliamentary  debate.  113  Subsequent  complaints  at 
Annual  Congresses  over  NHS  funding  were  equally  ineffectual.  '  14  Powell  refused  to 
108  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/15,  SIIWC  3,13  Nov.  1957. 
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123 increase  the  proportion  of  NHS  finance  from  general  taxation,  and  insisted  that  the 
abolition  of  charges  would  simply  means  cuts  in  spending  elsewhere.  115 
Ile  TUC's  campaign  against  NUS  charges  and  the  NHS  contribution  was 
ultimately  fruitless.  In  1951  health  service  charges  and  the  NHS  contribution 
provided  9.4  per  cent  of  NHS  expenditure;  this  figure  had  reached  19.5  per  cent  by 
1963/64.1  16  It  had  also  failed  to  convince  successive  governments  that  the  NHS 
should  assist  with  the  cost  of  travelling  to  hospital  in  spite  of  its  frequent  attempts. 
Neither  is  there  any  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  TUC's  attitude  towards  charges  ever 
informed  any  government  decisions  on  NES  funding. 
Signs  ofprogress?:  TUCparticipation  on  RHBs 
Given  its  lack  of  progress  in  relation  to  NHS  charges  it  would  appear  that  the 
government  paid  little  attention  to  the  TUC  in  relation  to  health  policy.  Yet  the  level 
of  contact  and  access  to  ministers  enjoyed  by  the  TUC  suggest  that  it  could  not  be 
completely  ignored.  Representation  of  trade  unionists  on  Regional  Hospital  Boards 
permitted  participation  in  health  policy  at  a  more  localised  level.  While  the  principle 
cf  trade  union  participation  on  the  regional  boards  had  been  accepted,  the  TUC 
consistently  found  the  level  of  involvement  to  be  deficient.  No  sooner  had  the  TUC 
obtained  a  firm  commitment  from  the  government  regarding  trade  union  appointments 
to  RHBs  than  the  government  failed  to  honour  it,  thus,  leaving  the  issue  unresolved. 
115  Ibid.,  SIIWC  4,9  Jan.  1963. 
116  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  p.  34. 
124 During  the  Attlee  years  the  TUC  had  complained  of  excessive  medical 
participation,  and  inadequate  representation  of  both  health  workers  and  NHS  patients. 
The  Ministry  of  Health  forbade  it  to  nominate  health  service  workers  to  the  boards, 
therefore,  the  TUC  became  more  involved  in  the  representation  of  NHS  patients.  The 
Labour  goverrunent  had  initiated  this  practice  and  the  role  was  quickly,  accepted  by 
the  TUC.  In  1953,  when  its  North-West  Regional  Advisory  Committee  protested  that 
its  nominees  were  not  being  appointed  to  the  RHB,  the  TUC  Social  Insurance 
Committee  complained  not  of  poor  levels  of  trade  union  representation  but  of  NHS 
patients.  117  Both  Labour  and  Conservative  governments  accepted  trade  union 
nominations  for  representation  of  users  of  the  health  service.  When  the  TUC 
complained  to  Ian  Macleod  about  an  increase  in  the  number  of  Regional  Hospital 
Boards  that  did  not  have  a  trade  union  member,  the  Minister  replied  that  he  realised 
that  consumer  representation  on  RHBs  was  important.  '  18  He  promised  that  he  would 
keep  TUC  nominees  in  mind  when  making  the  next  round  of  appointments  but  in  fact 
the  number  of  Boards  without  a  trade  unionist  increased  in  1955.119 
This  proved  to  be  characteristic  of  TUC  consultation  with  successive  Ministers  of 
Health  on  the  subject  of  representation  on  Regional  Hospital  Boards  over  the 
following  years.  Ministers  were  sympathetic  to  TUC  complaints  and  would  promise 
improvements  in  future, 
-which  would  not  materialise.  120  Ministers  of  Health 
generally  accepted  that  the  TUC  could  represent  NHS  users  although  Derek  Walker- 
117  MRC,  MSS.  292/16  1/10,  SIIWC  15,14  May  1953. 
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125 Smith,  in  1958,  pointed  out  that  the  TUC  did  not  hold  a  monopoly  in  this  respect.  121 
Nonetheless,  improvements  were  made  in  1959  and  in  1963  Enoch  Powell  promised 
that  each  RHB  and  Board  of  Governors  (with  one  exception)  would  now  have  a  trade 
union  member.  122  This  commitment  represented  a  significant  achievement,  which 
encouraged  the  TUC  to  seek  a  greater  role  on  Hospital  Management  Committees, 
again  presenting  itself  as  a  representative  of  consumer  opinion.  '  The  Minister  of 
Health  was  unable  to  assist  since  these  appointments  were  made  by  the  Regional 
Hospital  Boards  but  promised  to  consider  new  guidance  in  order  to  address  trade 
union  representation  on  HMCs.  123  Meanwhile  there  was  a  decrease  in  the  number  of 
doctors  on  NHS  committees  in  line  with  the  Guillebaud  Committee's 
recommendation.  124  These  achievements  were  then  overshadowed  in  1963  when  an 
additional  Regional  Hospital  Board  failed  to  appoint  a  trade  union  nominee.  The 
TUC  wrote  to  Enoch  Powell  expressing  its  disappointment.  125  Thus  at  the  end  of  this 
period,  the  issue  of  trade  union  representation  in  NHS  administration  was  still  a 
source  of  dissatisfaction. 
Consensus  at  last?  Developments  in  health  services 
The  TUC's  main  interest  in  health  services  during  the  years  of  Labour  government 
concerned  the  establishment  of  health  centres.  Its  campaign  enjoyed  little  success 
before  1951  and  even  less  thereafter.  By  1955  the  TUC  appear  to  have  more  or  less 
lost  interest  in  health  centres  and  took  a  growing  interest  in  problems  in  the  hospital 
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126 sector.  Hospitals  had  dominated  the  NHS  both  in  respect  of  policy  development  and 
resource  allocation  from  the  outset.  In  spite  of  this  imbalance,  they  still  suffered  from 
the  effects  of  inadequate  investment  and  spending  by  both  Labour  and  Conservative 
governments.  126  The  Guillebaud  Report  also  criticised  the  state  of  NHS  hospitals  in 
1956.  Thereafter  the  government  devoted  more  resources  to  hospital  building  and 
improvement,  culminating  in  the  1962  Hospital  Plan.  The  government's  new-found 
commitment  to  hospital  services  coincided  with  growing  TUC  criticism  of  problems 
in  this  area  which  the  government  now  planned  to  address.  Therefore,  dialogue 
between  government  and  the  TUC  on  hospital  matters  was  quite  amicable  since,  for 
once,  TUC  and  Conservative  policy  on  the  NHS  had  taken  the  same  direction.  It 
should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  coincidence  of  views  and  objectives  did  not 
appear  to  have  been  a  product  of  TUC  pressure. 
In  1951  the  TUC  had  only  just  managed  to  persuade  the  Labour  government  to 
undertake  a  small-scale  experiment  in  the  establishment  of  health  centres  when  the 
Conservatives  won  the  general  election.  The  new  government  was  unwilling  to 
subscribe  to  even  this  minor  concession;  Crookshank  wrote  to  Vincent  Tewson  to 
advise  him  that  the  continued  shortage  of  building  resources  prevented  the  large-scale 
development  of  health  centres,  and  he  did  not  foresee  any  change  in  policy  in  the  near 
future.  127  Ile  General  Council  did  not  pursue  the  matter  over  the  next  two  years  until 
the  Guillebaud  Committee  was  appointed.  The  TUC  was  dissatisfied  with  progress  in 
the  health  centre  programme,  or  the  lack  of  it,  and  still  supported  an  experimental 
approach  for  the  benefit  of  new  towns  and  housing  estates,  and  to  facilitate 
126  C  Webster,  The  national  health  service,  pp.  3945. 
127  MRC,  MSS.  2921847.21/1,  Crookshank  to  Vincent  Tewson,  17  Dec.  1951. 
127 cooperation  between  hospitals,  GPs  and  local  health  authorities.  128  It  sent  an  Annual 
Congress  resolution  on  the  subject  to  the  Minister  of  Health  and  Sir  Walter  Monckton, 
the  Minister  of  Labour.  129  Turton  dismissed  the  TUC's  proposal,  again  citing  the 
building  situation  and  a  lack  of  research  as  reasons  not  to  proceed.  130  At  a  meeting 
with  General  Council  representatives  in  March  1956,  he  advised  them  that  the 
government  could  only  build  health  centres  if  it  made  cuts  elsewhere  in  the  NHS.  13  1 
After  this  meeting  health  centres  were  scarcely  mentioned  in  discussions  on  TUC 
health  policy. 
Perhaps  the  TUC's  declining  interest  in  health  centres  can  be  explained  by  the 
distractions  produced  by  problems  in  NHS  hospitals.  It  would  appear  that  the  TUC's 
Social  Insurance  Committee  paid  little  attention  to  the  hospital  sector  until  it  was 
required  to  present  evidence  to  the  Guillebaud  Committee.  In  its  evidence,  the  TUC 
called  for  higher  spending  on  mental  health  and  geriatric  services.  It  also  complained 
of  overcrowding  in  mental  hospitals,  and  of  inadequate  community-based  care  for  the 
mentally  ill.  It  still  felt  that  the  hospital  sector  was  being  given  undue  emphasis  at  the 
expense  of  preventive  medicine  and  after-care  services.  Accordingly  it  recommended 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  home  nurses,  home  helps  and  health  visitors  in  order  to 
improve  these  areas.  132 
While  the  TUC  had  always  felt  that  the  hospital  sector  had  been'given  a 
disproportionate  amount  of  attention,  it  began  to  examine  the  problems  in  NHS 
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128 hospitals.  It  soon  found  evidence  of  excessive  waiting  lists  and  poor  standards  of 
hospital  buildings,  particularly  casualty  departments.  ,  It  suggested  that  resources  be 
concentrated  on  certain  hospitals  to  ensure  that  each  region  was  able  to  provide 
adequate  emergency  services.  In  1957  the  Social  Insurance  Committee  wrote  to  the 
Minister  of  Health,  Derek  Vosper,  to  complain  about  the  casualty  services.  133  There 
were  also  complaints  about  the  hospital  service  at  the  1958  Annual  Congress.  It 
passed  two  resolutions  that  criticised  the  slow  pace  of  hospital  building,  and 
improvement  and  the  lack  of  developments  in  preventive  health  care  measures.  134 
Vosper's  successor,  Derek  Walker-Smith  defended  the  government's  record:  NHS 
annual  expenditure  had  increased  from  approximately  E  10  million  in  its  early  years  to 
reach  predicted  levels  of  UO  million,  L22  million  and  E25.5  million  in  1958/59, 
1959/60,  and  1960/61.  The  TUC  acknowledged  that  spending  had  risen  but  criticised 
the  government  for  failing  to  provide  figures  in  real  tenns.  135 
In  spite  of  higher  spending  by  Conservative  govenunents  the  TUC  was  still 
unhappy  with  the  hospital  services.  The  1959  Annual  Congress  discussed  the 
inefficiency  of  out-patients  departments  and  delays  in  obtaining  appointments  with 
NHS  consultants.  The  Minister  of  Health  investigated  consultant  waiting  times  in 
rt:  sponse  to  the  TUC's  criticism;  he  later  wrote  to  the  TUC  to  advise  it  of  recent 
improvements.  136  The  1961  Annual  Congress  complained  of  inadequate  investment 
in  hospital  building  again,  and  also  the  shortages  in  medical  staffing  levels.  Once 
more  the  government  was  responsive  to  the  TUC's  criticisms;  Enoch  Powell  wrote  to 
133  MRC,  MSS192/161/14,  SIIWC  11,14  March  1957. 
134  MRC,  MSS2921161/16,  SIIWC  5,13  Nov.  1958. 
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129 advise  the  TUC  that  the  government  was  reviewing  the  staff  situation  in  hospitals,  and 
also  in  general  practice,  in  association  with  the  MedicalTractices  Committee  and  the 
General  Medical  Services  Committee.  In  addition  proposals  for  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  medical  students  were  currently  under  consideration.  137  He  wrote  again  six 
months  later  to  inform  the  TUC  that  plans  to  increase  the  number  of  doctors  were 
being  implemented.  138  He  also  drew-the  TUC's  attention  to  the  government's 
Hospital  Plan  which  was  designed  to  modernise  the  hospital  service  by  closing  1250 
hospitals,  improving  360  others,  and  building  90  new  hospitals.  Its  overall  aim  was  to 
offer  600-800  bed  district  general  hospitals  across  the  county.  139  In  April  1963  the 
government  also  published  a  survey  of  local  authority  plans  for  their  health  and 
welfare  services. 
While  the  TUC's  Social  Insurance  Committee  welcomed  both  the  proposed 
developments  in  the  hospital  sector  and  in  community  health  services,  it  was 
concerned  that  the  under-developed  community  care  services  would  be  overburdened 
unless  they  were  given  adequate  support.  140  Therefore  it  wrote  to  Enoch  Powell  for 
reassurance  that  sufficient  ftmding  would  be  provided  to  allow  local  authorities  to 
improve  their  services,  and  that  the  government  would  not  implement  cuts  in  the 
number  of  hospital  beds  until  community-based  provision  was  adequately 
developed.  141  The  1963  Annual  Congress  expressed  some  dissatisfaction  with  the 
standard  of  several  local  authority  plans  for  community  care  which  unions  believed 
did  not  reach  the  standards  required  by  the  Ministry  of  Health.  The  TUC  was  keen  on 
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130 the  development  of  community  care  given  its  reservations  over  the  predominance  of 
the  hospital  sector  in  the  NES:  the  1963  Congress  passed  a  resolution  which  called  for 
the  abolition  of  all  institutional  beds  before  1972  by  developing  community  care 
policies  and  establishing  elderly  day  care  centres.  142  Anthony  Barber,  Powell's 
successor  at  the  Ministry  of  Health,  accordingly  advised  the  TUC  that  the 
government's  plans  for  hospital  and  local  authority  health  services  were  flexible  and 
that  the  TUC's  comments  would  be  given  due  consideration  as  the  plans  were 
developed.  143  It  follows  that  developments  in  the  hospital  sector,  particularly  after 
1959,  were  marked  by  significantly  more  contact  between  the  Ministry  of  Health  and 
the  TUC  than  in  relation  to  any  other  area  of  the  NHS.  Ministers  of  Health  were 
responsive  to  TUC  observations,  comments  and  criticisms;  correspondence  was 
frequent  and  cordial.  This  probably  reflects  the  existence  of  government  plans  for 
improvements  in  NHS  hospitals  whereas  the  TUC's  other  policy  aims,  abolition  of 
charges  and  health  centres,  did  not  feature  in  Conservative  health  policy  after  195  1. 
Conclusion 
By  1964  the  NHS  remained  untouched  by  radical  policies,  providing  support  for  the 
aýgument  that  the  National  Health  Service  was  an  element  of  the  postwar  political 
consensus.  The  TUC's  attitude  towards  the  development  of  the  NHS  during  this 
period  has  been  examined  in  some  detail  in  order  to  discern  whether  this  consensus 
was  broader  in  its  scope.  Strong  TUC  criticism  of  some  government  health  policies 
after  1951  is  suggestive  of  an  absence  of  consensus.  However,  the  matter  is  not  so 
142  Ibid.,  SIIWC  2,13  Nov.  1963. 
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131 clear-cut.  It  is  true  that  the  TUC  was  extremely  antagonistic  where  Conservative 
health  charges  were  concerned  whilst  the  issue  of  representation  was  not  resolved 
during  this  period.  Nonetheless,  its  fundamental  goals  in  the  sphere  of  health  policy  - 
universal  access  and  free  health  care  save  the  introduction  of  some  direct  charges  - 
had  been  achieved.  As  the  TUC  stated  in  its  evidence  to  the  Guillebaud  Committee  in 
1953,  '[a]ny  criticisms  or  suggestions  for  improving  the  Health  Service 
...  are  not 
intended  in  any  way  to  detract  from  the  magnitude  of  this  achievement.  '  144 
Furthermore,  progress  was  made,  albeit  slowly,  in  relation  to  the  representation  issue, 
and  the  government's  acceptance  of  the  TUC  as  a  representative  of  consumers  was  a 
noteworthy  development  in  the  history  of  the  TUC  as  an  interest  group.  Discussions 
on  developments  in  hospital  care  after  1956  were  held  regularly  and  their  tone  was 
largely  amicable.  The  record  is,  therefore,  mixed  with  signs  of  consensus  being  not 
entirely  absent  after  1951  but  neither  does  the  concept  accurately  encapsulate  the 
nature  of  government-TUC  negotiations  on  the  NHS  during  the  Conservative  years. 
Although  scarcely  mentioned  in  the  course  of  this  chapter  owing  to  its  lack  of 
participation  in  the  making  of  health  policy,  the  British  Employers'  Confederation  did 
not  make  direct  attacks  on  the  NHS.,  This  is  in  keeping  with  the  idea  of  a  negative 
consensus.  Lowe  suggests  that  electoral  considerations  placed  limitation  on 
Conservative  policy-making.  145  Similarly  the  BEC  had,  during  the  war,  shown  itself 
to  be  conscious  of  the  dangers  of  contradicting  the  public  mood  and  the  NHS  was 
hugely  popular  with  the  public.  146  Its  unwillingness  to  participate  in  health  policy- 
making  also  has  implications  for  Keith  Middlemas'  theory  of  corporate  bias.  It 
144  MRC,  MSS.  292/161/1  1,  SllWC  12/2,14  April  1954. 
145  R  Lowe,  'Second  world  war',  p.  100. 
146  Chapter  2,  p.  37. 
132 strongly  suggests  that  the  existence  of  corporate  bias  was  not  simply  dependent  upon 
governmental  desire  to  involve  important  interest  groups  since  incorporation  was  not 
automatically  welcomed  or  sought  by  these  groups.  In  this  instance,  the  BEC 
declined  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  health  policy  and  tripartism  is,  therefore, 
quite  absent.  The  BEC's  approach  to  health  policy  serves  to  reinforce  the  findings  of 
the  two  earlier  chapters  where  BEC  involvement  was  shown  to  be  very  closely  linked 
to  those  issues  that  directly  affected  employers.  Therefore,  the  Confederation  was 
interested  in  national  insurance  and  retirement  pensions  because  employers  helped  to 
fund  the  schemes  and,  as  the  next  chapter  shows,  in  education  because  its  members 
employed  the  products  of  state  education.  While  the  NHS  may  have  assisted 
employers  by  creating  a  healthier  labour  force,  the  BEC  appear  not  to  have  recognised 
such  an  indirect  contribution. 
In  contrast  to  the  BEC,  the  TUC  welcomed  all  opportunities  to  participate  in  the 
formulation  of  health  policy  and  actively  sought  to  influence  it.  -  This  desire  was 
assisted  by  apparently  unlimited  access  to  Ministers  of  Health  combined  with 
representation  on  RHBs.  This  involvement  may  reflect  corporate  bias  and  Klein  and 
Harriet  Jones'  interpretations  of  consensus  as  the  TUC  was  not  required  to  assist  in 
the  implementation  of  health  policy  in  the  same  way  as  social  security.  However, 
competition  from  other  more  powerful  interest  groups  in  this  sphere,  such  as,  the 
BMA,  certainly  ruled  out  the  prospect  of  the  TUC  becoming  a  'governing  institution' 
in  relation  to  this  aspect  of  government  policy.  Not  only  did  the  BMA  dominate 
health  policy  during  the  1950s,  but  both  Labour  and  Conservative  governments 
refused  to  appoint  a  TUC  representative  to  the  main  advisory  body  in  the  NHS,  the 
133 Central  Health  Services  Council.  147  Neither  did  the  existence  of  corporate  bias 
contain  any  guarantees  that  the  TUC's  views  would  influence  policy  in  any  way.  On 
a  more  positive  note,  TUC  participation  in  the  administration  of  the  NHS  was 
guaranteed  at  a  local  level  through  its  appointments  to  RHBs.  Although  these 
appointments  were  not  representative,  they  cast  the  TUC  in  a  new  role  as  the 
representative  of  consumers  rather  than  a  narrowly-based  producer  interest  group. 
How  successful  then  was  the  TUC  in  advancing  the  interests  of  NHS  patients? 
Between  1945  and  1951,  the  TUC  can  be  criticised  in  this  respect  owing  to  its 
deference  to  the  Attlee  governments:  its  General  Council  was  very  quick  to  defend 
policy  without  even  seeking  consultation  on  issues  which  were  causing  anxiety  in  the 
wider  trade  union  movement  as  was  expressed  at  annual  congresses.  A  more 
belligerent  and  critical  approach  did  emerge  following  the  Conservative  electoral 
success  in  1951  but  the  TUC  failed  to  achieve  many  of  its  policy  objectives.  Several 
factors  may  offer  some  explanation  for  this:  First,  TUC  policies  were  often  expensive 
and  would  have  required  a  greater  contribution  from  the  Exchequer  during  a  period 
when  the  onus  was  on  minimising  the  Exchequer's  contribution.  Second,  other 
interest  groups  promoted  policies  that  conflicted  with  those  of  the  TUC;  for  instance, 
the  TUC  sought  the  establishment  of  health  centres  while  GPs  opposed  them.  Third, 
frequent  changes  in  Ministers  of  Health  may  have  prevented  the  TUC  from  building  a 
more  concrete  relationship  with  the  policy-makers.  These  are  possible  explanations 
as  to  why  the  TUC  did  not  achieve  its  goals  in  relation  to  health  policy.  Less 
defensible  is  the  TUC's  failure  to  recognise  and  take  action  with  regard  to  wider 
problems  that  were  emerging  in  the  NHS  in  the  1950s.  Its  tripartite  structure  was 
"7  R  Klein,  The  new  politics  ofthe  national  health  service,  p.  5  1. 
134 causing  increasing  concern,  and  also  of  great  relevance  to,  but  ignored  by  the  TUC, 
was  the  growing  awareness  of  the  NHS's  failure  to  tackle  wider  inequalities  in  health 
care  and  health  standards  which  had  their  roots  in  class  differences  and  geography. 
135 Chapter  Five:  Education 
We  have  thus  far  examined  TUC  and  BEC  policies  in  relation  to  social  security  and 
pensions,  and  trade  union  involvement  in  health  policy  and  the  NHS.  This  chapter  on 
education  provides  a  ftu-ther  insight  into  the  social  policies  of  these  two  organisations 
and  also  that  of  the  Federation  of  British  Industries,  which  otherwise  had  shown  little 
direct  interest  in  state  welfare.  Their  involvement  in  the  education  policy-making 
sphere  took  a  number  of  forms  in  this  period.  The  war,  of  course,  offered  plentiful 
opportunities  to  influence  education  policy  as  the  topic  was  then  so  open  to  debate. 
Thereafter,  the  establishment  of  ihe  Central  Advisory  Council  for  Education 
(England)  (CACE(E)),  which  held  regular  enquiries  into  different  aspects  of 
education,  provided  an  important  forum  for  educational  debate  in  which  these  interest 
groups  were  able  to  participate.  In  addition  to  the  activities  of  the  advisory  council, 
Ministers  of  Education  were  also  willing  to  accept  deputations  and  representations 
from  these  groups,  and  would  also  initiate  consultation  themselves.  The  TUC 
declared  its  interest  in  all  aspects  of  education  policy,  including  secondary,  technical, 
ftu-ther  and  higher  education,  which  are  discussed  here.  Industrial  interests  were  more 
complex  given  the  division  of  responsibility  between  the  BEC  and  FBI.  The  former 
addressed  issues  relating  to  education  in  secondary  modem  schools  and  technical 
education  while  the  FBI  concerned  itself  with  the  grammar  schools,  higher 
technological  education  and  the  universities. 
It  must  be  conceded  that  the  61ite  focus  of  this  study  is  least  useful  in  relation  to 
education  in  view  of  the  localised  nature  of  policy  implementation  and  the  important 
role  of  local  education  authorities.  Nonetheless,  the  Ministry  of  Education  was 
136 certainly  active  in  the  formulation  of  education  policies,  and  represented  the  focus  of 
much  of  these  interests  groups'  activities.  Therefore,  it  is  still  appropriate  to  seek  the 
existence  and  significance  of  corporate  bias,  and  explore  policy  at  this  level  for 
evidence  of  consensus.  Education  has  been  cited  as  a  feature  of  the  welfare  consensus 
but  only  briefly  without  ftu-ther  explanation.  '  The  argument  has  tended  to  surround 
the  Attlee  governments'  decision  not  to  proceed  with  comprehensive  schools  or  to 
abolish  the  public  schools!  Dennis  Dean  has  offered  a  more  detailed  assessment  of 
the  Churchill  government,  and  Brian  Simon  also  addresses  the  notion  but,  in  typical 
fashion,  both  these  studies  examine  only  the  two  major  political  parties.  '  In  view  of 
the  debate  over  Britain's  relative  economic  decline  at  this  time  and  criticisms  of  the 
paucity  of  British  technical  education  in  particular,  this  chapter  offers  a  valuable 
insight  into  industrial  attitudes  towards  education  policy. 
Education  before  the  second  world  war 
The  interwar  period  has  been  designated,  as  one  of  stagnation  with  regard  to  state 
education:  governments  were  not  particularly  interested  and  education  was  too  readily 
the  victim  of  cuts  in  public  expenditure.  "  Still,  ideas  and  proposals  for  reform  and 
development  were  far  from  absent  and  provided  the  basis  for  subsequent  reforms  in 
the  1940s.  '  The  1918  Education  Act  raised  the  school  leaving  age  to  fourteen  and 
abolished  fees  for  elementary  schools.  It  also  contained  plans  for  part-time  day 
continuation  education  for  young  workers  between  the  ages  of  fourteen  and  eighteen 
1D  Kavanagh  &P  Morris,  Consensus  politics  (1994),  p.  72;  D  Dutton,  British  politics  since  1945 
(199  1),  p.  3  1. 
2N  Ellison,  'Consensus  here,  consensus  there',  p.  292. 
3D  Dean,  'Consensus  or  conflictT  and  B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order. 
4D  Fraser,  The  evolution  ofthe  British  wey'are  state,  p.  205;  A  Crowther,  Socialpolicy  in  Britain, 
r.  35. 
P  Gordon  et  al,  Education  andpolicy,  p.  59. 
137 but  spending  cuts  in  the  1920s  prevented  its  implementation.  No  ftu-ther  reforms  were 
legislated  in  education  until  the  1939  Education  Act  but  planning  did  continue. 
Two  sets  of  proposals  were  presented  by  the  goverrunent's  own  Consultative 
Committee.  In  1926  the  Hadow  Committee  recommended  a  finther  increase  in  the 
school  leaving  age  to  fifteen  and  the  reorganisation.  of  elementary  schools  into  distinct 
periods  of  primary  and  secondary  education,  with  the  division  being  made  at  age 
eleven.  In  1931,  over  30  per  cent  of  children  were  receiving  an  education  under  the 
Hadow  recommendations.  "  Nonetheless,  most  were  still  based  in  elementary  schools 
-  88  per  cent  in  1938  -  and  tended  to  leave  school  at  the  minimum  leaving  age  with 
no  qualifications.  "  An  Education  Act  in  1936  contained  proposals  for  an  increase  in 
the  school  leaving  age  to  fifteen  as  endorsed  by  the  Hadow  Report  but  with 
exemptions  for  those  in  'beneficial'  employment.  Its  implementation  was  planned  for 
1939  but  this  was  interrupted  by  the  outbreak  of  war.  In  1938,  the  Consultative 
Committee  on  Education  released  another  report,  which  supported  the  earlier  findings 
of  Hadow  and  emphasised  the  need  for  the  development  of  secondary  education  on  a 
tripartite  basis.  However,  the  government  rejected  its  recommendations. 
Few  developments  took  place  in  the  spheres  of  technical,  ftirther  and  higher 
education.  Local  education  authorities  were  responsible  for  technical  education  and 
could  undertake  initiatives  on  a  voluntary  basis,  reflecting  the  government's  lack  of 
interest.  Further  education  tended  to  be  pursued  only  on  a  part-time  basis  at  evening 
classes  following  the  failure  to  develop  day  continuation  education!  Finally,  Simon 
IP  Thane,  Foundations  ofthe  wetrare  state,  p.  190. 
7B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order,  p.  26. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  30. 
138 believes  that  British  higher  education  was  inferior  to  that  in  other  advanced  industrial 
economies  in  the  interwar  period.  ' 
The  1930s  witnessed  growing  dissatisfaction  with  state  education.  Demands 
included  an  increase  in  the  school  leaving  age,  and  parity  of  esteem  between  different 
secondary  schools.  Criticism  of  the  public  school  system'was  also  growing.  The 
Labour  party  published  a  pamphlet,  written  by  RH  Tawney,  in  1922  which  called  for 
a  range  of  secondary  schools  and  the  abolition  of  fees  for  secondary  education.  The 
party's  dissatisfaction  with  state  education  reflected  that  of  the  TUC,  which  dated 
back  to  the  nineteenth  century.  Congress  resolutions  had  demanded  a  school  leaving 
age  of  sixteen,  part-time  education  for  young  workers,  and  maintenance  allowances  to 
permit  children  to  remain  at  school  after  the  statutory  leaving  age.  '  Employers  were 
also  unhappy  with  the  state  education  system,  and  identified  poor  English  and 
numeracy  skills  as  particular  problems.  However,  there  was  also  a  tendency  among 
some  to  belittle  school  education  as  being  inferior  to  training  in  the  workplace.  "' 
Wartime  Reconstruction 
While  substantial  progress  may  not  have  been  characteristic  the  educational  sphere  in 
the  interwar  period,  a  range  of  ideas  for  reforms  had  been  formulated.  Therefore,  the 
main  impact  of  the  outbreak  of  war  was  not  to  create  original  ideas  but  to  provide  a 
renewed  stimulus  to  the  demands  of  reformers.  Amid  mounting  criticism  of  the 
education  system,  civil  servants  at  the  Board  of  Education  acted  quickly  to  grasp  the 
9B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order,  p.  31 
10  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/5,  TUC  Education  Committee  (Educ.  Ctce)  3,  appendix,  10  Nov.  1942. 
11  K  Burgess,  'British  employers  and  education  policy',  pp.  34-5,53. 
139 initiative  and  to  establish  the  agenda  for  debates  on  educational  reconstruction.  Its 
ideas  were  presented  in  a  memorandum  entitled  Education  after  the  war,  the  'Green 
Book',  designed  to  stimulate  discussion  in  the  direction  of  proposals  that  the  Board 
found  acceptable.  "  To  this  end,  copies  of  the  memorandum  were  sent  to  various 
organisations  including  other  government  departments,  local  education  authorities, 
teachers'  organisations,  churches,  selected  individuals,  and  other  interested  groups. 
This  latter  category  included  the  TUC  since  Herwald  Ramsbotham,  the  President  of 
the  Board  of  Education  had  advised  it  of  the  preparation  of  the  Green  Book.  "  A  copy 
was  sent  to  neither  the  BEC  nor  the  FBI,  whose  records  offer  no  indication  that  they 
were  aware  of  the  document's  existence  at  this  time. 
Much  of  the  Green  Book's  content  was  not  original  in  the  sense  that  several  of  its 
proposals  had  been  first  floated  in  the  interwar  years.  It  recommended  the  abolition 
of  fees  for  secondary  education,  a  single  code  for  secondary  education,  the 
organisation  of  secondary  schooling  on  a  tripartite  basis.  It  endorsed  demands  for  a 
school  leaving  age  of  15  which  had  already  been  legislated  in  1936,  albeit  with 
exceptions.  Its  third  major  recommendation  was  for  further  education  for  young 
workers  on  a  part-time  basis  between  the  ages  of  fifteen  and  eighteen.  Again,  this  had 
fmtured  in  previous  legislation:  the  1918  Education  Act. 
The  TUC's  Education  Committee  examined  the  Board  of  Education's 
memorandum  over  the  course  of  several  meetings,  the  conclusions  of  which  were 
12  PRO,  ED  13  6/293,  'Education  after  the  war':  distribution  of  copies,  194  1.  The  Board's  agenda  is 
discussed  in  B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order,  p.  57  and  P  Gosden,  Education  in  the  second 
world  war,  p.  23  8. 
13  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/5,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  3,  Deputation  to  the  Board  of  Education,  18  Dec.  194  1; 
Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  194  1,  p.  123. 
140 recorded  in  a  comprehensive  statement  of  TUC  education  policy.  "  The  TUC  was 
interested  in  all  aspects  of  education  and  formulated  proposals  for  the  reform  of 
secondary  education,  further  and  technical  education,  and  higher  education. 
Regarding  secondary  education,  its  priorities  were  to  ensure  ftee  secondary  education 
for  all  and  to  secure  an  increase  in  the  school  leaving  age  to  sixteen  although  it 
conceded  that  this  could  be  implemented  in  two  stages.  The  reasoning  behind  the 
TUC's  demand  for  a  higher  school  leaving  age  was  to  ensure  equality  of  opportunity 
in  all  types  of  secondary  education,  'which  suggests  that  the  TUC  was  not  wholly 
averse  to  the  tripartite  system.  It  expected  both  public  and  church  schools  would  be 
integrated  into  the  state  system,  in  view  of  its  past  criticism  of  the  former  before  the 
war.  These  were  seen  to  preserve  inequality  in  the  education  system  while  the  church 
schools  provided  the  same  outcome  because  their  financial  difficulties  prevented  them 
from  offering  an  acceptable  standard  of  education.  " 
The  TUC  supported  the  provision  of  part-time  finther  education  in  day 
continuation  schools  for  young  workers  up  to  the  age  of  eighteen.  Its  purpose  was  to 
allow  young  people  who  left  school  at  the  minimum  school  leaving  age  to  continue 
their  general  education;  hence  finther  arrangements  for  the  expansion  of  technical 
education  would  also  be  required.  For  those  with  the  requisite  qualifications  for 
university,  the  TUC  called  for  an  expansion  of  the  scholarship  system  to  allow  those 
who  had  been  offered  a  place  to  accept  it.  Simultaneously,  the  TUC  sought 
14  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  1,17  Oct.  1941;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee2,11  Nov.  1941;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee3,16 
Dec.  194  1;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  8,25  March  1942;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  9,31  March  194;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  10, 
Comments  of  the  Board  of  Education's  memorandum  on  "Education  after  the  war",  14  April  1942. 
'5  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/15,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  10,  Comments  of  the  Board  of  Education's  memorandum 
on  "Education  after  the  war",  14  April  1942;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  11,12  May  1942. 
141 improvements  in  the  current  value  of  awards  to  permit  a  reasonable  standard  of  living 
for  univcrsity  studcnts  to  allow  full  participation  in  studcnt  life.  "' 
At  this  stage  the  BEC  and  FBI  were  more  conspicuous  by  their  absence  from 
debates  on  the  future  of  education.  We  have  noted  that  they  were  not  recipients  of  the 
Green  Book,  and  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  they  had  begun  to  consider 
educational  reconstruction  within  their  own  organisations.  The  replacement  of 
Ramsbotharn  by  RA  Butler  as  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Education  signalled  a 
new  attitude  towards  education  and  industry.  Not  only  did  the  pace  of  reform  quicken 
under  Butler  and  his  Labour  deputy  James  Chutcr  Ede,  but  industrial  organisations 
were  brought  into  the  fold. 
The  TUCs  activities  were  notable  compared  to  those  of  its  industrial  counterparts. 
Once  again  the  TUC  showed  itself  to  be  more  active  in  relation  to  postwar  social 
reconstruction  by  becoming  involved  in  the  debate  on  educational  reform  from  the 
outset.  It  was  also  anxious  that  reforms  should  be  implemented  before  the  end  of  the 
war  in  order  to  prevent  potential  delays,  particularly  since  the  war  had  caused  so 
much  interruption  to  children's  education  under  the  evacuation  programmes.  "  This 
led  the  TUC  to  combine  with  the  Workers'  Educational  Association  (WEA),  the 
National  Union  of  Teachers  (NUT)  and  the  Co-operative  Union  in  1942  to  form  the 
Council  for  Educational  Advance  (CEA).  Its  purpose  was  to  lobby  government  for 
early  educational  reform  by  way  of  representations,  pamphlets,  newspaper  articles, 
and  public  meetings  to  promote  wider  interest  in  the  subject. 
16  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  10,  Comments  of  the  Board  of  Education's  memorandum  on  "Education  after 
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142 Under  RA  Butler,  reform  proceeded  apace.  In  spite  of  Churchill's  aversion  to  the 
prospect  of  educational  reform  owing  to  the  controversies  it  might  stimulate,  Butler 
and  Chuter  Ede  had  refonns  on  the  statute  book  by  1944.  "  This  was  achieved  in  large 
part  by  commissioning  committees,  a  deliberate  tactic,  to  review  the  more  contentious 
aspects  of  reform,  thus  allowing  Butler  to  concentrate  personally  on  the  church  issue 
while  deflecting  criticism  from  the  government  in  relation  to  these  other  aspects  of 
policy.  Hence,  the  school  curriculum,  private  education  and  technical  education  were 
passed  to  government  committees  for  detailed  consideration.  Conveniently,  neither 
the  Norwood  Committee  on  Secondary  Education  nor  the  Fleming  Committee  on  the 
Public  Schools  reported  in  time  for  their  recommendations  to  be  incorporated  into  the 
government's  legislation,  while  the  Percy  Committee  on  Higher  Technological 
Education  was  not  appointed  until  1944.  " 
The  Fleming  Committee  was  of  particular  interest  to  the  TUC  given  its  attitude 
towards  the  private  education  system.  Its  General  Council,  Walter  Citrine  represented 
the  TUC  on  the  Committee  and  the  Education  Committee  presented  evidence.  The 
FBI  also  submitted  evidence  to  the  Fleming  Committee,  of  a  quite  different  tenor. 
The  war  had  not  softened  trade  union  views  on  the  public  schools  in  any  way.  The 
TUC's  evidence  to  the  Fleming  Committee  favoured  their  abolition  and  integration 
into  the  state  system  in  order  that  their  advantages  could  be  enjoyed  equally  by  all 
children.  "  This  reflected  the  its  policy  that  fees  should  not  be  charged  for  secondary 
education  unless  the  schools  were  of  an  experimental  nature,  as  were  some  direct 
"P  Addison,  'The  road  to  1945',  p.  173;  P  Thane,  Foundations  ofthe  wet(are  state,  p.  213. 
19  PRO,  ED  136/537,  Outline  of  how  educational  reconstruction  grew,  undated.  20  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/5,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  3,  Memorandum  of  evidence  for  Committee  on  Public 
Schools,  pp.  1-2. 
143 grant  schools,  or  self-supporting  denominational  schools.  "  The  lack  of  fees  would 
remove  distinction  between  different  types  of  school  to  secure  the  principle  of  'parity 
of  esteem'  in  secondary  education.  '  The  FBI's  Education  Committee,  in  its 
submission  to  the  Fleming  Committee,  strongly  supported  the  retention  of  public 
schools.  Several  of  the  Federation's  members  recruited  actively  from  this  sector  and 
the  FBI  expressed  a  desire  to  establish  closer  links  with  the  public  schoolS.  2'  It  was 
supported  in  this  stance  by  the  ABCC,  which  also  endorsed  the  maintenance  of 
private  education,  and  complained  of  the  prospect  of  greater  government  intervention 
in  this  sphere. 
24 
The  Fleming  Committee  served  its  purpose  well:  these  differences  of  opinion  as 
well  as  those  of  other  participants  were  effectively  contained  within  this  forum. 
When  the  committee  released  its  report,  which  ultimately  recommended  the  retention 
of  the  private  sector  with  only  small  concessions  in  return  for  local  education 
authority  financial  support,  the  TUC's  criticisms  had  little  impact,  and  the  controversy 
over  private  education  was  never  again  so  heated.  "  While  the  TUC  actively  pursued 
involvement  in  the  movement  for  educational  reform,  promoting  it  widely,  it  was  left 
to  the  government  to  stimulate  industrial  interest  in  the  subject.  At  an  early  date, 
Butler  expressed  an  interest  in  improving  relations  with  industry.  "  Hence,  a  meeting 
was  organised  with  BEC  representatives  in  December  1942  with  a  view  to  keeping 
21  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctce  4/1,  Memorandum  of  evidence  on  abolition  of  tuition  fees  in  grant-aidcd 
secondary  schools  for  the  Committee  on  Public  Schools,  10  Dec.  1942. 
22  Ibid. 
"  MRC,  MSS.  200/F/l/l/Vol.  116,  FBI  D/4268  A,  ref  325/A/l,  Memorandum  to  members  of  the 
Education  Committee,  District  Secretaries  and  F.  B.  I.  departments,  8  Jan.  1943;  FBI  D/4290B,  rcf, 
325WI,  Education  Committee,  20  Jan.  1943. 
24  PRO,  ED  12/518,  RB  Dunwoody,  ABCC  Secretary  to  RN  Heaton,  Joint  Secretary  to  the  Committee 
on  Public  Schools,  10  Feb.  1943. 
25  MRC,  MSS.  2921811/6,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  10/3,  Note  on  Fleming  Report  on  Public  Schools,  10  Aug. 
1944. 
26  C  Barnett,  The  audit  ofwar,  p.  282. 
144 them  informed  as  to  the  government's  plans  for  education.  "  Further  consultation  and 
discussion  on  technical  education  took  place  within  the  Joint  Consultative  Committee 
of  the  TUC  and  BEC  to  the  Ministry  of  Labour.  "  Both  Rodney  Lowe  and  Correlli 
Barnett  have  criticised  the  goverrunent  for  its  neglect  of  technical  education  prior  to 
the  establishment  of  the  Percy  Committee,  especially  when  compared  with  the 
attention  paid  to  the  religious  aspects  of  refonn.  "  It  is  true  that  Churchill's  attitude  to 
education  required  Butler  to  prioritise  church  issues  where  the  potential  of  an  outcry 
was  perceived  to  be  greatest.  Nonetheless,  industry  was  hardly  seeking  participation. 
The  government  was  responsible  for  encouraging  BEC  involvement  but  there  is  no 
indication  of  the  FBI's  views  prior  to  the  passing  of  the  1944  Education  Act  with  the 
exception  of  its  submission  of  evidence  to  the  Fleming  Committee.  Its  lack  of  direct 
interest  clearly  contrasts  significantly  with  that  of  the  TUC,  which  sought  meetings 
with  Butler  to  promote  its  education  policy,  and  helped  to  organise  over  400  public 
meetings  in  conjunction  with  the  CEA.  " 
The  government's  plans  were  revealed  in  the  1943  White  Paper,  entitled 
Educational  Reconstruction.  It  contained  few  departures  from  the  Board  of 
Education's  original  proposals.  Its  main  features  included  the  abolition  of  fees  in 
state  secondary  schools,  an  increase  in  the  school  leaving  age  to  fifteen  with  the 
prospect  of  a  ftuther  increase  to  sixteen,  and  the  provision  of  further  education  for 
young  people  in  day  continuation  schools  for  one  day  each  week.  These  proposals 
themselves  gave  the  TUC  no  cause  for  complaint,  but  they  were  considered  to  be  'the 
27  PRO,  ED  46/155,  Meeting  of  BEC  representatives  with  RA  Butler  and  J  Chuter  Ede,  21  Dec.  1942. 
23  These  meetings  are  discussed  in  C Barnett,  The  audit  ofwar,  pp.  285-6. 
29  R  Lowe,  The  wey4re  state  in  Britain  since  1945,  p.  200;  C  Barnett,  The  audit  ofwar,  p.  282. 
30  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1944,  p.  76. 
145 very  minimum  of  reform  necessary'.  "  The  timetable  for  reform  caused  most  dissent. 
In  particular,  the  government  had  ruled  out  an  increase  in  the  school  leaving  age 
within  the  first  18  months  after  the  end  of  the  war  unless  there  was  a  laboUr  surplus.  " 
This  proviso,  combined  with  ambiguity.  in  other  respects,  led  the  TUC  to  criticise  the 
government  for  its  'far  too  leisurely  approach  to  the  whole  question  of  reform'.  " 
Moreover,  the  postponements  in  increasing  the  school  leaving  age  were  perceived  to 
threaten  the  key  concept  of  equality  of  opportunity.  If  the  leaving  age  was  not 
increased  then  grammar  schools  would  offer  a  longer  course  of  secondary  education 
than  the  modem  schools,  thus  undermining  the  principle  parity  of  esteem.  "' 
The  BEC  appeared  to  have  virtually  ignored  the  publication  of  the  White  Paper,  as 
it  did  many  other  prescriptions  for  social  reform  but  the  FBI's  Education  Committee 
did  discuss  it.  The  Federation  was  happy  with  the  proposal  to  increase  the  school 
leaving  age  to  fifteen  in  the  hope  that  an  extra  year  of  schooling  would  facilitate 
learning  in  a  curriculum,  which  some  of  its  members  considered  to  have  too  much 
breadth.  They  had  found  poor  standards  of  secondary  education  in  some  recruits, 
which  undermined  the  effectiveness  of  industrial  training.  The  FBI  Education 
Committee  expressed  an  interest  in  becoming  more  involved  in  the  educational  sphere 
vrith  a  view  to  ensuring  that  state  education  matched  industry's  needs  more 
effectively.  For  instance,  it  advocated  industry's  participation  in  the  design  of  courses 
provided  in  day  continuation  schools  to  ensure  industry  accrued  maximum  benefit 
31  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/5,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  10/1,  Statement  on  White  Paper  on  educational 
reconstruction  II  Aug.  1943,  p.  3.  ý 
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33  MRC,  MSS.  2921811/5,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  10/1,  Statement  on  White  Paper  on  educational 
reconstruction,  II  Aug.  1943. 
34  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1943,  p.  65. 
146 from  this  provision2'  Again,  these  attitudes  contrast  quite  starkly  with  those  of  the 
TUC:  it  sought  the  extension  of  a  more  liberal  education,  while  industry  seemed  bent 
upon  shaping  the  system  to  meet  its  own  requirements.  Hence,  the  FBI's  greater 
interest  was  in  technical  education:  it  wanted  better  standards  of  courses,  and  all 
teachers  to  have  a  teaching  qualification.  The  Federation  hoped  that  industry  could 
help  in  this  respect  by  organising  staff  exchange  programmes,  and  arranging  refresher 
courses  for  technical  teachers,  which  would  heighten  industrial  awareness  of  the 
important  role  played  by  technical  teachers.  " 
The  Coalition  published  an  Education  Bill  in  December  1943,  which  again  was 
based  on  broadly  similar  lines  as  the  White  Paper.  Plans  for  the  abolition  of  fees  in 
the  state  sector  and  the  introduction  of  county  colleges  for  the  education  of  young 
workers  were  confu-med.  The  introduction  of  a  higher  school  leaving  age  was  fixed 
for  I  April  1945,  however  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Education  could  postpone  it 
for  up  to  two  years,  and  no  mention  was  made  of  a  leaving  age  of  sixteen. 
The  TUC's  reaction  to  the  Education  Bill  was  equivocal;  although  it  was 
appreciative  of  much  of  its  content,  it  described  the  government's  policy  as  'vague 
and  uncertain'.  "'  The  principle  of  free  secondary  education  was  not  to  apply  to  the 
direct  grant  schools,  much  to  the  TUC's  displeasure.  The  plan  for  county  colleges 
was  welcomed  more,  although  the  TUC  hoped  that  young  workers  would  ultimately 
spend  half  of  their  time  in  education.  "  Still,  the  TUC  certainly  wanted  the  measure  to 
be  implemented.  As  part  of  the  CEA,  it  wrote  to  Labour  MPs  and  other  MPs  with  an 
35  MRC,  MSS1OO/F/I/INol.  116,  D/5084,  ref.  325/A/l,  25  Nov.  1943. 
36  Ibid.,  D4882A,  ref.  325.1.  A,  10  Sept.  1943. 
37  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/6,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  4,  Note  on  the  Education  Bill,  13  Jan.  1944. 
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147 interest  in  educational  reform  urging  them  to  demand  the  abolition  of  fees  in  all 
secondary  schools,  and  for  a  school  leaving  age  of  sixteen.  However,  Butler  rejected 
Citrine's  representations  on  this  latter  issue,  suggesting  that  priority  should  be  given 
to  the  reorganisation  of  all-age  schools.  "  The  TUC  also  published  a  statement  on 
educational  reform  in  the  Daily  Herald,  and  sent  circulars  to  affiliates  asking  them  to 
lobby  their  local  MP  for  support.  The  CEA  continued  to  organise  local  meetings  in 
recognition  of  the  vital  role  local  education  authorities  would  play  in  the 
implementation  of  legislation.  ' 
The  TUC's  activity  in  this  sphere  was  substantial  and  even  the  BEC  showed  an 
interest  in  the  Education  Bill,  and  asked  the  Board  of  Education  to  receive  a 
deputation  to  discuss  it  further.  However,  it  was  Sir  Robert  Wood,  the  deputy 
secretary  at  the  Board  of  Education,  rather  than  Butler,  who  met  with  the  deputation. 
Sir  John  Forbes  Watson,  the  BEC  director,  sought  a  stronger  focus  on  the  basic 
subjects  of  reading,  writing  and  arithmetic,  but  was  unenthusiastic  about  the  prospect 
of  a  school  leaving  age  of  sixteen.  The  Confederations'  reservations  were  not  based 
on  educational  considerations  but  interference  with  the  apprenticeship  system  if  pupils 
had  to  remain  at  school  until  the  end  of  the  term  in  which  they  reached  sixteen!  '  This 
showed  that  the  BEC's  interest  in  education,  like  that  of  the  FBI,  was  very  narrowly 
conceived  in  line  with  the  particular  needs  of  industrialists.  Nevertheless,,  the 
39  PRO,  ED  136/457,  Walter  Citrine  to  RA  Butler,  17  March  1944;  RA  Butler  to  Sir Walter  Citrine, 
29  March  1944. 
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no.  27  to  secretaries  of  trades  councils  and  federations,  II  Nov.  1943;  TUC  circular  no.  28  to  general 
secretaries  of  all  affiliated  organisations,  II  Nov.  1943;  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1944, 
77;  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1945,  p.  87. 
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148 Confederation  also  expressed  an  interest  in  becoming  ý  more  involved  with  state 
education. 
The  Education  Act  itself  received  the  Royal  Assent  in  August  1944.  It  heralded 
the  introduction  of  free  secondary  education  for  all  until  the  age  of  sixteen  although 
definite  plans  were  made  for  the  raising  of  the  school  leaving  age  to  fifteen  only. 
County  colleges  would  be  established  to  provide  part-time  education  for  workers  aged 
fifteen  to  eighteen,  although  no  timetable  for  their  introduction  was  provided.  The 
Act  also  upgraded  the  Board  of  Education  to  a  Ministry,  and  made  provision  for  the 
appointment  of  the  Central  Advisory  Council  for  Education  (England).  It  ignored  the 
issue  of  the  public  schools  on  the  basis  that  their  future  was  being  considered  by  the 
Fleming  Committee,  which  had  only  just  reported.  It  presumed  rather  than  prescribed 
a  tripartite  basis  for  secondary  education  as  endorsed  by  the  1943  Norwood 
Committee,  but  offered  no  explicit  guidance  either  way.  The  dual  system  was  also 
retained  with  more  local  control  in  exchange  for  more  public  finance. 
Following  the  passing  of  the  1944  Education  Act,  the  FBI  published  a  pamphlet 
that  raised  educational  issues  that  were  important  to  industry.  42  It  identified  the 
shortage  of  technical  and  science  teachers  as  an  important  educational  issue.  "'  With 
regard  to  secondary  education,  the  FBI  shared  the  TUC's  view  that  parity  of  esteem 
between  different  types  of  school  was  of  the  utmost  importance.  Yet  while  the  TUC 
held  this  objective  in  the  interests  of  social  equality,  the  FIB  was  more  concerned  with 
the  perceived  anti-industry  bias  prevalent  in  public  and  grammar  schools  -a  problem 
42  Federation  of  British  Industries,  Industry  and  education. 
43  MRC,  MSS/200/F/l/l/Vol.  116,  D/6046,  ref.  325/A/l,  4  Oct.  1944. 
149 that  could  be  alleviated  by  reducing  the  hierarchical  nature  of  secondary  education.  " 
The  appointment  of  the  Percy  Committee  provided  the  FBI  with  a  fin-ther  opportunity 
to  express  its  views  on  state  technical  education.  It  advised  the  Committee  of  a 
growing  need  in  industry  for  workers  with  training  in  technology.  The  prospect  of 
staff  exchanges  was  raised  as  a  means  of  assisting  its  development,  but  the  FBI  was 
also  concerned  that  practical  difficulties  including  being  able  to  provide  teachers  with 
suitable  work,  and  the  ability  of  firms  to  release  their  own  staff  for  teaching  would 
render  this  policy  impracticable.  " 
Ile  Labour  povemment  and  the  1944  Education  Act 
The  'White  Paper  Chase'  presented  the  new  Labour  government  with  a  number  of 
prescriptions  for  reform,  but  the  Education  Act  had  actually  been  legislated  with  the 
consent  of  the  Labour  party  as  partners  in  the  Coalition  govermnent.  Responses  to  the 
Act  varied  in  different  quarters  of  the  Labour  party,  but  ultimately  the  leadership  and 
both  Ministers  of  Education,  Ellen  Wilkinson  and  George  Tomlinson,  sought  to 
implement  educational  reforms  in  the  spirit  of  the  Butler  Act.  46  The  Attlee 
government  did  not  instigate  any  radical  education  policies:  'the  simple  priorities 
were  to  maintain  prewar  standards  and  to  lay  the  foundations  for  the  achievement  of 
"equality  of  OpportUnity".  141 
44  K  Burgess,  'British  employers  and  education  policy',  p.  52. 
45  PRO,  ED  46/295,  Fourteenth  meeting  of  Higher  Technological  Committee,  26  April  1945;  ED 
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Departmental  Committee  on  Higher  Technological  Education,  12  April  1945. 
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150 Hence  emphasis  was  placed  on  raising,  the  school  leaving  age  to  fifteen,  and 
providing  more  school  places  accordingly,  improving  ftu-ther  education  and  technical 
education,  and  increasing  access  to  higher  education.  The  pursuit  of  these  goals  was 
hindered  at  an  early  stage  by  shortages  of  building  materials  and  teachers,  which  was 
compounded  further  by  economic  difficulties  after  1947.  Conflict  over  education 
policy  between  the  parties  was  virtually  absent,  but  was  present  within  the  Labour 
party,  and  was  on  the  increase  in  the  trade  union  movement.  Here  the  General 
Council  did  follow  up  complaints  about  education  expressed  at  annual  congresses, 
proving  itself  to  be  less  tolerant  of  financial  restraint  in  this  area  of  the  social  services. 
Discord  also  existed  between  the  TUC  and  industrial  representatives  over 
fundamental  aspects  of  government  education  policy.  Their  attitudes  towards 
developments  in  state  education  at  the  level  of  secondary  education,  further  and 
technical  education,  and  higher  education  are  considered  below. 
Secondary  Education 
The  TUC's  wide-ranging  interest  in  education  policy  has  already  been  illustrated  in 
relation  to  its  wartime  activities.  Neither  the  BEC  nor  the  FBI  demonstrated  a 
comparable  degree  of  interest,  but  had  sought  to  discuss  education  policy  with 
government  or  government  committees  where  it  could  be  seen  to  impinge  upon 
industry.  Both  had  expressed  a  desire  to  build  closer  links  with  the  Ministry  of 
Education,  albeit  in  the  narrowest  sense.  The  TUC  sought  to  secure  the  principle  of 
(equality  of  opportunity'  in  the  state  education  system,  and  anticipated  that  the  1944 
Act,  in  spite  of  its  weaknesses,  would  produce  this  outcome,  particularly  if  the  TUC 
151 sought  to  ensure  its  full  implementation  with  improvements  in  line  with  trade  union 
policy. 
The  Labour  government  adhered  to  the  tripartite  system  of  secondary  education, 
recommended  by  the  193  8  Spens  Committee,  endorsed  by  -the  1943  Norwood 
Committee,  and  assumed  in  the  1944  Act.  The  TUC  had  supported  multilateral 
schools  in  the  1930s  whereby  single  schools  would  offer  a  range  of  courses  in 
accordance  with  the  different  needs  and  abilities  of  their  pupils,  and  criticised  the 
Spens  Committee  for  not  choosing  this  option.  "  Nevertheless,  high  priority  was  not 
attached  to  the  organisation  of  secondary  education  either  during  the  war  or 
afterwards.  Despite  a  backlash  against  tripartism  on  the  left  of  the  Labour  party,  the 
TUC  appear  to  have  been  ambivalent.  It  believed  that  'our  public  education  system 
should  provide  equally  (but  not  identically)  for  all  children'.  "'  Its  only  obvious 
reservations  concerned  the  efficacy  of  the  tripartite  system  to  meet  this  objective  if  the 
school  leaving  age  was  not  raised  to  sixteen  for  the  modem  schools,  and  if  restraint  in 
public  expenditure  undermined  development  of  the  secondary  modems  in  other  ways. 
The  question  of  the  school  leaving  age  prompted  an  early  debate:  the  TUC  had 
been  bitterly  disappointed  in  1945  when  Butler  had  announced  the  postponement  of 
the  increase  in  the  leaving  age  to  fifteen.  Ellen  Wilkinson  intended  to  implement  this 
policy  as  soon  as  possible,  but  was  still  not  particularly  responsive'to  a  CEA 
deputation  that  requested  timescales.  She  also  ruled  out  a  ftirther  increase  to  sixteen 
"D  Rubinstein  &B  Simon,  The  evolution  ofthe  comprehensive  school,  p.  18. 
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152 prior  to  the  establishment  of  county  colleges.  "  The  TUC  was  unhappy  with  her 
response  because  of  its  implications  for  parity  of  esteem  between  the  grammar  and 
secondary  modem  schools.  "  When  the  Minister  announced  the  raising  of  the  school 
leaving  age  to  fifteen  in  April  1947,  the  TUC  merely  regarded  this  as  a  first  step  and 
started  a  campaign  for  a  leaving  age  of  sixteen,  which  would  last  for  the  whole  of  this 
period.  Ellen  Wilkinson  continued  to  reject  TUC  demands  for  a  further  increase:  she 
argued  that  the  demands  on  resources  of  the  increase  to  fifteen  had  been  too  great  to 
contemplate  another  extra  year  of  education.  Other  policies  including  the  introduction 
of  county  colleges,  the  reorganisation  of  all  age  schools,  and  a  reduction  in  class  sizes 
also  took  priority  over  a  statutory  leaving  age  of  sixteen.  " 
Ellen  Wilkinson's  recaltricance  over  a  higher  school  leaving  age  did  not  meet  with 
universal  concern.  The  BEC  was  irate  when  a  date  was  set  for  its  increase  to  fifteen. 
Owing  to  full  employment,  employers  had  little  interest  in  improvements  to  schooling 
that  would  produce  a  corresponding  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  labour  force.  Hence 
the  Confederation  asked  the  goverment  to  keep  the  leaving  age  at  fourteen  to  avoid 
exacerbating  the  labour  situation.  "  Hugh  Dalton  also  put  this  proposition  to  the 
Cabinet  in  view  of  the  findings  of  the  1947  Economic  Survey  but  the  government 
decided  against  a  fiu-ther  delay.  The  school  leaving  age  was  raised  to  fifteen  in  April 
much  to  the  annoyance  of  the  BEC,  which  criticised  the  Act  for  its  'inopportuneness 
and  unwisdom'  since  it  would  remove  approximately  370,000  potential  school  leavers 
5o  mRc,  mss.  292/8  I  in,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  4/3,  Council  for  Educational  Advance  deputation  on  19 
Dec.  1945,3  Jan.  1946;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  6,19  March  1946,  p.  24. 
51  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  8/1,  Notes  for  deputation  to  Minister  of  Education  on  school  leaving  age,  14 
May  1946,  p.  1;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  8/2,  Memorandum  to  Minister  of  Education  on  school  leaving  age,  14 
May  1946;  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report,  1946,  p,  117. 
52  MRC,  mss.  292/8  I  in,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  9/1,  Report  of  deputation  to  Minister  of  Education  on 
school  leaving  age  on  5  June  1946,19  June  1946. 
33  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C4  pt.  118,  reE  N.  C.  9730,  notes  for  National  Joint  Advisory  Council  Meeting 
on  Economic  Survey  for  1947,14  May  1947. 
153 from  the  labour  market.  This  loss  of  manpower  would  be  compounded  by  the 
requirement  for  labour  to  build  and  equip  the  schools  needed  to  accommodate  the 
increased  school  population.  '  Any  benefits  which  may  have  accrued  from  a  better- 
educated  workforce  did  not  seem  to  occur  to  the  BEC.  Timmins  suggests  that  the 
level  of  demand  for  labour  at  this  time  meant  that  quality  considerations  were  simply 
not  as  important.  " 
Economic  difficulties  created  a  significant  strain  on  the  state  education  system 
after  secondary  education  was  extended,  which  was  exacerbated  by  the  additional 
demands  on  the  education  system  created  by  the  postwar  increase  in  the  birth  rate  and 
the  need  for  schools  on  new  housing  estates.  The  balance  of  payments  crisis  in  1947 
led  to  cuts  in  the  school  building  programme.  Following  a  further  sterling  crisis  in 
1949,  the  Ministry  of  Education  issued  Circular  210  with  instructions  for  local 
education  authorities  to  reduce  standards  of  school  accommodation,  to  cut  leisure 
facilities,  to  make  administrative  savings,  and  to  increase  the  fees  for  evening  classes 
by  ten  per  cent. 
As  in  other  policy  areas  financial  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Labour  government 
did  not  appear  to  cause  the  TUC's  Education  Committee  undue  concern.  However,  at 
least  two  unionists  at  the  1950  Annual  Congress  felt  that  the  General  Council  was 
being  too  lenient  over  the  government's  education  policy.  "'  WB  Beard,  the  Chairman 
of  the  TUC's  Education  Committee,  sought  to  deflect  criticism  of  the  government's 
policy  by  asking  unions  to  monitor  the  actions  of  local  education  authorities  who 
54  Ibid. 
55  N  Timmins,  Thefive  giants,  p.  97. 
-56  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report,  1950,  p.  500. 
154 would  implement  the  cuts.  "  Still,  the  Education  Committee  did  then  write  to  George 
Tomlinson  with  Congress'  complaints  about  the  school  building  programme,  where 
not  enough  schools  were  being  built  and  standards  were  perceived  to  be  inadequate.  " 
This  approach  was  significant  given  that  the  General  Council  had  not  presented 
criticisms  of  the  government's  social  policy  in  other  areas  made  at  Congress  while 
Labour  was  in  power.  George  Tomlinson  rejected  its  complaint  on  the  basis  that  the 
government  expected  to  reach  its  goal  of  providing  1,150,000  new  school  places  by 
December  1953  which  led  him  to  believe  that  schooling  was  receiving  its  fair  share  of 
resources.  39 
Further  and  Technical  Education 
This  area  of  education  presented  a  fin-ther  area  of  disagreement  between  the  TUC  and 
BEC.  The  main  thrust  of  policy  initially  was  the  introduction  of  county  colleges. 
Although  the  Labour  government  attached  much  importance  to  this  policy,  the 
increased  demand  for  schooling  combined  with  accommodation  and  staff  shortages 
necessarily  reduced  its  capacity  to  proceed  with  their  establishment.  '  The  TUC's 
interest  was  long-standing,  but  the  BEC  was  much  less  keen.  "'  The  Confederation 
opposed  the  introduction  of  county  colleges  in  principle,  and  complained  that 
employers  had  not  been  consulted  over  which  workers  would  attend  and  the  content 
of  the  curriculum.  Disagreement  also  arose  over  cost-related  issues:  employers  were 
unwilling  to  pay  their  workers  who  wanted  to  take  further  education  courses  on  a 
57  Ibid.,  pp.  163  &  500. 
MRC,  MSS-292/811/10,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee9,3  July  1951. 
MRC,  MSS.  292181  1/11,  TUC  Educ.  Ctce  1,9  Oct.  1951,  P.  5. 
PRO,  ED  46/677,  Memorandum  on  county  colleges  by  Ministry  of  Education,  undated. 
MRC,  MSS.  292/811n,  TUC  Educ.  Ctce  4/1,  Memorandum  for  Central  Advisory  Council  for 
Education  (England),  15  Jan.  1946,  p.  5. 
155 block-release  basis,  and  many  were  even  averse  to  bearing  the  cost  of  day  release.  " 
As  the  TUC  insisted  that  workers  should  be  paid  when  absent  for  educational  reasons 
regardless  of  their  timetable,  the  National  Joint  Advisory  Committee  to  the  Ministry 
of  Labour  was  unable  to  make  any  recommendation  on  this  matter.  " 
In  1948  the  government  asked  the  CACE(E)  to  review  the  future  development  of 
county  colleges.  The  Council's  report  on  'The  Education  of  the  Young  Worker' 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  government  should  prioritise  the  needs  of  schooling 
over  the  establishment  of  county  colleges.  Even  once  there  were  enough  school 
places,  the  government  would  have  to  carry  out  improvements  in  many  schools  and 
complete  the  Hadow  reorganisation  of  all-age  schools.  In  the  meantime,  the  Council 
advised  the  establishment  of  a  small  number  of  colleges  to  provide  an  indication  of 
how  they  would  function.  "  There  is  no  record  of  the  BEC's  response  to  this  report 
but  the  TUC  was  clearly  disappointed. 
Higher  education 
Otherwise  the  government  was  more  interested  in  developing  the  study  of  technology 
at'  more  advanced  levels,  including  specialisms  such  as  engineering.  The  Percy 
Committee  released  its  report  on  Higher  Technological  Education  in  1945.  Its 
recommendations  were  somewhat  limited:  its  only  concrete  proposal  regarded  the 
designation  of  some  technical  colleges  to  provide  diploma  and  degree  level  courses. 
It  also  suggested  that  the  government  set  up  a  central  advisory  body  with  regional 
62  PRO,  ED  46/676,  National  Joint  Advisory  Committee  meeting,  27  Oct.  1948. 
113  Ibid. 
"  PRO,  ED  136/730,  Central  Advisory  Council  for  Education  (England)  memorandum  to  the  Minister 
of  Education,  May  1949. 
156 committees  to  promote  the  study  of  technology  and  to  foster  relations  between 
industry  and  the  technical  colleges.  The  government  quickly  accepted  the  latter 
proposal  and  appointed  a  National  Advisory  Council  for  Education  in  Industry  and 
Conunerce  (NACEIC)  and  Regional  Advisory  Councils  for  Further  Education.  Both 
the  central  and  local  bodies  had  trade  union  and  industrial  representation,  the  BEC 
having  actively  sought  appointment  to  the  National  Advisory  Council;  nonetheless 
Martin  Davis  points  out  that  both  the  NACEIC  and  the  regional  councils  were 
dominated  by  educational  interests  with  industrial  representation  never  exceeding  20 
per  cent  of  their  membership.  " 
The  new  NACEIC  took  responsibility  for  developing  the  government's  policy  on 
technological  education.  ,  Its  first  report,  'The  Future  Development  of  Higher 
Technological  Education',  advocated  the  introduction  of  new  advanced  courses  in 
technology  and  a  new  type  of  award.  It  proposed  the  establishment  of  a  Royal 
College  of  Technologists  to  make  awards  in  order  to  improve  the  status  of  technical 
education.  The  Labour  government  published  a  White  Paper'that  largely  embodied 
these  recommendations  but  the  Conservatives'  success  in  the  1951  election 
interrupted  its  plans. 
The  TUC  welcomed  the  government's  White  Paper  as  the  unions  attached  much 
importance  to  the  development  of  technical  education  at  its  more  advanced  levels. 
There  is  no  record  of  the  FBI's  response  but  Roy  Lowe  found  it  was  unhappy  with 
postwar  developments  in  technical  education.  "  It  complained  of  the  shortage  of 
15  M  Davis,  'Technology,  institutions  and  status',  p.  124. 
66  R  Lowe,  Education  in  thepost-waryears,  p.  165. 
157 science  and  technology  graduates  amid  the  broader  labour  shortage  and  the  need  for 
Britain  to  increase  her  export  levels.  The  Federation  argued  that  advances  in 
scientific  and  technological  research  in  the  production  of  substitutes  could  help  to 
address  the  shortages  of  manpower  and  raw  materials.  Consequently  it  was  irritated 
by  the  continued  recruitment  of  science  and  engineering  students  into  the  armed 
forces  when  they  were  so  obviously  needed  in  the  domestic  economy.  Moreover, 
amid  the  industrial  labour  shortage,  science  teachers  were  returning  to  industry,  which 
was  likely  to  further  undermine  the  development  of  scientific  education  in  the  long- 
term.  "' 
Besides  the  govenunent's  policy  relating  to  higher  technological  education,  both 
the  TUC  and  the  FBI  followed  developments  in  university  education.  The  FBI  sought 
direct  involvement  with  the  universities  because  many  of  its  member  firms  recruited 
from  their  ranks.  In  order  to  develop  greater  understanding  of  industry's  needs  and 
the  functioning  of  the  universities  for  their  mutual  benefit,  conferences  were  held  and 
a  FBI  working  party  was  established  to  examine  how  closer  links  could  be  created. 
Suggestions  arising  from  these  initiatives  included  the  appointment  of  industrialists  to 
university  governing  bodies,  staff  exchanges  and  better  communication  in  general  in 
order  to  establish  the  qualifications  that  industry  sought  in  graduate  recruits.  "  In 
addition,  regional  conferences  were  held  in  order  to  develop  links  between  local 
industry  and  their  universities.  " 
67  MRC,  MSS1001B/3/2/C966  pt.  2,  D14703,  Memorandum  from  FBI  to  BEC,  'Call-up  of  university 
scientific  and  technical  graduates'  submitted  to  the  Technical  Personnel  Committee  of  the  Ministry  of 
Labour  and  National  Service,  Sept.  1947. 
6"  MRC,  MSS.  200/F/l/1NoL  116,  D/5128,  Education  Committee,  17  Oct  1947,  p.  6,19  Nov.  1947; 
Dn733A,  Education  Committee,  4  Oct.  1948,  p.  4,28  Oct.  1948;  PRO,  ED  46/470,  Report  of 
conference  on  industry  and  the  universities  organised  by  the  FBI  Education  and  Industrial  Research 
Committees  1949,  p.  77. 
69  h4RC,  MSS.  200/F/I/INOI  116,  D13674,  Education  Committee,  12  Oct.  1950,  p.  4,2  Nov.  1950. 
158 The  TUC  was  more  concerned  with  government  policy,  and  in  particular  the 
question  of  access  to  higher  education.  It  joined  the  Campaign  Committee  for  Higher 
Education  to  promote  interest  in  the  work  of  the  universities.  "  The  TUC  wanted 
expansion  of  university  education  to  ensure  an  adequate  number  of  places  for  all 
qualified  pupils,  and  improvements  to  the  award  system  to  ensure  that  financial 
circumstances  did  not  prevent  anyone  from  pursuing  a  university  degree.  "  It  was 
critical  of  the  number  of  awards  available,  discrepancies  between  different  local 
education  authorities,  and  the  lack  of  provision  for  non-university  students.  '  Its 
demands  were  met  in  part  by  the  report  of  the  government's  Working  Party  on 
University  Awards,  which  advocated  reform  of  the  grant  system  to  ensure  that  merit 
71 
was  the  only  criterion  for  entering  a  course  of  higher  education. 
Ultimately  the  Labour  government's  policy  was  centred  upon  the  implementation 
of  the  1944  Education  Act  insofar  as  resources  and  demographic  change  would 
permit.  Secondary  education  dominated  government  policy:  its  major  achievement 
here  was  the  raising  of  the  school  leaving  age  to  fifteen,  much  to  distaste  of  the  BEC. 
Otherwise,  the  trend  in  this  sector  was  one  of  expansion  along  broadly  similar  lines  as 
before.  Secondary  schools  were  set  up  on  tripartite  lines,  and  there  was  no  mention  of 
abolishing  the  public  schools  while  Labour  was  in  goverment.  Further  education  in 
county  colleges  was  the  victim  of  economic  circumstances  and  a  redrawingof  the 
"  other  member  groups  included  the  Association  of  Scientific  Workers,  Association  of  Teachers  in 
Technical  Institutions,  Association  of  University  Teachers,  British  Association  of  Chemists,  British 
Medical  Association,  National  Union  of  Students,  National  Union  of  Teachers,  Workers'  Educational 
Association,  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report,  1948,  p.  165. 
71  Annual  Trades  Union  Congress  Report  1948,  p.  552;  1950,  p.  534.. 
MRC,  MSS.  292/811/9,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  5,11  Jan.  1949. 
ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  6/2  (amended),  Report  on  university  awards,  draft  letter  to  the  Minister  of 
Education  commenting  on  the  report,  8  Feb.  1949. 
159 government9s  priorities  in  favour  of  schooling.  Developments  in  technical  education 
were  planned  at  advanced  levels  but  little  was  actually  achieved  under  Labour. 
Similarly,  gradual  expansion  of  higher  education  was  initiated.  Cuts  to'educational 
expenditure  after  1947  caused  concern  in  the  TUC,  as  did  the  lack  of  commitment  to  a 
school  leaving  age  of  sixteen  and  the  postponement  of  county  colleges.  Both  these 
policies  were  unacceptable  to  the  BEC.  At  this  stage,  the  Confederation  prioritised 
labour  market  needs  over  education.  The  FBI  adopted  a  longer-term  perspective  with 
regard  to  technical  education,  and  supported  government  plans  for  its  development. 
Otherwise,  it  formed  direct  contacts  with  universities  in  order  to  discuss  industry's 
needs  in  relation  to  their  work  rather  than  discussing  higher  education  policy  with  the 
government  While  continuity  between  the  Coalition  government  and  Labour's 
policy  gives  rise  to  signs  of  consensus,  as  does  the  lack  of  Tory  opposition  in  this 
sphere  between  1945  and  195  1,  producer  interests  were  not  quite  so  harmonious.  74  ,,, 
Conservative  izoverrunents 
As  Tory  interest  in  education  reform  had  been  largely  precipitated  by  a  desire  to 
overshadow  the  Beveridge  Report,  it  is  perhaps  hardly  surprising  that  the  new 
Churchill  government  in  1951  showed  little  interest  in  the  subject.  "  Moreover,  the 
reforming  Minister  of  Education,  RA  Butler,  now  presided  at  the  Treasury  where 
financial  considerations  were  predominant.  Education  policy  between  1951  and  1955 
was  characterised  by  financial  restraint,  and  the  emphasis  lay  simply  on  making 
enough  provision  for  the  ongoing  implementation  of  the  1944  Act.  76  By  contrast,  the 
'4  B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order,  identifies  a  strong  element  of  continuity  in  education 
policy  in  the  1940s. 
"A  Seldon,  Churchill's  Indian  summer,  p.  270. 
76  Ibid.,  p.  274. 
160 period  after  1955  has  been  described  by  Brian  Simon  as  one  of  'break-out"  a  term 
used  to  convey  the  significant  degree  of  expansion  at  all  levels.  '  Concerns  about 
economic  decline  and  public  dissatisfaction  informed  much  of  government  interest  in 
education  policy  after  1955. 
Although  Tomlinson  had  sanctioned  significant  cuts  to  education  spending  in 
1949,  the  TUC's  response  to  Conservative  implementation  of  this  policy  was  by  now 
predictably  censorious.  The  new  Minister  of  Education,  Florence  Horsburgh,  released 
Circular  242  in  December  1952  in  order  to  reduce  educational  spending'-by  E13 
million  with  instructions  for  local  education  authorities  to  cut  their  budgets  by  five  per 
cent.  The  TUC  now  found  cuts  in  educational  spending  to  be  unacceptable:  'Circular 
242  makes  a  second  bite  at  a  cherry  already  bitten  by  Circular  210  and  the  cherry  is 
just  not  big  enough  to  accommodate  two  bites.  "'  As  with  the  Conservatives'  health 
charges,  the  TUC's  concern  was  based  on  its  belief  that  Labour  policy  had  been  a 
temporary  contingency  in  response  to  difficult  economic  circumstances,  whereas  it 
anticipated  that  increased  charges  and  spending  cuts  would  typify  Conservative 
policy.  Its  Education  Committee  suggested  that  'this  circular  indicates  an  intention 
... 
to  halt  and  reverse  the  whole  process  of  development  and  expansion  of  the  education 
service'.  "  Spending  concerns  featured  highly  in  TUC  dissatisfaction  with  the 
government's  education  policy  over  the  next  thirteen  years,  but  to  little  effect.,  It 
argued  with  successive  Conservative  Ministers  of  Education  that  their  policies 
represented  a  threat  to  the  principles  of  secondary  education  for  all  and  equality  of 
"B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order. 
73  MRC,  MSS.  292/81  1/11,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  3,11  Dec.  195  1,  p.  27;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  511  (amended), 
Ministry  of  Education  circular  242  -  Educational  Economies,  statement  by  the  Trades  Union  Congress, 
21  Jan.  1952,  p.  2. 
"  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  3/3,  Comments  on  Ministry  of  Education  circular  242  on  the  subject  of 
educational  expenditure,  II  Dec.  195  1. 
161 opportunity.  Ministers  duly  accepted  these  representations  and  defended  goverment 
policy  against  TUC  criticism,  but  it  would  appear  that  the  TUC's  concerns  merited 
little  further  consideration.  " 
Secondary  Education 
The  impact  of  spending  restrictions  was  felt  throughout  the  whole  of  the  system  but  it 
was  most  visible  in  relation  to  schooling.  The  abolition  of  fees,  the  raising  of  the 
school  leaving  age,  new  housing  estates,  and  the  increase  in  the  birth  rate  at  the  end  of 
the  war  that  affected  primary  schools  in  the  early  1950s  had  already  increased  demand 
substantially  in  this  sector.  Under  Churchill,  education  was  not  given  a  great  deal  of 
prionty,  and  the  main  thrust  of  policy  with  respect  to  schooling  was  to  ensure  there 
were  enough  places  in  terms  of  provision  of  accommodation  and  staff.  "  ý  The  school 
building  programme  captured  TUC  attention  throughout  the  early  1950s,  while  being 
of  little  or  no  interest  to  the  industrial  organisations.  The  Ministry  of  Education 
regularly  released  circulars  that  advised  of  new  restrictions  on  school  building.  These 
would  be  removed  as  the  economic  situation  eased  but  were  then  re-established  at  any 
sign  of  a  downturn.  These  circulars  caused  a  great  deal  of  frustration  in  the  TUC:  not 
only  did  the  matter  preoccupy  the  Education  Committee,  but  persistent  complaints 
were  made  at  annual  congresses.  Meetings  with  Ministers  of  Education  produced 
little  by  way  of  results.  Both  Florence  Horsburgh  and  Sir  David  Eccles  countered 
TUC  criticism,  each  claiming  that  the  level  of  school  building  was  at  its  highest  ever, 
so  MRC,  MSS.  292/811/12,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  4,12  Jan.  1954,  pp.  25-26;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  5/7,  Report  of 
meeting  with  Minister  of  Education  on  IS  Jan.  1954,9  Feb.  1954;  MSS.  292/811/13,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee 
6,13  March  1956,  pp.  46-47;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  9,9  July  1956,  p.  65;  MSS.  292/811/14,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee 
2,12.  Nov.  1957,  p.  12. 
"A  Seldon,  Churchill's  Indian  summer,  pp.  270  &  275. 
162 and  showing  that  spending  on  education  under  the  Conservatives  was  growing  at 
faster  rate  than  that  on  other  areas  of  social  poliCy.  92  Yet  cuts  were  made  in  1955, 
83 
1956  and  1957,  all  of  which  angered  the  TUC.  Its  Education  Committee  identified 
the  impact  of  financial  stringency  in  terms  of  the  number  of  substandard  school 
buildings,  overcrowded  classrooms,  inadequate  facilities  for  teaching  science  and  the 
persistence  of  all-age  schools.  " 
It  was  not  until  1957  that  the  TUC  seriously  began  to  lend  consideration  to  the 
functioning  of  the  tripartite  system  of  secondary  education.  Professional  and  public 
reservations  over  tripartism  and  the  eleven-plus  selection  examination  had  gradually 
mounted  throughout  the  decade.  The  Labour  party  formally  adopted  a  multilateral 
policy  in  1953,  but  the  TUC  remained  fixated  on  the  school  leaving  age  as  the  source 
of  all  difficulties  in  secondary  education.  Neither  was  the  BEC  nor  the  FBI 
particularly  concerned,  although  the  latter  complained  of  discrepancies  in  the  number 
of  grammar  school  places  between  local  education  authorities.  "  The  Conservatives 
had  retained  the  tripartite  structure  with  limited  experiments  in  comprehensive 
schools  where  desirable,  but  in  truth  the  system  was  more  bipartite  than  tripartite 
owing  to  the  lack  of  development  of  the  technical  school.  Local  education  authorities 
were  never  particularly  keen  on  this  type  of  school  on  the  grounds  of  the  cost  of  their 
establishment,  and  disputes  over  the  appropriate  age  of  entry.  "  Conservative 
82  MRC,  MSS192/811/12,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  5n,  Report  of  meeting  with  Minister  of  Education  on  18 
Jan.  1954,9  Feb.  1954;  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  6/  1,  Report  of  deputation  to  Minister  of  Education  on  8  Feb. 
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1956,  p.  65;  MSS.  2921811/14,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  2,12  Nov.  1957,  p.  12. 
"  MRC,  MSS.  2921811/14,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  5/1a,  Statement  on  Ministry  of  Education  Circular  334.11 
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's  PRO,  ED  46/1070,  FBI  D/2638,  Crowther  Report  -  FBI  memorandum  to  the  Ministry  of  Education, 
2  Aug.  1960,  p.  2. 
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163 governments  were  ambivalent  and  left  it  up  to  local  education  authorities  to  decide 
how  they  wished  to  provide  technical  education.  "'  Local  education  authorities  tended 
to  opt  for  a  greater  emphasis  on  science  subjects  or  technical  streams  in  the  modem 
and  grammar  schools.  Consequently,  only  3.7  per  cent  of  school  children  -attended 
technical  schools  in  19572" 
No  greater  support  for  technical  schools  could  be  found  in  the  TUC,  which  now 
expressed  an  aversion  to  these  schools  on  the  grounds  that  the  curriculum  was  too 
narrow  and  restrictive.  It  favoured  'a  flexible  and  adequate  system  of  secondary 
technical  courses  available  for  suitable  children  following  on  a  sound  general 
education'.  "  This  could  best  be  provided  in  either  bilateral  or  comprehensive  schools 
in  order  to  build  a  sound  foundation  for  the  urgent  need  for  an  expansion  in  higher 
technological  education  to  address  the  shortage  of  scientists  and  technologists.  90 
Neither  was  the  FBI  keen  on  technical  schools.  It  also  expressed  a  preference  for 
bilateml  schools,  which  would  not  focus  exclusively  on  technology.  "  Indeed,  Rodney 
Lowe  attributes  much  of  the  lack  of  development  of  technical'education  to  industry, 
as  employers  sought  academic  rather  than  vocational  qualifications  in  potential 
employees.  ' 
This  discussion  on  technical  education  and  the  TUC's  support  for  bilateral  or 
comprehensive  schools  was  the  first  indication  that  the  TUC  was  beginning  to  reject 
91  PRO,  ED  1471638,  Edward  Boyle,  to  Commander  JW  Maitland,  MP,  15  April  1959. 
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164 the  existing  model.  Its  concerns  were  based  not  only  on  technical  education  but  also 
on  growing  criticism  of  the  secondary  modem  schools.  Approximately  75  per  cent  of 
pupils  attended  these  schools,  which  were  widely  and  increasingly  regarded  as 
inferior  to  the  grammar  schools.  As  standards  of  education  in  the  modem  schools 
were  being  questioned,  doubt  was  correspondingly  being  placed  on  the  fairness  of  the 
eleven-plus  examination.  Awareness  was  growing  of  the  happy  coincidence  between 
the  numbers  who  passed  the  exam  and  the  number  of  grammar  school  places  in  each 
local  education  authority.  Both  the  TUC  and  FBI  highlighted  this  flaw  in  the  system 
when  discussing  secondary  education.  " 
In  1957  the  government  requested  the  CACE(E)  to  examine  education  for  children 
between  fifteen  and  eighteen.  The  TUC,  BEC  and  FBI  submitted  evidence  to  the 
committee,  which  was  chaired  by  Lord  Geofftey  Crowther  on  which  the  TUC  was 
also  represented.  The  appointment  of  the  committee  coincided  with,  or  inspired  the 
TUC's  recognition  that  the  difference  in  the  school  leaving  age  was  not  the  only 
source  of  inequality  between  the  secondary  modems  and  the  grammar  schools. 
Research  was  also  indicating  that  social  factors  as  well  as  demonstration  of  ability 
were  important  in  determining  children's  performance  in  the  eleven-plus  examination. 
Furthermore,  the  opportunities  to  change  schools  after  the  initial  selection  process  had 
taken  place  were  limited.  In  its  evidence  to  the  Crowther  Committee,  the  TUC 
advocated  an  expansion  in  bilateral  schools  and  more  experiments  with 
comprehensives,  but  this  did  not  amount  to  ftill  endorsement  of  reorganisation.  "  It 
'3  PRO,  ED  46/1070,  FBI  D/2638,  Crowther  Report  -  FBI  memorandum  to  the  Ministry  of  Education, 
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165 stillplaced.  a  great  deal  of  emphasis  on  a  school  leaving  age  of  sixteen  and  urged  the 
Crowther  Committee  to  give  this  matter  serious  consideration  as  all  children  should 
receive  a  course  of  secondary  education  lasting  five  years.  "  The  BEC  was  still 
strongly  opposed  to  this  proposal;  although  it  was  dissatisfied  with  standards  of 
reading,  writing  and  numeracy  among  young  workers,  it  rejected  the  notion  that  an 
extra  year  of  schooling  would  resolve  these  deficiencies.  In  fact  the  Confederation 
claimed  that  the  increase  in  the  school  leaving  age  to  fifteen  in  April  1947  had  not 
been  worthwhile  for  pupils  in  secondary  modem  schools  since  they  made  such  little 
progress  in  their  final  year.  Accordingly  they  would  be  better  served  by  beginning 
work  at  fourteen  rather  than  remaining  any  longer  in  education.  "  The  FBI  did  not 
endorse  a  statutory  leaving  age  of  sixteen  but  it  was  embarrassed  by  the  BEC's 
remarks;  its  Education  Committee  noted  'strong  feeling 
...  that  the  B.  E.  C.  's  evidence 
to  the  Central  Advisory  Council  contained  a  number  of  unfortunate  and  retrogressive 
statements'.  "  The  Federation  favoured  a  voluntary  approach,  where  suitable  pupils 
could  remain  at  school  if  they  so  wished  after  reaching  fifteen.  In  a  more  tactful  vein, 
it  agreed  with  the  BEC  that  not  all  pupils  would  benefit  from  a  further  year  of 
secondary  education,  and  also  highlighted  the  burden  that  such  a  policy  would  place 
on  teachers  and  accommodation.  "  ' 
While  the  Crowther  Committee  was  carrying  out  its  enquiry,  the  government 
responded  to  growing  public  dissatisfaction  with  the  education  system  in  the  form  of  a 
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166 White  Paper,  Secondary  educationfor  all,  in  1958.  This  was  the  fruit  of  a  dialogue 
between  Sir  David  Eccles  and  Harold  Macmillan.  Subsequently  the  Prime  Minister 
decided  that  the  Conservatives  should  select  secondary  education  as  a  high-profile 
policy  measure  in  view  of  the  current  debate.  "  The  White  Paper  contained  proposals 
for  a  000  million  programme  to  improve  standards  in  secondary  schools,  permit 
pupils  to  remain  at  school  until  sixteen  on  a  voluntary  basis,  and  complete  finally  the 
reorganisation  of  all-age  schools.  "  The  White  Paper  promised  to  address  many 
issues  raised  by  the  TUC  in  recent  years,  but  its  Education  Committee  was  ambivalent 
towards  it.  The  repeated  expenditure  cuts  and  restrictions  of  the  past  decade  had 
taken  their  toll  on  the  TUC's  relationship  with  the  government;  it  no  longer  trusted  the 
government  to  implement  this  programme.  In  addition,  it  also  complained  that  no 
progress  had  been  made  in  increasing  the  school  leaving  age.  "' 
Consolation  was  offered,  however,  in  the  following  year,  when  the  Crowther 
Committee  put  forward  as  a  key  recommendation  an  increase  in  the  leaving  age  to 
sixteen,  to  be  implemented  at  an  appropriate  juncture  between  1966  and  1969.  "1  The 
TUC  was  obviously  pleased,  and  issued  a  public  statement  urging  the  government  to 
accept  the  conunittee's  recommendation  and  raise  the  leaving  age  at  the  earliest 
opportunity.  "'  Less  predictably,  the  BEC's  Education  Sub-Committee  also  endorsed 
the  Crowther  Committee's  proposal  in  a  marked  reversal  of  its  previous  position.  The 
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167 Confederation  now  accepted  that  a  higher  leaving  age  should  be  implemented  in  order 
to  secure  higher  standards  in  English  and  mathematics  with  the  mere  proviso  that  the 
final  year  could  be  spent  in  either  school  or  technical  college.  '"  The  BEC's  records 
offer  no  explanation  for  this  turnaround.  The  FBI's  influence  is  unlikely  given  that  it 
maintained  its  support  for  a  voluntary  policy  only.  Another  reason  for  its  change  of 
heart  could  be  growing  awareness  of  the  link  that  was  being  made  between  education 
and  Britain's  relative  economic  decline.  "  There  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  explicitly 
that  this  directly  influenced  the  BEC's  attitude  towards  the  length  of  secondary 
education,  but  it  -was  also  becoming  more  positive  about  day  release  and  staff 
exchanges  towards  the  end  of  the  1950s. 
The  government  accepted  the  Crowther  Committee's  proposal,  but  did  not  address 
the  question  of  implementation  immediately.  "'  In  March  1960,  the  Minister  of 
Education,  Derek  Walker-Smith,  announced  a  reordering  of  the  government's 
priorities  in  education.  Its  main  concern  would  now  be  the  reduction  of  class  sizes, 
which  would  be  pursued  before  the  school  leaving  age  was  to  be  raised,  but  this 
would  now  be  considered  more  urgent  than  the  establishment  of  county  colleges.  107  In 
1964,  the  government  announced  that  the  school  leaving  age  would  be  raised  to 
sixteen  in  1970.  "  This  eventually  took  place  in  1972. 
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168 The  Crowther  Committee  was  followed  by  another  Central  Advisory  Council 
enquiry  on  secondary  education  in,  1961  when  the  Newsom  Committee  was  appointed 
to  consider  the  education  of  children  between  the  ages  of  thirteen  and  sixteen  of 
average  or  less-than-average  ability.  In  its  evidence  to  the  Newsom  Committee,  the 
TUC  finally  rejected  the  tripartite  system  outright.  On  the  basis  of  contemporary 
research  findings,  the  TUC  argued  that  academic  ability  could  not  be  measured 
effectively  at  the  age  of  eleven.  "'  The  BEC's  evidence,  as  was  now  customary, 
reflected  its  own  specific  interests  in  state  education.  Nevertheless,  its  attitude  was 
positive  as  it  sought  to  develop  links  between  industry  and  the  schools.  Afterwards, 
the  Confederation  introduced  a  pilot  programme  to  allow  student  teachers  to 
undertake  work  placements.  "'  'Introduction  to  Industry'  had  several  aims  that 
included  providing  an  insight  into  the,  nature  of  industrial  work;  helping  to  indicate 
the  standards  of  education  required  by  employers;  assisting  employers  in 
understanding  the  teaching  process;  and  to  improve  generally  relations  between 
education  and  industry  and  encourage  better  communication.  "'  Although  these  still 
reflected  a  preoccupation  with  the  needs  of  employers  rather  than  a  wider  appreciation 
of  state  education,  the  BEC's  new-found  interest  in  schools  should  be  viewed  in  a 
positive  light,  and  suggests  a  greater  recognition  of  the  importance  of  education  for 
industrial  performance  in  the  longer  term.  The  pilot  programme  signalled  a  much 
more  active  role  for  the  usually  reticent  employers'  organisation. 
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169 By  the  end  of  this  period,  a  substantial  expansion  had  taken  place  in  secondary 
education  to  meet  the  demands  placed  on  the  sector,  if  not  always  successfully  in 
views  of  the  continuation  of  overcrowded  classes  and  poor  standards  of 
accommodation.  Nevertheless,  the  appointment  of  the  Crowther  Committee  and  the 
Newsom  Committee  and  the  1958  White  Paper  all  reveal  that  the  government  was 
aware  of  the  deficiencies  of  secondary  education.  The  period  was  not  entirely 
satisfactory  for  the  TUC.  '  Expenditure  cuts,  the  school  leaving  age  and  the  increasing 
problems  of  the  ý  tripartite  structure  all  combined  to  create  a  great  deal  of 
dissatisfaction,  and  this  was  only  in  relation  to  schooling.  The  FBI  and  BEC  were 
less  concerned:  the  former  did  not  get  involved  with  the  secondary  modem  schools 
and  only  the  number  of  grammar  school  places  gave  it  any  cause  for  concern.  it  was 
ambivalent  in  the  debate  about  the  leaving  age  and  merely  considered  the  policy 
inadvisable  but  no  great  threat  either.  The  secondary  modem  schools  should  have 
been  of  more  concern  to  the  BEC,  but  this  organisation  showed  little  positive  interest 
in  schooling  until  the  late  1950s.  Even  then,  its  concerns  reflected  industrial  interests 
rather  than  awareness  of  the  wider  debates  in  education  at  this  time. 
Further  Education  and  Technical  Education 
It  was  not  until  the  mid-1950s  that  concerns  about  decline  began  to  have  implications 
for  this  sector  of  education,  which  were  recognised  in  a  White  Paper,  Technical 
Education,  published  in  1956  under  the  new  Eden  government.  Further  and  technical 
education  were  somewhat  neglected  under  the  Churchill  government,  and  no  further 
progress  was  made  with  county  colleges.  The  White  Paper  indicated  a  renewed 
interest  in  technical  education  to  reflect  recognition  that  Britain's  provision  was  poor 
170 compared  to  that  of  her  industrial  competitors.  It  was  proposed  to  spend  E20  million 
to  promote  technical  education  in  local,  regional  and  advanced  technical  colleges. 
One  approach  favoured  by  the  Ministry  of  Education  was  to  encourage  staff 
exchanges  with  the  technical  colleges.  The  FBI  and  BEC  had  already  expressed  some 
apprehension,  which  was  sustained  but  the  BEC  did  make  a  tentative  suggestion  that 
industry  may  be  able  to  offer  refresher  courses  for  teachers.  '  'I  The  Confederation  was 
less  encouraging  when  the  Ministry  of  Education  consulted  it  with  regard  to  its  plans 
for  day  release  courses  for  young  workers.  The  government  had  already  made  efforts 
in  this  diiection  but  to  little  effect.  Therefore,  the  White  Paper  included  plans  to 
double  the  number  of  participants  in  day  release  schemes  to  450,000.  The  BEC 
claimed  this  objective  would  be  unattainable  in  some  sectors  of  industry.  It  also 
continued  to  be  concerned  that  workers  would  choose  courses  that  pertained  to  their 
general  education  or  other  interests  rather  than  vocational  courses  acceptable  to  their 
employers.  "' 
Its  doubts  over  staff  exchanges  aside,  the  FBI  welcomed  the  White  Paper, 
particularly  its  plans  for  the  development  of  advanced  courses,  but  the  Federation  was 
still  disquieted  by  the  lack  of  a  firm  timetable  for  its  implementation.  "  The  trade 
union  movement  hoped  that  better  technical  education  would  lead  to  higher  levels  of 
productivity,  which  in  turn  would  raise  living  standards.  Hence,  to  -encourage 
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171 students  to  choose  technical  courses,  the  TUC  called  for  *  non-means-tested 
scholarships  for  this  sector.  "' 
Further  education  also  came  under  examination  by  the  Crowther  Committee.  That 
year  the  Minister  of  Education,  Derek  Vosper,  advised  the  TUC  that  the'government 
could  not  set  up  county  colleges  owing  to  an  insufficient  number  of  teachers.  ""  In 
their  evidence  to  the  Crowther  Committee,  both  the  BEC  and  FBI  displayed  an 
antipathy  towards  county  colleges,  although  it  was  much  stronger  on  the  part  of  the 
former.  The  Confederation  suggested  that  rather  than  setting  up  county  colleges  to 
provide  ftuther  education  on  a  universal  basis,  the  government  should  concentrate 
resources  on  its  most  talented  young  people.  "'  The'FBI  did  not  reject  further 
education  for  young  workers  outright,  but  wanted  to  use  the  existing  further  education 
colleges  for  this  purpose  instead  of  creating  a  new  institution.  "s 
The  Crowther  Committee  reached'a  compromise:  in  principle  it  supported  the 
establishment  of  county  colleges,  but  suggested  that  a  large-scale  expansion  of  day 
release  should  precede  their  establishment  in  order  to  gain  experience  of  how  they 
would  operate.  "'  This  recommendation  was  quickly  accepted  by  the  government  but 
not  necessarily  as  a  prerequisite  to  county  colleges:  David  Eccles  advised  the  TUC 
that  he  did  not  envisage  compulsory  attendance  at  these  within  the  next  20  years.  120 
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Council  for  Education  (England),  12  March  1958,  pp.  1-2. 
119  MRC,  MSS.  292B/811/17,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  1/4,  Day  Release  for  Further  Education,  II  Oct.  1960,  p. 
1. 
120  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  2/2,  Day  release  for  further  education  -  report  of  meeting  with  Minister  of 
172 Ilie  government  was,  however,  very  interested  in  the  Crowther  Committee's 
discussions  on  day  release,  particularly  since  it  was  not  meeting  the  targets  that  it  had 
set  itself  in  the  1956  Wbite  Paper.  "'  Consequently,  the  Ministry  of  Education 
undertook  serious  consideration  of  -an  idea  that  had  been  discarded  by  the  Central 
Advisory  Council  regarding  the  prospect  of  a  legal  right  to  day  release.  Eccles  hoped 
that  such  a  policy  would  alleviate  criticism  of  the  government's  lack  of  progress  so  far 
in  expanding  day  release,  and  also  deflect  attention  from  ý  its  refusal  to  introduce 
county  colleges.  112 
Day  release  was  discussed  at  length  over  the  next  few  years  by  committees, 
working  parties  and  tripartite  discussions  with  employers  and  employees' 
representatives.  Eccles  initially  consulted  the  TUC  and  the  FBI  on  the  prospect  of 
compulsory  day  release.  Both  were  circumspect:  the  TUC  was  worried  that  young 
workers  who  exercised  their  right  to  day  release  against  the  wishes  of  their  employers 
would  suffer  recriminations,  and  the  Federation  was  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  day 
release  should  be  initiated  by  employers.  "  In  the  wake  of  these  consultations,  the 
Ministry  of  Education  appointed  a  working  party  to  investigate  the  idea  fin-ther. 
The  FBI  became  increasingly  hostile  to  the  notion  of  a  legally-based  scheme:  'the 
general  principle  of  placing  the  power  in  the  hands  of  the  young  person  instead  of  the 
employer  is  contrary  to  all  our  accepted  ideas  about  the  relationship  between 
employer  and  employee'.  Newton,  a  member  of  its  Education  Committee,  suggested 
Education  on  31  Oct.  1960,8  Nov.  1960. 
121  Ibid.,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  1/4,  Day  release  for  further  education,  II  Oct.  1960. 
122  PRO,  ED  46/1009,  JF  Embling,  Under  Secretary  at  Ministry  of  Education  to  S  Goldman,  Treasury, 
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123  MRC,  MSS.  292B/811/17,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  1/4,  Day  release  for  further  education,  II  Oct.  1960,  p. 
2;  MRC,  MSS.  200/F/l/I/1  18,  D/3691,  FBI  Education  Committee,  12  Oct.  1960,  p.  2. 
173 that  it  might  also  discourage  small  firms  from  employing  under-18s  owing  to  the 
added  cost.  124  The  BEC  did  not  seem  particularly  concerned  about  the  prospect  of  a 
compulsory  scheme,  and  still  considered  the  type  of  course  to  be  the  most  important 
issue.  It  was  adamant  that  workers  should  not  be  allowed  to  choose  recreational 
courses.  125 
The  working  party  released  its  report  in  1962,  having  reached  the  conclusion  that  a 
compulsory  scheme  of  day  release  would  be  successful  only  if  employers  who  refused 
to  cooperate  could  be  penalised  in  some  way.  "  Even  so,  it  warned  that  a  very 
successful  programme  might  exceed  available  resources  of  teaching  staff  and 
accommodation,  which  could  adversely  affect  other  aspects  of  education  poliCy.  127  A 
further  meeting  with  the  TUC,  BEC  and  FBI  agreed  that  a  compulsory  scheme  would 
be  too  expensive.  The  FBI  was  particularly  unenthusiastic,  and  emphasised  that  the 
cost  to  the  employer  as  well  as  the  taxpayer  had  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 
The  BEC  proved  to  be  more  supportive.  Although  it  still  maintained  reservations 
over  course  content,  its  representative  Henniker-Heaton  suggested  that  '[i]t  might  be 
more  expensive  in  the  long  term  not  to  undertake  the  development  of  day  release.  '  128 
Having  still  not  found  a  way  of  increasing  participation  in  day  release  schemes,  the 
Ministry  set  up  a  special  committee:  the  Committee  on  the  Development  of  Day 
Release,  chaired  by  Henniker-Heaton.  The  Ministry  had  deliberately  selected  an 
124  PRO,  ED  46/1008,  Attachment  to  R.  D.  R.  Minutes  2,19  Sept.  1961,  circulated  by  Mr  Newton  (FBI) 
-  The  difficulties  that  employers  foresee  in  the  introduction  of  the  proposal  by  the  Minister  of 
Education  that  young  people  under  the  age  of  18  should  have  the  right  to  demand  part-time  day  release; 
R.  D.  FL  Minutes  5,28  March  1962. 
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127  PRO,  ED  46/1009,  Note  on  the  working  party  on  the  right  to  day  release  by  JAR  Pimlott,  Under 
Secretary  at  Ministry  of  Education,  4  June  1962. 
128  Ibid.,  The  development  of  day  release  -  note  of  a  meeting,  20  July  1962. 
174 industrialist  for  this  position  because  industry's  co-operation  was  so  vital  to  the 
policy's  effectiveness.  '  Representatives  of  the  TUC,  BEC  and  FBI  were  also 
appointed  to  its  membership.  Those  making  representations  were  advised  in  advance 
that  the  committee  would  be  unable  to  make  proposals  that  would  involve 
considerable  cost.  `  Hence,  each  of  the  industrial  groups  accorded  a  measure  of 
prionty  to  different  groups  of  young  workers  who  should  be  entitled  to  day  release. 
'Me  TUC  had  recently  decided  in  favour  of  a  compulsory  scheme,  but  under  the 
committee's  limited  terms  of  reference  it  opted  to  prioritise  fifteen  year  olds  since 
they  left  school  at  the  minimum  age.  Once  this  group  had  been  provided  for,  it 
wanted  the  government  to  identify  which  sectors  of  the  economy  had  most  need  for 
ftu-ther  education.  "'  The  FBI  and  BEC  both  prioritised  on  the  basis  of  occupational 
hierarchy:  the  Federation  attached,  most  importance  to  workers  for  whom  further 
education  provision  already  existed,  followed  by  those  school  leavers  who  had  been 
in  employment  for  less  than  one  year;  then  other  young  workers  who  would  benefit 
from  day  release.  132  The  employers  gave  preference  to  apprentices  and  other  skilled 
workers  over  less-skilled  young  people  who  would  then  be  offered  courses  which 
both  they  and  their  employers  found  mutually  acceptable.  133  The  Committee  on  the 
Development  of  Day  Release  issued  a  report  in  1964  containing  recommendations  for 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  workers  taking  part  in  day  release  by  250,000  over  the 
next  five  years.  The  target  was  to  be  divided  among  local  education  authorities  who 
would  be  expected  to  work  with  local  industry  in  order  to  ensure  that  it  would  be 
129  Henniker-Heaton  was  the  Director  of  the  Master  Cotton  Spinners  and  a  member  of  the  BEC 
Education  and  Industrial  Training  Committee. 
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13'  Ibid. 
132  PRO,  ED  204/3,  DDR/E/7,  Evidence  by  the  Federation  of  British  Industries,  1963 
133  Ibid.,  BEC  63/179,  Statement  of  Confederation's  evidence  to  Special  Committee  of  Enquiry  into  the 
Development  of  Day  Release  for  Young  Persons,  March  1963. 
175 achieved.  "  The  plan  was  welcomed  by  the  TUC,  but  the  BEC's  membership  was 
less  impressed.  Although  the  Confederation  publicly  expressed  its  support,  some  of 
its  members  felt  the  government's  targets  were  too  high.  The  curriculum  also 
remained  a  source  of  disagreement  as,  the  Confederation,  and  also  the  ABCC, 
continued  to  resist  non-vocational  courses.  135 
As  debate  continued  on  the  expansion  of,  day  release,  other  developments  were 
taking  place  with  regard  to  technical  education.  In  1961,  the  government  released  a 
further  White  Paper  entitled  Better  Opportunities  in  Technical  Education.  Its  issue 
reflected  recognition  in  the  Ministry  of  Education  that  recent  advances  in  technical 
education  had  overlooked  the  needs  of  technicians,  operatives  and  craftsmen.  Current 
technical  courses  were  also  considered  to  be  out-of-date.  The  White  Paper  also 
sought  to  address  the  high  wastage  rates  in  ftn-ther  education  by  reorganising  courses 
to  provide  more  variety  and  to  meet  industry's  needs  more  effectively.  136 
Higher  Education 
The  FBI  continued  to  meet  with  university  representatives  in  the  1950s.  A  conference 
was  held  in  1953,  and  in  the  following  year  its  Education  Committee  undertook  a 
project  designed  to  encourage  their  members  to  appoint  graduates  to  higher 
positions.  "'  It  also  sought  to  increase  student  interest  in  work  in  industry,  and 
134  MRC,  MSS.  292B/811/20,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee  12,14  July  1964,  p.  64. 
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Technical  Education'  -  summary  of  White  Paper,  196  1. 
137  MRC,  MSS.  200/F/l/l/VoI  117,  D.  9948,  Education  Committee,  3  March  1953,  p.  3,16  March  1953. 
176 published  two  pamphlets  on  this  subject  -  'Industry  and  the  graduate'  and  'A  career 
for  the  graduate  in  industry'.  "" 
Both  the  TUC  and  FBI  took  an  interest  in  the  student  award  system,  again  for 
different  reasons.  The  TUC's  policy  was  still  premised  upon-  the  principles  of 
improving  access  and  ensuring  the  grants  were  adequate  to  allow  students  to  accept  a 
university  place.  In  June,  1952,  Florence  Horsburgh  announced  the  removal  of 
restrictions  on  the  number  of  awards  in  order  that  all  those  offered  a  university  place 
would  receive  fmancial  assistance.  At  the  same  time,  the  means-test  would  be 
tightened.  Although  the  TUC  was  disappointed  with  the  more  severe  means-test,  it 
welcomed  the  new  policy  which  would  facilitate  access  to  higher  education  and  thus 
stimulate  expansion.  "'  -  The  policy  would  have  been  less  satisfactory  for  the  FBI, 
which  was  already  unhappy  with  the  operation  of  the  means-test.  The  Federation's 
concern  reflected  the  impact  of  means-testing  grants  on  parents  in  the  higher  income 
brackets.  "  Nevertheless,  it  had  decided  not  to  complain  to  the  Ministry  of  Education, 
on  the  basis  that  such  an  approach  would  be  inappropriate  since  the  government  had 
recently  granted  income  tax  relief,  and  was  currently  in  pursuit  of  an  economy  drive 
of  which  the  FBI  highly  approved.  "' 
These  issues  were  raised  once  again  at  the  end  of  the  1950s  when  the  government 
appointed  the  Committee  on  Grants  to  Students  (Anderson  Committee).  For  the  TUC, 
access  to  higher  education  was  still  the  crucial  issue.  Although  the  number  of 
university  places  had  been  increased  throughout  the  decade  and  awards  had  improved 
Ibid.;  D/4537,  Minutes  of  Education  Committee  on  7  Dec.  1954,  p.  2,20  Dec.  1954. 
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177 in  value,  the  TUC  noted  the  persistence  of  obstacles  to  higher  education.  -  More  pupils 
held  the  qualifications  for  university  than  places  existed,  while  there  were 
geographical  discrepancies  in  the  number  of  awards  offered  by  different  local 
education  authorities.  More  fundamentally,  the  TUC  believed  that  inadequate 
standards  in  some  secondary  schools  prevented  many  children  from  fully  developing 
their  academic  potential.  To  address  this  latter  issue,  it  asked  for  increases  in  the 
maintenance  allowances  for  children  remaining  at  school  beyond  the  minimum 
leaving  age  in  order  to  encourage  them  to  do  so.  It  also  sought  a  further  increase  in 
maintenance  awards  to  encourage  young  people  to  take  up  university  places.  142 
The  FBI  was  also  critical  of  regional  disparities  in  the  number  of  awards  for  higher 
education,  and  requested  harmonisation  of  the  criteria  for  receipt  of  awards  in 
different  local  education  authorities.  It  recommended  a  50  per  cent  increase  in  the 
number  of  awards  that  were  made  by  the  Ministry  of  Education  in  order  to  combat 
these  geographical  differences  and  to  make  the  selection  process  fairer.  It  also  wanted 
the  means-test  to  be  abolished  and  replaced  by  a  system  whereby  the  value  of  the 
award  would  be  added  to  parents'  taxable  incomes.  ""  The  ABCC  also  disliked  the 
means-test  but  was  cautious  about  its  abolition  on  the  grounds  of  cost.  Hence,  the 
Chambers  of  Conunerce  suggested  that  the  goverment  hold  an  enquiry  'with  a  view 
to  alleviating  hardship  among  professional  men  and  those  in  the  "middle  income 
groups",  who  at  present  find  it  almost  impossible  to  educate  their  children  without 
considerable  sacrifice'.  " 
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178 The  expansion  of  higher  education  -  had  been  an  important  issue  for  the  TUC 
throughout  this  decade.  It  complained  of  shortages  of  graduates  for  industry  and 
commerce,  in  public  administration  and  the  social  services.  "'  In  March  1957,  its 
representatives  met  with  Treasury  officials  and  Sir  Keith  Murray  of  the  University 
Grants  Committee  to  discuss  expansion  in  the  universities.  The  TUC  was  reassured  at 
this  meeting  that  policies  were  already  being  considered  to  promote  the  development 
of  higher  education.  '" 
The  1959  Crowther  Report  also  criticised  the  inadequate  number  of  university 
places.  ""'  Subsequently,  the  Prime  Minister  appointed  the  Robbins  Committee  on 
Higher  Education  in  February  1961  to  review  and  make  recommendations  on  the 
long-term  development  of  higher  education.  The  TUC's  evidence  to  the  Robbins 
Committee  was  highly  critical  in  its  tone.  It  noted  the  inadequacy  of  provision  in 
terms  of  the  number  of  places  and  facilities.  ""  The  Robbins  Report  was  published  in 
October  1963.  It  advocated  the  large-scale  expansion  of  university  education  in  order 
to  ensure  that  all  suitably  qualified  persons  would  be  able  to  obtain  a  place.  "'  Hence, 
it  anticipated  that  current  numbers  would  double  over  the  next  ten  years  through  the 
growth  of  existing  universities  and  the'upgrading  of  approximately  ten  further 
education  institutions.  "'  The  government  quickly  endorsed  the  Robbins  Committee's 
recommendations.  "'  The  report  was  also  warmly  welcomed  by  the  TUC.  1'2 
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15  to  18,  p.  462. 
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151  B  Simon,  Education  and  the  social  order,  p.  222. 
132  MRC,  MSS.  292/B/811/2  1,  TUC  Educ.  Ctee.  3/6  (Amended),  Note  of  comment  on  the  Report  of  the 
179 Industry's  response  to  the  Report  is  not  recorded  although  one  commentator  has  noted 
its  lack  of  influence:  Carswell  makes  the  point  that  'though  industry  had  three  seats 
on  the  Committee,  its  voice  was  little  heard'.  "' 
Developments  also  took  place  in  higher  technological  education  during  this  period. 
Ile  Labour  government's  1951  White  Paper  on  this  subject  was  largely  endorsed  by 
the  incoming  Conservative  administration.  The  one  exception  was  the  proposal  for  a 
Royal  College  of  Technologists,  which  was  dropped  in  preference  for  the 
establishment  of  at  least  one  institution  of  university  stature,  which  would  specialise 
in  technology.  "  The  Conservatives  also  chose  to  develop  higher  technological 
education  through  the  expansion  of  sandwich  courses  to  address  the  shortage  of 
technologists.  "'  This  provoked  a  prolonged  debate  with  the  FBI  over  funding.  The 
Ministry  of  Education  wanted  industry  to  pay  tuition  fees  and  also  maintenance  grants 
to  employees  who  took  sandwich  courses.  ""  The  NACEIC  set  up  a  sub-committee  to 
review  the  provision  of  sandwich  courses.  Its  report  endorsed  the  Ministry's  earlier 
contention  that  employers  should  pay  their  workers'  tuition  fees  and  their  full  salary 
for  the  time  that  was  spent  in  college.  The  TUC  was  quite  happy  with  these  findings, 
but  the  FBI  was  less  so.  It  argued  that,  in  the  past,  employers  had  supported  sandwich 
course  students  financially  in  order  to  get  the  courses  underway;  now  that  sandwich 
courses  were  an  established  method  of  providing  higher  technological  education,  the 
FBI  believed  that  financial  responsibility  lay  with  the  Ministry  of  Education  or  the 
Committee  on  Higher  Education,  10  Dec.  1963. 
153  J  Carswell,  Government  and  the  universities  in  Britain,  p.  3  1. 
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155  PRO,  ED  46/504,  Note  of  a  discussion  with  representatives  of  the  F.  B.  I.  on  sandwich  training  and 
education,  3  Feb.  1955. 
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180 local  education  authorities.  "'  The  Ministry  rejected  the  FBI's  argument,  but  was 
forced  to  accept  a  compromise  when  the  Federation  announced  that  industry  would 
only  be  recruiting  those  students  who  had  already  completed  their  studies. 
Subsequent  talks  produced  an  arrangement  wher&  the,  FBI  would  encourage  firms  to 
support  employers  on  sandwich  courses  if  they  could  afford  to  do  so  while  the 
Ministry  would  recommend  that  local  education  authorities  should  provide 
maintenance  to  sandwich  course  students  who  did  not  receive  financial  support  form 
their  employers.  "' 
Conclusion 
In  spite  of  repeated  expenditure  cuts  in  education,  the  sum  of  development  in  the 
provision  of  state  education  by  the  end  of  1964  conjures  up  a  strong  impression  of 
real  progress,  particularly  after  1956.  The  main  points  of  contention  between  Labour 
and  Conservatives  concerned  comprehensive  schools  and  private  education,  but  these 
were  not  so  important  for  the  representatives  of  industry  or  labour.  While  the  TUC 
did  adopt  the  policy  of  comprehensive  schools,  it  did  so  only  slowly  and  was  not 
openly  supportive  before  the  1960s.  A  number  of  other  issues  were  regarded  more 
sc-riously  and  merited  a  great  deal  more  attention.  Often  these  caused  disagreement 
between  organisations  themselves  and  with  the  government.  Nonetheless,  unlike 
other  aspects  of  the  welfare  state,  a  degree  of  consensus  did  exist  by  the  end  of  this 
period.  The  TUC's  constant  demands  for  a  school  leaving  age  of  sixteen  now  had  the 
157  MRC,  MSS.  200/B/3/2/C966  pt.  5,  Appendix  to  Paper  D/160  (FBI)  -  Finance  for  Professional 
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181 endorsement  of  the  BEC,  and  also  the  FBI,  albeit  only  as  a  voluntary  initiative. 
County  colleges  were  still  resisted  by  the  industrial  organisations,  but  plans  for  the 
expansion  of  day  release  were  formulated  in  a  tripartite  forum.  At  the  same  time,  the 
reasons  behind  their  interest  in  education  remained  very  different.  The  TUC's  interest 
stemmed  from  a  desire  to  ensure  adequate  provision  for  the  population  as  a  whole  for 
the  benefit  of  each  person's  own  well-being.  Both  the  Bk'  ,  and  FBI  were  clearly 
motivated  by  how  industry  could  benefit  from  the  state  education  system,  and  perhaps 
with  wider  concerns  about  economic  and  industrial  performance. 
Both  the  BEC  and  FBI  sought  to  develop  links  between  industry  and  education, 
and  expressed  the  view  that  this  was  a  desirable  objective.  Both  considered  at  length 
the  benefits  of  staff  exchanges,  although  they  avoided  making  a  firm  commitment  to 
the  widespread  adoption  of  this  policy  measure.  Lobbying  of  government  ministers 
was  generally  the  province  of  the  TUC,  and  was  even  regarded  by  the  FBI  as 
inappropriate  behaviour.  The  TUC  sent  deputations  and  wrote  to  Ministers  of 
Education  regularly.  Access  was  readily  granted  and  communications  were  always 
acknowledged  but  there  is  little  evidence  that  these  approaches  had  much  impact. 
Ministers  seem  to  have  paid  little  attention  to  the  TUC's  complaints,  especially  when 
these  concerned  government  spending. 
The  TUC's  lack  of  success  in  influencing  goverment  policy  and  the  FBI's  lack  of 
interest  in  securing  consultation  with  ministers  lends  little  support  to  the  concept  of 
'corporate  bias'.  Of  more  interest  in  connection  with  education  policy  is  the  role  of 
government  committees  and  enquiries.  Through  the  Central  Advisory  Council  for 
Education  (England),  Conservative  governments  encouraged  a  debate  about  the 
182 direction  of  education  policy  with  frequent  investigations,  the  outcome  of  which  was 
generally  accepted  by  the  goverrunent.  Representatives  of  industry  and  labour 
submitted  evidence  to  these  enquiries  on  a  regular  basis. 
- 
While  the  impact  of  these 
groups  is  difficult  to  assess,  the  enquiries  provided  an  invaluable  opportunity  in 
allowing  these  bodies  to  express  their,  views  in  an  environment  conducive  to  reform. 
Their  representation  on  government  committee  may  itself  have  been  a  product  of 
'corporate  bias'  but,  once  again,  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  the  peak  level 
representatives  of  capital  and  labour  were  elevated  to  the  status  of  'governing  bodies' 
in  the  process. 
183 Chapter  Six:  Conclusions 
In  the  course  of  this  thesis,  we  have  surveyed  in  some  detail  the  attitudes  of  the  TUC, 
BEC  and  FBI  towards  wartime  social  reconstruction  and  their  responses  to  the 
postwar  welfare  state.  This  now  permits  us  to  draw  some  conclusions  about  the 
governments"  relations  with  these  groups  in  a  hitherto  neglected  area  of  policy,  to 
examine  the  implications  of  their  participation  in  policy-making,  and  to  explore  their 
views  on  state  welfare  in  connection  with  the  concept  of  a  welfare  consensus.  The 
thesis  has  sought  to  identify  the  existence  of  a  welfare  consensus  among  these  interest 
groups  on  the  premise  that  some  adherents  of  the  consensus  thesis  have  considered 
consultation  of  them  to  be  of  significant  importance  during  this  period.  ' 
Keith  Middlemas'  work  remains  the  most  thorough  analysis  of  state-interest 
groups  relations  in  terms  of  its  substantial  empirical  element.  2  Like  other  corporatist 
theorists,  Middlemas  has  looked  only  at  industrial  and  economic  policy  in  any  great 
detail.  The  application  of  his  theory  of  corporate  bias  to  social  policy  thus  tests  its 
validity  in  relation  to  areas  of  policy  that  have  been  traditionally  of  -less  interest  to 
corporate  theorists.  It  also  holds  the  potential  to  explain  government  consultation  of 
primarily  industrial  interest  groups  on  social  policy  issues.  Ultimately  only  a  tentative 
case  can  be  made  for  the  existence  of  corporate  bias.  It  is  difficult  to  distinguish  a 
pattern  that  encapsulates  government  attitudes  towards  consultation  in  all  aspects  of 
state  welfare.  Indeed  this  presumes  state  welfare  to  be  characterised  by  a  single, 
uniform  set  of  values  unaffected  by  political  party,  time  or  other  external  influences. 
1P  Addison,  'The  road  from  1945';  D  Kavanagh  &P  Morris,  Consensus  politics.  2K  Middlemas,  Politics  in  industrial  society  and  Power,  competition  and  the  state,  vols.  I  and  11. 
184 Certainly,  there  was  a  great  deal  of  communication  between  governments  and  the 
TUC,  BEC  and  FBI  during  this  period,  bearing  in  mind  the  limited  nature  of  the  FBI's 
interest.  In  some  respects  this  reflects  the  existence  of  corporate  bias  where  'fruitfid 
access  to  government'  stemmed  from  acknowledgement  of  these  groups'  status  in 
postwar  Britain  rather  than  their  capacity  to  contribute  significantly  to  the  content  of 
policies.  3  There  were  elements  of  this  in  some  consultation  by  government, 
appointments  to  committees  and  working  parties,  and  in  the  willingness,  of 
government  ministers  to  meet  with  these  groups  upon  request  but  it  was  not  always  in 
evidence. 
The  TUC  in  particular  benefited  from  access  to  government,  and  continued  to  use 
deputations  on  a  regular  basis  to  gain  knowledge  of  the  govenunent's  plans  and  to 
influence  policy  in  accordance  with  its  own  views.  Ministers  in  Pensions  and  Social 
Security,  Health  and  Education  all  met  with  TUC  representatives  at  intervals,  and 
only  seldom  rejected  its  requests  for  consultation.  The  BEC  approached  government 
less  often,  while  the  Federation  of  British  Industries  disliked  this  practice  and 
considered  it  to  be  inappropriate  behaviour.  4  The  BEC  and  FBI  also  chose  not  to  be 
involved  in  health  policy  in  any  way  outside  of  the  industrial  health  services,  so  did 
riot  take  advantage  of  access  to  the  Ministry  of  Health.  The  government  also 
instigated  consultation,  though  less  frequently.  This  was  more  the  case  with  regard  to 
social  security  and  education  than  health.  It  often  reflected  government  requirements 
for  advice,  support  and  assistance,  evident  in  the  preparation  of  the  1952  National 
Insurance  and  Family  Allowances  Act,  earnings-related  retirement  pensions  and 
3K  Middlemas,  Power,  competition  and  the  state,  voL  I,  p.  344. 
4S  Blank,  Industry  and  government,  p.  77. 
185 unemployment  and  sickness  benefit,  the  financial  arrangements  for  sandwich  courses, 
and  provision  for  the  expansion  of  day  release  for  young  workers. 
Direct  contact  with  government  ministers  allowed  policy  to  be  made  with 
knowledge  of  the  views  of  these  interests,  but  membership  of,  and  the  opportunity  to 
submit  evidence  to,  committees  investigating  particular  aspects  of  social  policy 
provided  an  invaluable  prospect  of  influencing  policies  which  were  already  under 
review.  The  war  itself  created  such  an  environment  across  the  range  of  welfare 
policies,  but  after  1945  government  gained  more  control  of  the  reform  process.  For 
this  purpose,  advisory  bodies  were  set  up  for  social  security  and  pensions,  health  and 
education.  These  were  complemented  by  a  number  of  ad  hoc  committees  and 
working  parties  in  different  sectors.  Govenunent  policy  on  industrial  representation 
on  advisory  committees  was  at  times  inconsistent.  Participation  on  the  National 
Insurance  Advisory  Committee  was  countered  by  exclusion  from  the  Central  Health 
Services  Council.  Opportunities  did  always  exist,  however,  for  these  groups  to 
submit  evidence  which  in  itself  offered  regular  opportunities  to  influence  the  direction 
of  policy. 
Both  the  TUC  and  BEC  were  represented  on  the  National  Insurance  Advisory 
Committee,  which  was  responsible  for'formulating  social  security  regulations.  The 
TUC  was  firmly  refused  representation  on  the  Central  Health  Services  Council,  which 
provoked  some  consternation.  Bevan's  reasoning  behind  his  rejection  of  TUC  claims 
for  an  appointment  to  the  CHSC  reflected  the  specialised  medical  role  of  the  Council. 
Thus,  TUC  nominations  to  Regional  Hospital  Boards  were  for  the  purpose  of 
representing  the  viewpoint  of  NHS  patients  rather  than  the  trade  union  movement. 
186 This  signif  ied  a  new  role  for  the  TUC,  reaching  beyond  its  remit  as  a  purely  sectional 
producer  organisation.  In  education,  the  Central  Advisory  Council  for  Education 
(England)  was  reconstituted  for  each  of  its  enquiries;  only  the  1957  Crowther 
Committee  on  the  education  of  fifteen  to  eighteen  year  olds  included  TUC 
representation.  Curiously,  the  TUC  did  not  pursue  greater  participation  even  though 
exclusion  from  the  Health  Services  Council  had  met  with  bad  grace.  Besides  the 
advisory  councils,  independent  committees  and  working  parties  offered  ftirther  scope 
to  influence  government  policy.  During  this  period,  these  included  the  Percy 
Committee  on  Higher  Technological  Education,  the  -Phillips  Committee  on  pensions, 
the  Guillebaud  Committee  on  the  NHS,  the  Robbins  Committee  on  Higher  Education, 
and  a  number  of  working  parties  in  the  field  of  education.  The  TUC  and  BEC,  and  at 
times  the  FBI,  were  involved  both  as  members  and  in  providing  evidence  to  various 
enquiries  and  investigations. 
Contact  with  government  ministers  and  appointments  to  government  committees 
may  reflect  the  existence  of  corporate  bias,  but  access  was  not  always  tantamount  to 
influence.  Moreover,  the  BEC  and  FBI  were  often  unwilling  to  take  advantage  of 
access  thus  rendering  corporate  bias  irrelevant  in  these  circumstances.  The 
participation  of  the  British  Employers'  Confederation  in  policy-making  was  not 
merely  dependent  on  government  sanction;  it  also  had  to  reflect  the  BEC's  desire  to 
be  involved.  This  was  not  always  evident:  the  Confederation  ignored  developments 
in  social  security  policy  once  the  Conservative  government  had  been  forced  to 
endorse  the  Beveridge  Report  in  spite  of  fierce  early  opposition  to  its  proposals. 
Corporate  bias  may  have  permitted  the  BEC  to  take  part  in  the  formulation  of  health 
policy  but  its  lack  of  direct  interest  in  the  NHS  resulted  in  its  exclusion  from  policy 
187 discussions.  Similarly,  the  FBI's  views  would  not  have  been  unwelcome,  but  the 
Federation  eschewed  the  practice  of  approaching  governments  to  apply  pressure  to 
implement  its  policy.  5  This,  was  exemplified  by  its  attitude  towards  university 
awards:  in  spite  of  its  dissatisfaction  with  the  existing  system,  the  FBI  Education 
Committee  believed  that  it  would  be  unacceptable  to  approach  government  to  discuss 
this  matter. 
Even  if  corporate  bias  was  in  evidence  in  the  practice  of  consultation,  its 
significance  is diminished  if  the  resulting  consultation  and  participation  did  not  allow 
interest  groups  a  measure  of  influence  over  the  direction  of  government  policy.  The 
evidence  is  often  to  the  contrary.  Barberis  and  May  have  observed  that  'access  has 
never  been  any  guarantee  that  influence  will  be  exerted  on  goverment  poliCy,  ).  6 
Certainly,  there  are  few  signs  that  they  did  actively  affect  policy.  The  TUC  failed  in 
its  campaigns  for  subsistence  benefits,  the  abolition  of  health  service  charges,  and  to 
secure  an  increase  in  the  school  leaving  age  during  this  period.  Similarly,  from  an 
opposite  point  of  view,  the  BEC  was  unable  to  prevent  plans  for  postwar  reform  of 
social  security  and  the  raising  of  the  leaving  age  to  fifteen.  At  times,  influence  was 
exercised  negatively:  the  TUC's  attitude  prevented  governments  from  increasing  the 
age  of  retirement,  while  the  BEC  managed  to  prevent  arrangements  for  making 
occupational  pensions  transferable  in  the  1950s.  This  role  is  suggestive  of  Addison's 
labelling  of  these  organisations;  as  'veto  groups'  than  'architects  of  policy'.  7  In  some 
senses  he  is  correct,  but  this  concept  still  conjures  up  the  image  of  passive  groups 
which  were  not  actively  involved  in  the  social  policy  sphere.  It  may  fit  the  BEC 
5  Ibid. 
6P  Barberis  &T  May,  Government,  industry  andpolitical  economy,  p.  97. 
7P  Addison,  'Tle  road  from  1945',  p.  I  S. 
188 better  than  the  TUC,  which  spent  the  whole  of  this  period  seeking  improvements  in 
state  welfare.  Perhaps  then,  it  is  Andrew  Taylor's  concept  of  'inclusion'  in  his 
discussion  of  the  trade  unions  that  seems  to  be  most  apposite  to  both  labour  and 
industrial  interests.  Here  'unions  achieve  a  representational  status,  are  consulted 
frequently  by  government  but  are  excluded  from  effective  decision-making'.  8 
It  must  be  bome  in  mind  these  groups  often  displayed  views  that  contradicted  each 
other.  Beer  points  out  that  if  the  government  had  tried  to  meet  the  demands  of  the 
TUC  in  relation  to  welfare,  it  would  have  been  unlikely  to  secure  the  consent  of 
business  when  trying  to  create  the  necessary  conditions  for  wage  restraint.  9 
Combining  this  with  the  influence  of  other  groups  such  -as  the  British  Medical 
Association,  it  becomes  difficult  to  attribute  direct  influence  to  any  single 
organisation.  Other  factors  determining  policy  include  public  opinion  which  was  a 
key  factor  in  secondary  education  reforms  in  the  late  1950s,  electoral  considerations, 
and  the  economic-  climate.  During  much  of  this  period,  expenditure  considerations 
predominated  in  social  policy  decisions,  which  made  many  of  the  TUC's  demands 
untenable.  10  Equally,  BEC  anti-welfare  state  sentiment  had  to  be  contained  in  view  of 
the  popularity  of  government  welfare  measures. 
Conservatism  on  the  part  of  these  organisations  also  impeded  their  ability  to  affect 
reform.  The  BEC's  formidable  reluctance  to  accept  any  measure  of  social  policy 
reform  during  the  war  prevented  it  from  influencing  the  direction  it  took,  although  its 
views  were  so  negative  that  their  acceptability  was  unlikely.  The  TUC  accepted  the 
1A  Taylor,  Trade  unions  andpolitics,  p.  97. 
9S  Beer,  British  politics  in  the  collectivist  age,  p.  3  67. 
10  J  Cronin,  The  politics  ofstate  expansion,  p.  5. 
189 Beveridge  model  of  social  security  so  resolutely  that  neither  it  nor  the  BEC  were  able 
to  make  a  positive  contribution  towards  the  debate  on  pensions  in  the  1950s.  The 
TUC  was  also  reluctant  to  accept  eamings-relation  in  either  pensions  or other  national 
insurance  benefits  for  the  same  reasons..  This  tendency  was  also  apparent  also  in 
other  areas:  TUC  preoccupation  with  health  service  charges  prevented  it  from 
recognising  more  fundamental  sources  of  inequality  in  health  care.  In  education,  the 
BEC  only  slowly  sought  to  establish  links  with  schools  and  the  TUC  only  seems  to 
have  recognised  the  divisive  nature  of  schooling  with  the  results  of  outside  research 
and  growing  public  dissatisfaction. 
Direct  influence  may  be  difficult  to  detect  but  these  groups  were  substantially 
involved  in  the  social  policy  sphere,  and  formulated  detailed  policy  documents 
accordingly;  the  TUC  was  particularly  rigorous  in  its  research.  Such  documents  and 
communication  with  the  government  provide  a  valuable  insight  into  their  attitudes 
towards  state  welfare,  which  permits  us  to  assess  existence,  or  otherwise,  of  a 
producer-based  consensus  that  encompassed  the  welfare  state. 
The  TUC  was,  without  doubt,  a  strong  supporter  of  state  welfare.  This  is  evident 
from  wartime  campaigns  for  reconstruction,  and  its  welcome  of  government 
initiatives  in  social  policy.  The  Trades  Union  Congress  had  been  lobbying 
governments  for  social  security  and  health  reforms,  and  improvements  to  the  state 
education  system  before  the  war.  It  eagerly  grasped  the  opportunities  offered  by  the 
war  to  express  widely  its  views  in  support  of  extensive  social  reform.  Indeed,  it  was 
the  TUC  that  inadvertently  stimulated  the  range  of  plans  for  postwar  reform  when  the 
government  appointed  the  Beveridge  Committee  in  order  to,  placate  the  unions. 
190 During  the  %&-ar,  the  TUC  prepared  detailed  policy  documents,  organised  campaigns  to 
secure  public  support  for  welfare  reforms,  and  met  with  government  ministers  to  urge 
them  to  proceed  with  reforms  in  line  with  TUC  policy.  It  adopted  the  Beveridge 
Report  as  its  model  for  social  security  and  pensions  provision,  and  supported  the 
promise  of  secondary  education  for  all,  and  universal,  free  health  services. 
The  potential  support  that  this  lends  to  a  consensual  picture  disappears  upon  closer 
inspection,  however.  In  spite  of  this  obvious  desire  for  social  reforms,  the  TUC  did 
not  necessarily  support  all  aspects  of  government  policy.  Various  proposals  contained 
in  the  Beveridge  Report,  the  White  Papers  on  social  insurance  and  health  and  the 
1944  Education  Act  attracted  TUC  criticism.  These  included  the  incorporation  of 
workmen's  compensation  into  national  insurance,  the  transitional  period  for  the 
introduction  of  retirement  pensions,  the  maintenance  of  the  voluntary  hospitals,  and 
the  government's  failure  to  make  a  firm  commitment  to  raising  the  school  leaving 
age.  But  more  fandamentallY9  the  TUC  believed  that  the  Coalition's  programme  for 
social  reform  was  lacking  in  precision,  did  not  go  far  enough,  and  was  particularly 
dissatisfactory  in  respect  of  its  timetable.  These  reservations  set  the  stage  for  the 
TUC's  campaign  in  all  aspects  of  government  welfare  in  the  postwar  years.  While 
welcoming  developments  thus  far,  the  TUC  was  certainly  not  satisfied  with  the 
progress  that  was  made  during  the  war. 
If  closer  examination  of  TUC  policy  is  necessary  to  detect  only  qualified  support 
of  government  policy,  a  mere  glance  at  BEC  documents  for  this  period  instantly 
reveals  its  deep-seated  aversion  to  the  very  principle  of  social  reform.  If  the  war  did 
represent  a  watershed  in  attitudes  towards  social  reform,  it  omitted  the  BEC,  whose 
191 earlier  antagonism  towards  government  welfare  in  the  interwar  period  was  sustained. 
'Me  sole  effect  of  the  increasing  popularity  of  social  reform  on  the  BEC  was  to  cause 
intense  irritation  that  its  views  were  so  out  of  step  with  the  public  mood  to  the  extent 
that  they  had  to  be  contained.  Historians  have  tended  to  focus  on  the  views  of  the 
National  Policy  for  Industry  group  in  an  attempt  to  sustain  the  impression  of  social 
reform  as  an  uncontested  objective,  and  to  lend  support  to  the  consensus  thesis.  It  is 
hoped  that  the  BECs  much  more  negative  views  will  now  be  given  due  consideration. 
Tle  Confederation  may  not  have  been  particularly  representative  of  British  industry 
but  it,  %-as  the  only  industrial  organisation  to  make  representations  to  government,  and 
to  be  consulted  on  questions  pertaining  to  social  policy  after  the  war  had  ended.  In 
this  respect,  its  views  had  the  capacity  to  be  more  influential  in  the  long  term. 
TUC  and  BEC  social  policies  were  clearly  in  conflict  at  the  end  of  the  war,  and  the 
early  postwar  period  characterised  by  economic  problems  after  1947  was  not 
conducive  to  change.  The  TUC  welcomed  the  Attlee  government's  programme  for 
social  reform,  and  of  its  underlying  principles:  egalitarianism,  universality  and 
comprehensiveness.  Still,  even  a  Labour  government  precipitated  complaints  after 
refusing  to  pay  social  security  benefits  for  an  unlimited  duration,  failing  to  introduce 
h,  mlth  centres,  and  procrastinating  over  the  raising  of  the  school  leaving  age. 
Impatience  with  goverrunent  policy  grew  at  annual  congresses  but  a  superficial 
consensus  prevailed  owing  only  to  the  TUC's  reluctance  to  criticise  overtly  the 
Labour  government's  policies.  Jim  Tomlinson  has  recently  highlighted  the  austerity 
that  chamcterised  Labour's  welfare  state,  which  contrasts  with  prevailing  images  of 
extensive  and  radical  reform.  "  In  the  1940s,  the  TUC  was  aware  of  financial 
11  J  Tomlinson,  'Why  so  austere?  The  British  welfare  state  of  the  1940s',  p.  63. 
192 stringency  in  social  policy  but  was  reluctant  to  draw  attention  to  it.  The  ldck  of 
substance  in  this  consensus  would  be  revealed  immediately  when  the  Conservatives 
won  the  1951  election. 
Once  more  this  rather  tentative  consensus  is  finther  undermined  when  the  BEC's 
views  are  taken  into  account.  'Me  Confederation  was  even  less  enamoured  of 
government  social  policy  in  the  early  postwar  years.  Its  wartime  reluctance  to  speak 
out  on  the  subject  ended  in  1947  when,  owing  to  the  economic  situation,  it  asked  the 
government  to  cancel  the  implementation  of  social  security  and  health  reforms,  and  to 
postpone  the  raising  of  the  school  leaving  age  to  which  it  was  opposed  in  principle. 
In  its  dealings  with  the  National  Insurance  Advisory  Committee,  the  BEC  also  sought 
to  increase  restrictions  in  the  national  insurance  scheme  in  order  to  reduce  entitlement 
to  benefits,  prevent  abuse,  and  minimise  its  cost. 
This  mood  continued  to  characterise  the  BEC's  perspective  on  social  policy 
throughout  the  1950s  while  the  TUC,  having  lost  the  need  to  support  the  goverrunent, 
irrespective  of  its  actions,  became  much  more  critical.  Accordingly,  signs  of 
consensus  were  disappearing  rapidly.  In  particular,  government  spending,  or  the  lack 
ol"  it,  was  the  greatest  source  of  TUC  discontent  with  all  aspects  of  state  welfare. 
Tbis,  in  turn,  undermined  many  projects  to  which  the  unions  attached  great 
importance.  Government  refusal  to  increase  the  Exchequer's  contribution  to  the 
national  insurance  ftmd  was  seen  to  prevent  the  maintenance  of  national  insurance 
benefits  and  pensions  at  a  subsistence  level,  a  concept  which  had  been  scarcely 
implemented  before  increases  in  the  cost  of  living  rendered  it  redundant.  Neither  did 
the  Conservatives  introduce  health  centres,  while  adding  insult  to  injury  by  regularly 
193 increasing  NHS  charges  and  the  NES  element  in  the  national  insurance  contribution. 
The  fact  that  the  Labour  government  had  introduced  charges  was  of  little  import  as 
these  had  been  considered  a  temporary  expedient  under  Labour.  The  school  building 
programme  %-as  a  further  source  of  concern  after  1951,  though  it  had  also  incited 
complaints  beforehand.  Once  more,  inadequate  government  spending  was  seen  to  be 
the  cause  of  overcrowded  classes,  poor  standards  of  accommodation  and  a  shortage  of 
teachers,  which  threatened  to  undermine  the  concept  of  free  secondary  education  for 
all. 
While  the  TUC  was  fi-ustrated  at  the  government's  lack  of  development  in  the 
social  services,  the  BEC  was  taking  quite  the  opposite  tack.  TUC  policies  reflected 
Beveridgian  principles  of  equality  and  social  justice,  but  the  BEC  was  motivated  only 
by  self-interest  and  a  desire  to  contain  the  scope  of  state"welfare  as  much  as  it  could. 
Economic  objectives  rather  than  social  concerns  represented  the  only  justification  for 
any  expansion  or  reform  of  state  welfare.  These  sentiments  were  expressed  in 
meetings  with  the  Minister  of  National  Insurance  in  which  the  BEC  urged  the 
expansion  of  means-tested  national  assistance  instead  of  offering  subsistence  benefits 
under  the  national  insurance  scheme.  In  its  evidence  to  the  Phillips  Committee,  the 
BEC  expressed  its  distaste  for  the  effects  of  state  welfare  in  creating  a  population  that 
was  excessively  dependent  upon  the  government,  and  deplored  the  principle  of 
subsistence  benefits.  The  Confederation  used  the  National  Insurance  Advisory 
Committee  to  oppose  regulations,  which  would  improve  the  national  insurance 
scheme  from  the  perspective  of  its  beneficiaries,  unless  these  also  served  the  interests 
of  employers.  Thus,  it  opposed  more  restrictive  conditions  on  unemployment  benefit 
for  short-time  workers  as  they  would  create  pressure  on  employers  to  organise 
194 working  patterns  to  permit  maximum  entitlement  to  unemployment  benefit.  In  1963, 
the  BEC  made  its  feelings  on  state  social  security  quite  clear:  in  discussions  with  the 
government  and  the  TUC  on  the  introduction  of  earnings-related  unemployment  and 
sickness  benefit,  the  BEC  refused  to  consider  the  social  advantages  of  this  provision, 
and  insisted  the  proposals  must  be  judged  in  terms  of  their  economic  benefits  only. 
It  was  only  in  education  that  significant  changes  in  the  BEC's  attitude  took  place 
during  this  period.  Before  1959,  it  was  typically  antagonistic  to  measures  of 
expansion  in  state  education  that  did  not  offer  direct  benefits  to  industry.  Even  when 
advantages  were  obvious,  it  was  very  ambivalent  towards  further  education  for  young 
people  during  working  hours,  and  lent  only  qualified  support  for  the  expansion  of  day 
release  on  the  grounds  that  employers  might  find  it  too  costly,  and  that  workers  might 
choose  courses  from  which  their  employers  would  derive  no  tangible  benefit.  The 
prospect  of  a  school  leaving  age  of  sixteen  was  particularly  bitterly  resisted  by  the 
BEC,  and  the  FBI  would  support  only  a  voluntary  policy  for  the  extension  of 
compulsory  schooling.  After  1959,  BEC  attitudes  towards  education  became  much 
more  positive,  for  reasons  that  are  not  clear.  It  accepted  the  Crowther  Report's 
proposal  for  full-time  education  to  the  age  of  sixteen  and  it  was  more  favourable  to 
the  expansion  of  day  release  than  the  FBI.  Prevarication  over  the  practicalities  of 
staff  exchange  schemes  with  educational  establishments  ended  as  the  BEC  launched 
its  own  pilot  scheme.  This  much  more  interventionist  stance  can  be  detected  in 
relation  to  education  only,  and  contrasts  significantly  with  its  opposition  to 
improvements  to  the  national  insurance  scheme.  Hence,  it  is  unwise  to  conflate 
different  sectors  of  welfare  in  the  search  for  a  wider  consensus. 
195 Education  policy  witnessed  growing  compatibility  of  industrial  and  labour  views, 
but  in  other  spheres  they  continued  to  be  directly  opposed  to  each  other.  Furthen-nore, 
the  motives  that  underpinned  their  respective  interest  in  social  policy  also  remained 
very  different.  Although  labour  market  considerations  affected  the  TUCs  capacity  to 
campaign  for  better  retirement  pensions,  its  social  policies  were  generally  informed 
by  humane  and  social  concerns.  These  were  seldom  evident  in  the  policies  of  either 
the  BEC  or  the  FBI,  which  continued  to  be  motivated  by  economic  and  industrial 
interests  only,  and  did  not  appear  to  recognise  or  accept  the  social  objectives  of  state 
welfare  during  this  period.  For  each  of  these  groups,  the  welfare  state  was  understood 
in  no  broader  context  than  as  a  range  of  social  services,  which  they  studied  in 
isolation  from  each  other.  The  TUC  at  least  understood  and  endorsed  its  wider  goals 
-  of  equality  and  social  justice  -  but  these  were  rejected  outright  by  the  industrial 
organisations.  Nowhere  was  this  more  clearly  expressed  than  in  the  BEC's 
contributions  to  the  discussions  on  earnings-related  national  insurance.  Therefore,  the 
supposed  welfare  consensus  can  scarcely  claim  to  have  included  either  organised 
industry  or  organised  labour  either  during  the  war  or  after. 
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